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CHAPTER 1
Inequality and House Prices
This paper studies the interaction between inequality and house prices
using an incomplete market model with heterogeneous households. The
model links cross-sectional household portfolio saving decisions to hous-
ing market outcomes, and it can account for the positive empirical re-
lationship between growth in inequality and changes in house prices. It
also illustrates a new house price formation mechanism in which an in-
vestment motive among the wealthy plays a key role. A quantitative ap-
plication of the theory rationalizes the recent substantial housing boom
accompanied by rising household saving rates in China. The theory in
this paper shows that market frictions can have a differential impact
cross-sectionally, increasing inequality. Inequality can in turn amplify
frictions in the market.
1.1 Introduction
In the past several decades, many countries have seen rising trends in both in-
equality1 (exemplified by the top income share series documented in Atkinson et al.
(2011)) and house prices (see Knoll et al. (2014)). Each of these phenomena has
drawn attention from policy makers and researchers alike. This paper argues that
1Inequality has many dimensions. This paper mostly looks at the dimensions over income and
wealth. Moreover, because of the lack of administrative data on wealth, cross-sectionally comparable
wealth data are limited. Therefore, inequality measures in most of the empirical analyses of this
paper are along the income dimension similar as in Atkinson et al. (2011). However, wealth inequality
and income inequality are closely related, at least to certain degrees of aggregation (see Saez and
Zucman (2014)).
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rising inequality accompanied by rising house prices is not a coincidence, and identi-
fies a two-way causality mechanism where income inequality and house price run-ups
feed on each other.
Figure 1.1.1: Top income share growth and house price appreciation
(a) Cross-country (b) China
Notes:
1.For each observation in Panel (a), the average growth rates are obtained by averaging the yearly
growth rates over the entire sample periods. In Panel (a), cross-country (real) house price indexes are
taken from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’s International House Price Database as described
in Mack and Mart´ınez-Garc´ıa (2011); cross-country top 5% income shares are taken from Alvaredo
et al. (2015) (income excludes capital gains). Appendix 1.A contains more details about data
source, variable construction, robustness check, and other related empirical analysis (in particular,
an analysis of the cross-state data in the United States).
2. All the income inequality measures in Panel (b) are calculated by author from Chinese Household
Income Project (CHIP) 2002, 2007 (n.d.) and China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) 2010, 2012
(n.d.). Both CHIP and CFPS are large-scale national household surveys, which are arguably the
best available data sources on household income and financial assets in China. Appendix 1.C.2 has
more descriptions of the two data sets. The price-over-income ratio is the data trend of housing
price over per capita income. The construction of the income inequality measures and the price-
over-income ratio is explained in more detail in Appendix 1.C.3.
Cross country correlation of income inequality change and house price growth
is strongly positive, as shown in Panel (a) of Figure 1.1.1.2This correlation is also
shown to be robust at the cross-state level in the United States (see Appendix 1.A
2This paper uses the top 5 percent income share as the income inequality measure. Although there
is no natural division between high-income households and low-income households in an economy, the
top 5 percent are often considered as high-income households in the literature that studies the cross-
sectional heterogeneity in household consumption and saving behavior, see Kumhof et al. (2015)
for example. This division also fits the purpose of this study since the top 5 percent households
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for a detailed analysis). Moreover, Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.1 provides the time series
from China illustrating this pattern: house price growth far outpaced income growth
(red line) during the recent period of rising income inequality.
In this paper, I first lay out a mechanism that might rationalize the positive corre-
lation between income inequality and house price shown in Panel (a) of Figure 1.1.1.
The mechanism is then embedded in a heterogeneous agent incomplete markets frame-
work in the style of Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) augmented with endogenous
rent-or-own decision and dynamic portfolio choice. The model features endogenous
house prices, rents and wealth distribution. I apply the model to account for the
dynamics of house prices in China in Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.1 . The quantitative
exercise also provides an explanation for the rising Chinese household saving rate.
The basic intuition motivates the mechanisms in the paper is that housing is
not only a consumption durable but also an investment asset. What’s more, as an
investment asset, housing has an access barrier that naturally favors the wealthy,
especially when there is a tight borrowing constraint. Therefore, wealthy households
can act faster in the housing market and tend to own more investment houses: housing
demand and thus its price will depend positively on inequality.
To put the intuition into work, I first set up a simple equilibrium model with
income heterogeneity and a frictional housing market. Households in the model con-
sume goods and housing services, and can save in either liquid bonds or housing.
Since a homeowner is assumed to gain no direct utility from housing ownership and is
allowed to rent out any amount of housing services at no cost, household’s rent-to-own
decision is linked to its portfolio choice. Moreover, due to frictions in the housing
ownership market3, the adjustment in housing assets is both large and infrequent,
which I refer to as lumpy. The lumpiness induces a financial rate of return premium
of housing over bonds. In the end, housing is essentially a lumpy financial asset with
a return premium to households.
To see how equilibrium housing price depends on inequality, it’s informative to
look at cross-sectional household portfolio saving decision in the presence of a lumpy
housing asset. In particular, housing demand from wealthy households is responsive
to changes in individual and market conditions since housing adjustment costs mat-
ter less as households get wealthier. Housing demand from the poor, however, is
rigid because their housing investment is constrained (or close to constrained) by the
are likely to be wealthy enough to buy houses for investment purposes. Analyzing the investment
motive in housing is the focus of this paper.
3There are several frictions in adjusting the housing asset, with fixed adjustment cost as the main
one.
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lumpiness. As a result, the aggregate demand and aggregate price of housing respond
positively to a rise in inequality (a shift of resources from the irresponsive poor to the
responsive wealthy increases housing demand).
The basic model illustrates the mechanism that make the equilibrium housing price
positively respond to inequality. To quantitatively evaluate how much the mechanism
can account for housing market dynamics in a realistic setting, I introduce hetero-
geneous dynastic households facing uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks to the
basic model to study the recent housing boom in China. I analyze a non-stationary
equilibrium where the model predicts the evolution of the wealth distribution as well
as the equilibrium house price trajectory. I first parameterize the model to match
important dimensions of aggregate and cross-sectional data of the Chinese economy
before 2002. I then feed in changes in both aggregate income and income inequality
from 2002 to 2012 taken from the data to the calibrated model and solve for the
perfect foresight transition path equilibrium. The model is shown to reproduce the
observed housing price run-up mainly through an endogenous feedback loop between
house prices and wealth inequality. This feedback loop causes house prices to re-
spond strongly to changes in fundamentals. The mechanism is, again, based on the
differential responsiveness in cross-sectional housing demand.
The feedback mechanism is initiated by expected income growth, which will ul-
timately lead to house price appreciation. Due to potential capital gains, a period
of high premium in housing is thus anticipated among households. In response, the
most responsive wealthy households stock up on housing wealth initially, causing a
surge in house prices. Due to the skewed housing wealth distribution, the price surge
causes a higher dispersion in capital income and thus higher wealth inequality fol-
lows. Higher wealth inequality, in turn, helps sustain the growth in house prices.
This is because, while housing demand from wealthy households saturates, demand
from households with modest wealth starts to pick up after a short delay. Even with
a high premium, transaction frictions and liquidity constraints still limit less-wealthy
households’ response in the housing market. Accordingly, the inequality gap between
wealthy housing investors and the rest continues to widen as house prices keep creep-
ing up. This creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop between house price and wealth
inequality. In the end, persistent episodes of faster-than-income housing price appre-
ciation is rationalized by relays of housing purchases in the cross section – market
frictions cause households taking turns to be active in the housing market: wealthy
households are the first movers and initially rising prices force the poor to delay the
housing purchase.
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Not only can the model rationalize the observed housing price run-up, it also
provides a new explanation for the recent prolonged rising aggregate personal saving
rate trajectory in China. First of all, all households initially save more rather than
spend more when facing a temporal positive income shock. This is because, for the
wealthy, the incentives to tap in the temporary higher return premium in housing
market dominates the desire to spend more. For the poor, a stronger saving motive is
dictated by the faster-than-income housing price appreciation. The high saving rate
is then sustained by the portfolio re-balancing motive. Households in the model all
desire a certain level of liquid wealth to ensure against temporary income risks. After
the initial portfolio shift toward housing wealth, while waiting for the capital gain in
housing asset to fully realize, households need to save up more liquid wealth since it
is still the better form of buffer against idiosyncratic income shocks (housing asset is
too expensive to adjust frequently).
Broadly, the mechanism behind the interaction between inequality and housing
prices illustrates a new channel through which inequality and macroeconomic forces
can interact. In particular, market frictions can have a differential impact cross-
sectionally, increasing inequality. An increase in inequality can in turn amplify fric-
tions in the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses related lit-
erature. To illustrate the key mechanisms in this paper, Section 1.3 introduces a
simplified version of the model to illustrate key mechanisms. It also presents facts
about the Chinese economy to inform the model’s assumptions and provide an ev-
idence base for testing the theory. Section 1.4 calibrates the quantitative model to
the Chinese economy to study the Chinese housing boom between 2002 and 2012,
and Section 1.5 concludes. An Appendix that contains additional empirical analyses,
proofs, and numerical algorithms follows.
1.2 Related Literature
The modeling approach in this paper builds on a growing strand of literature
that tries to rationalize housing price dynamics in an incomplete-market setting with
heterogeneous households. See, for example, Kiyotaki et al. (2011), Sommer et al.
(2013), Iacoviello and Pavan (2013), and Favilukis et al. (forthcoming). The model
in this paper differs from the rest of the literature in the sense that it provides a
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new channel to relate inequality to housing market outcomes.4 This is achieved
by linking rent-or-own decision to portfolio choice. Market frictions make housing
choices lumpy, and the lumpiness in housing affects housing choices differently across
wealth groups. Thus, housing market outcomes are closely linked to cross-sectional
household portfolio saving decisions. The model highlights the investment motives of
wealthy households in driving house price dynamics.
In addition, the modeling approach of this paper also takes elements from the lit-
erature initiated by Grossman and Laroque (1990) that studies optimal consumption
problems under fixed adjustment costs. Of particular interest here are those papers
that analyze portfolio choices in the presence of housing, see, for example, Flavin and
Yamashita (2002), Fischer and Stamos (2013), and Corradin et al. (2014). In general,
this strand of literature adopts a representative agent framework and studies partial
equilibrium implications of lumpy housing for consumption and investment decisions
with exogenously specified processes for house prices. In contrast, this paper explores
the differential impact of the fixed adjustment costs on portfolio choices across wealth
groups and investigates its implications for endogenous house price formation.
There is a strand of recent literature that investigated the connection between
inequality and house price in the context of static spatial or assignment models. For
example, Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) adopt a spatial model with changes in cross-
sectional productivity differences to explain the increase in house price dispersion
across US metropolitan areas. Ma¨a¨tta¨nen and Tervio¨ (2014) and Landvoigt et al.
(2015) both use assignment models to study how the distributions of house prices
within a metro area are affected by the distribution of assorted households characters.
My modeling approach is very different from those static models. In addition, my
model features endogenous wealth distribution and the inter-temporal feedback loop.
The focus of my paper is on the dynamic interaction between aggregate house prices
and inequality.
A few papers study mechanisms whereby house prices may “overreact” to changes
in fundamental factors. Ortalo-Magn and Rady (2006) show that house prices can
overshoot when changes in income affect the number of credit-constrained owners
moving up the property ladder, while in this paper the overreaction in house prices
4Favilukis et al. (forthcoming) also point out the importance of a realistic wealth distribution
in determining housing price dynamics. However, their mechanism is very different from that of
this paper. In their paper, since housing assets cannot be a vehicle for investment (because housing
assets are non-tradable), wealth heterogeneity only serves the purpose of generating a large fraction
of housing demand from financially constrained households. This aspect of their mechanism makes
equilibrium house price sensitive to changes in financing constraints and interest rates.
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is caused by the investment motives of the unconstrained wealthy housing investors.
Kahn (2008) finds that regime-switching productivity growth trends in output can
generate house prices that are substantially more volatile than output. But the model
in Kahn (2008) abstracts from heterogeneity and financial frictions, both of which are
central for the mechanisms in this paper. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) provide a
search model to illustrate that a small number of optimistic traders can have a big
impact on house prices. This paper shows that wealthy housing investors can drive
the house price dynamics.
Finally, the quantitative exercise in this paper links the two strands of literature
that study house prices and household saving rates in China. Unlike this paper,
which tries to theoretically rationalize the fast appreciation of house prices, most
existing papers in the emerging literature that studies China’s house prices focus on
empirically explaining the high house price level in China. See Wei et al. (2012) and
Wang and Zhang (2014) for example. Garriga et al. (2014) and Chen and Wen (2014)
are two exceptions that study the growth rate of housing price theoretically. Garriga
et al. (2014) use a spatial model to explore the role of structural transformation
and the resulting rural-urban migration in the house price dynamics in urban areas
of China. However, their model forces housing demand to be determined only by
migrants moving from rural areas to cities, which does not seem to be consistent with
the excessively strong investment housing demand from existing homeowners found
in the data (Chen and Wen (2014)). Chen and Wen (2014) propose a growing-bubble
theory to explain the fast house price growth, but their basis is a general asset bubble
framework with no particular relevance to the nature of housing assets (since housing
is an intrinsically valueless asset in their baseline setup). In contrast, the theory
provided by this paper stresses the crucial role played by the lumpy nature of housing
as an investment vehicle.
China’s high and rising household saving rates have attracted a growing literature
investigating the mechanisms behind them. Many factors have been proposed as the
possible drivers of these rising saving rates, but no answer has been found conclusive
(see, for example, Modigliani and Cao (2004), Chamon and Prasad (2010), Chamon et
al. (2013), and Curtis et al. (2015), among many others). Among those factors, rising
house prices is one of the usual suspects. Under a partial equilibrium setting (where
house prices are exogenously given), Wang and Wen (2012) and Bussie`re et al. (2013)
both show that the saving rates of certain household groups can increase with house
prices, provided that certain conditions hold. However, to my best understanding,
there is no existing theory that can endogenously generate fast-growing house prices
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and rising saving rates at the same time, as this paper does. This paper provides new
intuition in understanding the seemingly puzzling persistent high household saving
rates in contemporary China.
1.3 The Basic Model
This section introduces basic elements of the model in a simplified setting. The
simple model produces the result that house prices positively depend on exogenous
inequality measures.5 The mechanisms behind the results are analytically illustrated
and intuitions for further quantitative analysis are discussed.
1.3.1 Environment
Key elements of the model setting include income heterogeneity, a frictional hous-
ing ownership market, and separable rent-to-own decisions. Under this setup, housing
becomes a lumpy financial asset that affects heterogeneous households differently. Be-
low, we describe the model environment in details.
Endowments and generational structure In this economy, time is discrete and
extends from t = 0, . . . ,∞. There are no aggregate or household-specific uncertainty.
Aggregate endowment Y is constant every period. Two types of young house-
holds are born at the beginning of each period, referred to, respectively, as high earn-
ers (with constant population share µ in each generation) and low earners (1 − µ).
Households live 2 periods and receive income only when they are young. The share of
endowment received by high earners is pi. Each generation has a constant population
mass of one half. Note that the relative endowment between the high earner and low
earner is pi(1−µ)
µ(1−pi) , which increases with both high income share pi and low population
share 1−µ. Note that pi and 1−µ are the two parameters that govern the exogenous
endowment inequality of this economy.
There is also a fixed amount of housing stock H in the economy, which produces
flow services each period. Newborn households are not endowed with any housing
assets (i.e., the older generation owns all the housing stock).
Markets and timing Households can trade the ownership of housing assets. Other
than housing, households can also invest in a one-period fully enforceable bond b,
5The distribution for non-capital income is exogenously specified in the model, while capital
income and wealth distributions are endogenously determined.
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which pays a fixed gross interest rate of 1 + r. I assume a small open economy so
that bonds are supplied by an outside intermediary with infinite supply elasticity.
Households enter a period with last period’s bond holdings b and housing assets h
(newborn households have no assets). At the beginning of the period, a household
receives its income, i.e., the output share for the young, and the returns from financial
assets for the old (the return from housing assets is the rental income earned).
Asset markets open first in order to allow the older generation to sell off assets
for consumption. Young households can buy or borrow bonds from the outside in-
termediary at the fixed price 1/(1 + r) with a collateralized constraint for borrowing.
In particular, households cannot borrow more than a fraction λh of their housing
assets. The collateralized borrowing constraint is to guarantee debt payment (default
is not allowed in the model). Households can also trade housing assets, but there is
a minimum holding size requirement in the housing asset market.6 To be specific, a
household can only hold housing stock at a quantity larger than or equal to h with
unit price P .7
After asset markets close, households consume goods and housing services (as
owners and/or renters). Unlike housing asset markets, the housing rental market is
frictionless in that households can buy any amount of services s at the market unit
price R. The model’s frictionless rental market may be a bit extreme, but it captures
the idea that a person can rent a very small shared living space that is not, however,
available for sale.8
Household preferences and the nature of housing Households have the same
individual preferences. In particular, they all receive utility from consuming output
c and housing services s. I assume the following separable flow utility function:
U(c, s) = (1− ϕ) ln c+ ϕ ln s,
6This minimum size friction here serves the purpose of generating lumpiness in the housing mar-
ket in a tractable way. Although the minimum size friction is frequently adopted in the quantitative
housing literature (see, for example, Iacoviello and Pavan (2013)), it is not essential for the mech-
anisms in this paper as long as there are other frictions in place that make housing lumpy. See
Section 1.3.5 for more discussion.
7The specification of a (quality-adjusted) per-unit price of housing is natural here since the total
stock is fixed and the individual housing choice is continuous when it is above the minimum threshold
size h. The general focus of this paper is the aggregate housing price, not the cross-sectional price
dispersion.
8In the quantitative housing literature, when the rental decision is explicitly modeled, it is com-
mon to assume that rental units come in smaller sizes than houses, see Iacoviello and Pavan (2013)
and Sommer et al. (2013) for example.
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where ϕ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the utility weight of housing services in total consumption.9
The discount factor is constant at β across all the households.
Note that housing ownership does not enter into household’s utility function.
Moreover, this paper assumes two separate markets for housing services and housing
stock. Considering a household that owns h units of housing stock, the housing
consumption of this household is not necessarily h, since household members are
allowed to either rent out part of their housing stock to become landlords (s < h) or
to purchase more rental services and be net renters (s > h). This means that although
housing services and housing stock are necessarily the same in aggregate (S = H),
individual housing ownership and consumption can be different (s 6= h) without any
friction.10 This structure separates individual decisions about housing consumption
and housing investment. It stresses the financial aspects of housing, allowing housing
purchase to be an investment decision only.11
Therefore, housing in this economy is essentially a financial asset that delivers a
dividend at the rate of R
P
.
1.3.2 Household’s problem and optimal decision rules
In each period, a household chooses housing and non-housing expenditures. Let
the total expenditure be x (x = c+Rs). Then the indirect utility function resulting
from optimal expenditure allocation is
u (x) = lnx+ (1− ϕ) ln(1− ϕ) + ϕ lnϕ− ϕ lnR.
Old households only make the above consumption choices. The young households’
problem also involves a consumption-saving decision and a portfolio choice between h
and b for their saving. Using the indirect utility function, this problem can be written
as
9The log-specification over consumption and housing services provides tractability. A more gen-
eral utility function will be considered in the quantitative model in section 1.3.
10Although in reality becoming a landlord bears with it various costs, such as management costs
and differential tax treatments, this paper abstracts from those costs, in order to keep the exposition
clean.
11Sommer et al. (2013) allow households to invest in rental properties. However, housing invest-
ment decisions in their model can not be easily separated from housing consumption decisions, since
becoming a landlord is assumed to shift one’s utility function.
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max
{x,h,b}
lnx+ β lnx′ (1.3.1)
s.t. x+ b+ Ph = y
x′ = (1 + r)b+ (P +R)h
b ≥ −λhPh (1.3.2)
h ∈ {0, [h,+∞]}. (1.3.3)
Optimal decision rules Before characterizing the equilibrium, we first discuss the
optimal decision rules for households for given aggregate situations. In particular,
we consider the “interior” case where aggregate prices satisfy R
P
> r (housing has a
higher financial rate of return than bonds).12
Figure 1.3.1: Policy functions for housing and bonds
Notes: This figure illustrates the equilibrium policy functions for both housing asset and bonds. The
policy functions correspond to one set of parameter values that satisfies the conditions for equilibria
in which RP > r. Moreover, for the ease of exposition, borrowing is not allowed (λh = 0).
Note that, when R
P
> r, optimal portfolio choice depends on income level y, due to
12The “corner” case where aggregate prices satisfy RP = r is trivial and is explained in Ap-
pendix 1.B.
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the minimum size friction in housing ownership and the borrowing constraint. More-
over, whenever the optimal saving portfolio consists of non-zero housing, constraint
(1.3.2) will bind; i.e., it is in the household’s interest to fully utilize the collateral-
ized borrowing opportunity. Figure 1.3.1 plots optimal rules for saving in housing and
bonds as functions of lifetime income y (the analytical derivation is in Appendix 1.B).
If there is either no friction in the housing market (h = 0) or no limit in bor-
rowing (λh = 1), denoted as the no-friction benchmark, households will simply save
a constant share of total resources. And all of the savings will go to housing (the
dotted line). However, with housing market frictions and borrowing limits, certain
households’ saving decisions are distorted. In particular, households with low levels
of resources cannot enter the housing market and save only in bonds (shown as “out-
siders” in Figure 1.3.1); although households with modest resources participate in the
housing market, they are constrained by the frictions and have to save more relative
to the no-friction benchmark (as “constrained participants”). Only those households
with high enough resources are not affected by the frictions (as “unconstrained” par-
ticipants). As a result, households with low and modest resources are in large zones of
inaction: their housing demand is “unresponsive” to changes in income.13 In contrast,
affluent households have “responsive” housing demand.
1.3.3 Definition of equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium associated with parameters µ, pi, Y , r, λh, H and h
consists of prices (R and P ), decision rules (b(y,R, P ), h(y,R, P ), and x(y,R, P )),
and a stationary distribution Γ(y, b, h) such that,
1. Given R and P , b(y,R, P ), h(y,R, P ) and x(y,R, P ) solve the young household’s
problem defined in (1.3.1).
2. The stationary distribution Γ(y, b, h) is induced by b(y,R, P ), h(y,R, P ), and
x(y,R, P ).
3. Markets clear:
(a)
∫∫
Γ(y,b,h)
h(y, b, h) = H,
(b)
∫∫
Γ(y,b,h)
s(y, b, h) = H.
13Note that housing demand is very responsive (it jumps) at one critical point where switching
occurs between “outsiders” and “constrained participants”.
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Note that, in the model, the distribution of y is exogenously given, and both rent
R and house price P are endogenously determined by market clearing conditions.
Although there are separate market clearing conditions for housing rental and own-
ership, R and P are jointly determined in the equilibrium since housing demand is a
function of its financial rate of return R
P
. Moreover, since housing assets are risk-free
in a stationary environment, due to the minimum holding size friction, the equilib-
rium return from housing has to be at least as high as the return from the risk-free
bond (i.e., R
P
≥ r).
1.3.4 The analytical result
With the policy functions identified in Figure 1.3.1, equilibrium prices can be
derived using market clearing conditions (3a) and (3b). Similarly, I only consider the
“interior” equilibrium in which the return in housing is higher than bonds (R
P
> r)
and all young households own some housing asset.14
In equilibrium, the old households do not own any housing asset, the low-earner
young households own the minimum-size house, and the high-earner young households
save a constant share of their income in housing, thus, asset market clearing condition
(3a) can be simplified to15
µ
2
× piY
µ
× β
(1 + β)λh
+
(1− µ)
2
× Ph = PH,
which implies the equilibrium housing price
P =
βpiY
(1 + β)λh(2H − (1− µ)h).
Note that equilibrium housing price P increases with both inequality measures pi
and 1− µ. In equilibrium, the low earners participate in the housing market but are
constrained while high earners are unconstrained.16 So it is easy to understand why
an increase in inequality will cause house prices to go up: an increase in either pi or
1 − µ generates more housing demand from the top earners (who are “responsive”)
but does not suppress demand from the bottom earners (who are “unresponsive”).
14The model also has “corner” equilibria in which low-earner young households could not afford
the minimum-size house, when there is no restriction on parameter values. See Appendix 1.B for
the full characterization.
15See Appendix 1.B for the detailed derivation.
16There are only two income levels among all households in the basic model. When allowing for
more household types, the constrained participants would be households in the middle income range.
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1.3.5 Discussion
In this section, I discuss several key intuitions derived from the simple model that
are generalizable to more realistic settings.
First, housing purchases are lumpy due to frictions in the market. In the simple
model, the lumpiness is built in by the minimum purchase size friction. In reality,
there are many other reasons for housing purchases to be lumpy. Non-convex ad-
justment cost, considered later in the quantitative model, is one obvious reason.17
Second, housing has to provide a higher equilibrium rate of return than bonds to
compensate the frictions in trading. Thus, housing is a preferred asset than bonds
when a household can “comfortably” afford it (housing is lumpy). Third, the re-
sponsiveness in housing demand differ across wealth groups due to the lumpiness.
Wealthy households are more responsive than the poor in the housing market. This
is especially the case if credit conditions are tight.
As a result, house prices will respond to inequality when housing is both lumpy
and pays a premium. Since wealthy households are more responsive in the housing
market, an increase in inequality will increase the housing price. Rental price, how-
ever, does not respond to changes in inequality. This is because all households spend
a constant share of their income on rental consumption and the rental price is roughly
proportional to aggregate output.
In sum, the simple model in this section explains the basic mechanisms behind
the positive association between inequality and house prices. Those mechanisms will
be further developed to make quantitative analysis.
1.3.6 The case of China
The mechanism that the above model describes depends on housing market fric-
tions and housing being the preferred asset (differential asset returns). In this section,
I provide independent evidence that this is the case in China. In particular, I look
at Chinese household finance in urban China18 and document that there are just two
major asset classes, and the return on housing exceeds that on other financial assets.
I also discuss that Chinese housing markets are subject to substantial frictions.
17See Iacoviello and Pavan (2007) for a discussion of various realistic frictions that make housing
investment lumpy within the context of the US. The lumpiness is even more relevant for economies
with underdeveloped financial markets. Section 1.4.1 contains more details about the formulation,
calibration, and evaluation of the frictions that make housing lumpy in the quantitative model.
18There is a big urban-rural divide in China. This paper does not consider rural China.
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1.3.6.1 Household finance in China
The most prominent feature of household finance in China might be that house-
holds have an asset portfolio dominated by housing and fixed bank deposits.
Figure 1.3.2: Household asset position and interest rate
China US
Housing net 79.4% 34.5%
Housing gross 81.8% 44.6%
Housing debt -2.4% -10.1%
Fixed deposits 5.3% 0.9%
Other financial 5.5% 40.1%
Other 9.7% 24.6%
Total 100% 100%
(a) Asset composition (b) Interest rate
Notes: The statistics in Panel (a) are calculated by the author using the CFPS 2012 and the Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2013. See Appendix 1.C for the detailed calculation procedure. In
Panel (b), the 1-year deposit rate is from the People’s Bank of China and the inflation rate is from
the NBS of China.
Panel (a) in Figure 1.3.2 compares the components of total assets in 2012 between
China and the United States. The share of housing (net of mortgages) in total assets
in China is more than two times as big as that in the United States. Moreover, the
share of financial assets in China is only about one fourth of the US share. Half of the
financial assets in Chinese household portfolios are in terms of fixed bank deposits,
which achieve low returns (sometimes even negative in real terms, as shown in Panel
(b) in Figure 1.3.2). In contrast, the share of fixed deposits is negligible for US
households.
Chinese households have good reason to save in housing and bank deposits: in fact,
they have no good alternatives. First of all, the Chinese government implements strict
capital controls so that saving in capital markets outside of China is off the table for
most households. Second, domestic stock markets were underdeveloped and offered
meager returns in the last two decades. As shown in Table 1.3.1, at least during the
2003–2013 period, stock market index returns are dominated by the housing price
index according to a simple mean and variance comparison.
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Table 1.3.1: Returns of Stock Market Index vs. Housing Price Index (2003–2013)
Mean Std. Dev.
Stock Housing Stock Housing
2003-2013 0.073 0.157 0.515 0.154
2003-2008 0.090 0.204 0.662 0.105
2009-2013 0.053 0.109 0.339 0.191
Notes: The numbers in this table are directly extracted
from Table 3 and Table 4 in Fang et al. (2015). The hous-
ing price index is for first-tier cities only. See Fang et al.
(2015) for more details and discussion.
To sum up, the basic setup of the model (i.e., households choosing portfolios of
housing and fixed return bonds) is well suited for the case study of China.
Another important feature of household finance in China is that Chinese house-
holds save a lot. Moreover, the average urban household saving rate in China rose
significantly during most of the first decade of the 21st century (see Chamon and
Prasad (2010), Yang et al. (2013), and Curtis et al. (2015)). The saving rate dynam-
ics will also be one of the focus in the later quantitative analysis.
1.3.6.2 Tight credit conditions in the housing market
In China, housing became a commodity that individuals can purchase only after
the early 1990s (before that local governments or work units allocated housing).19
Commercial mortgages could rarely be seen until late 1990s. After mortgages are
available, the minimum down payment requirement for first home purchases in China
is strictly regulated by the People’s Bank of China. It has changed over time but was
never lower than two levels: 30% or 40%.20 Mortgages to finance purchases of second
homes can be subject to even higher down payment requirements.
Moreover, due to the lack of a official credit record system (no official credit record
system exists until 2006), loan approval in China is very strict. The most important
factor considered by the bank for mortgage approval is usually the applicant’s income.
Although there is no clear-cut loan to income criterion universally set for all the banks,
guidelines from bank regulators usually require that a borrower’s ratio of monthly
mortgage payment to income should be lower than 50%.21
19A more detailed discussion of the housing market privatization process in China can be found
in Appendix 1.C.1.
20Down payment requirement in the US.
21For a comprehensive discussion of residential mortgages in China, see Fang et al. (2015).
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Tight credit conditions also make China a good case to apply the theory (as
explained in the basic model analysis, tight credit conditions work in favor of the
mechanism).
Summary The simple model in this section qualitatively explains how inequality
and housing market outcomes can interact due to heterogeneity in cross-sectional
portfolio allocation. It is of more interest to quantitatively evaluate how much the
proposed theory can account for facts about portfolio allocation in a cross section
as well as the dynamics of house prices and wealth inequality. For the quantitative
analysis, this paper chooses the Chinese economy as a case study. This is because
features of the Chinese economy map well into the model’s key assumptions, as made
evident by institutional backgrounds and stylized facts presented above.22
To make a quantitative test of the theory, in particular, to evaluate the model’s
ability to match the housing price and the saving rate trajectories given the cross-
sectional household characteristics, a quantitative model equipped with more realistic
features will be presented in the next section. The facts documented in this section
will be used to inform the specification of the quantitative model in Section 1.4.1.
Some of the facts presented in this section will also be used for the calibration and
evaluation of the quantitative model in Section 1.4.2 and Section 1.4.3.
1.4 A Quantitative Analysis
The basic model identified a mechanism that make the equilibrium housing price
positively respond to inequality (holding aggregate resources constant). In this sec-
tion, I embed this mechanism into a richer model with heterogeneous dynastic house-
holds facing uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks. I will demonstrate that the full
model can quantitatively account for the 2002-2012 housing price run-up in China
with realistic exogenous shocks, and it can also match the dynamics of other impor-
tant aggregate variables such as saving rate and wealth gini.
1.4.1 Model setup
Compared to the basic model in Section 1.2, I make two main extensions in the
quantitative model: households become infinite-lived and they face uninsurable id-
22Although some institutional features are unique to China, the theory still generally applies
to other economies, as long as sufficient frictions exist in the housing market. Factors such as
institutional details that can affect the lumpiness of housing, financial market developments, and
the inequality level will determine to what extent the mechanism will be effective.
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iosyncratic earnings risks, which are shared by standard incomplete-market settings
such as in Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). The main addition is a frictional
housing market. Relative to standard incomplete markets models with heterogeneous
households, the model in this paper has a frictional housing market equilibrium. The
setup of the model will allow equilibrium house prices and rents to depend on the
wealth distribution as well as its endogenous evolution.
In discussing the model environment, I focus on the extensions and give only brief
consideration to the parts that are similar to those of the basic model. Moreover,
I try to keep variable definitions and notations consistent with those in Section 1.2
whenever possible.
1.4.1.1 Household preferences and endowments
The setup is still an endowment economy, with no aggregate uncertainty and
populated by two types of earners differing in income processes. Superscript i ∈
{B, T} will be used to denote bottom and top earners, respectively. In addition to
the basic model, there are preference shocks change household patience parameter
periodically.23
Each type i earner is ex-ante identical and infinitely lived, with lifetime utility
given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βitu (ct, st) ,
where βit describes the cumulative discount factor between period 0 and period t, and
I allow it to differ between bottom and top earners and leave it to the calibration to
pick the respective values. In particular, βBt = β˜
BβBt−1, where β˜
B is an idiosyncratic
shock following a three-state, first-order Markov process. But βTt = β˜
TβTt−1, where β˜
T
is a standard constant one period discount factor. The instantaneous utility function
u (ct, st) is modeled as a non-separable form (the basic model is a special case where
σ = 1), following Kiyotaki et al. (2011) and others:
u (ct, st) =
((
ct
1−ϕ
)1−ϕ (
st
ϕ
)ϕ)1− 1σ
− 1
1− 1
σ
,
where σ is the risk aversion parameter and ϕ ∈ (0, 1) again reflects the utility weight
23This follows Krusell and Smith (1998) and allows the model to obtain rich aggregate wealth
dynamics while respecting computational constraints.
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of housing services in the consumption aggregate of c and s. Note that although the
Cobb-Douglas preference has implications for the degree of substitutability between
housing and non-housing consumption, it still produces the feature that the housing
expenditure share is constant.24
Households in the economy also face idiosyncratic endowment shocks denoted as ε
(the same for bottom and top earners), which are the same as unemployment shocks.
In particular, ε follows a first-order Markov process with two states {0, 1}; ε = 1
means that the corresponding household is employed, receives a normal endowment,
according to her type (y¯B for a bottom earner and y¯T for a top earner). If ε = 0, the
household is unemployed, receiving a safety-net endowment that equals a fraction ω
of the endowment at normal times. Note that the sum of the bottom earners’ income
always equals (1− µ)Y and the sum of the top earners’ income always equals µY .25
1.4.1.2 The household decision problem
Households in this model accumulate wealth to insure against idiosyncratic en-
dowment shocks. They also make a portfolio choice between liquid wealth (bonds)
and illiquid wealth (housing). In each period, households decision making not only
depend on individual states but also the aggregate distribution. In particular, the
state variables relevant to a type i earner’s decision making include the individual
state vector ki, which includes (ε, β˜
i, b, h); the aggregate state variables Y , pi, and
Λ, where Λ denotes the measure of households over ki and i; and the expectation of
future individual states ki
′
as well as aggregate states Y ′, pi′ and Λ′.
Denote V i(ε, β˜i, b, h; Λ, Y, pi,H) as the current period value function for a type i
earner, and the dynamic programming problem is the following:
V i(ε, β˜i, b, h; Λ, Y, pi,H) = max
x,b′,h′
u (x;R) + β˜iE[V i
′
(ε′, β˜i
′
, b′, h′; Λ′, Y ′, pi′, H ′)|ε, β˜i]
24This feature is consistent with the empirical finding that, over time and across cities, the ex-
penditure share on housing is constant (see Iacoviello and Pavan (2013)).
25Note that the endowment process is kept simple in the model, which does not take certain cross-
section and life-cycle aspects of the income distribution into account. There are two main reasons
for adopting this modeling approach. The first simply has to do with data availability. A panel data
set with a close tracking of individual income would be needed to identify the persistence parameter
in the income process. The second reason is that a more elaborate endowment process will affect
not only inequality in earnings in the cross-section but also the individual earnings uncertainty.
However, for the transition exercise in Section 1.4, I want to isolate the effect of changes in cross-
section inequality from changes in individual earnings uncertainty. The current modeling approach
for the endowment process better fits that purpose.
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s.t.
x+ b′ + Ph′ + Φ(h′, h) = εy¯i + (1− ε)ωy¯i + (1 + r)b+R′h+ (1− δ)P ′h
b′ ≥ b¯(λh, h′, λy, ε)
h′ ∈ {0, [h,+∞)},
for i ∈ {B, T}.
b¯(λh, h
′, λy, ε) denotes the borrowing constraint. In addition to the loan to value
ratio criterion in the basic model, there is an additional loan to income criterion. In
particular, not only are households unable to borrow more than a fraction λh of their
housing stock, they cannot borrow more than a fraction λy of their expected earnings
either; i.e.,
b¯(λh, h
′, λy, ε) = max{−λhPh′,−λyY(ε, y¯i)},
where Y(ε, y¯i) = E[
∑N
k=0
yk
(1+r)k
|ε, y¯i] approximates the expected present discounted
value of lifetime endowment. The endowment at period k is denoted as yk, and
N is the approximate length of a life-cycle. This constraint is consistent with the
usual lending criteria in the mortgage market that take into account minimum down
payments, ratios of debt payments to income, and current and expected future em-
ployment conditions.
Φ(h′, h) denotes housing adjustment costs. Unlike in the basic model, a home-
owner incurs a cost Φ(h′, h) whenever she adjusts her housing stock:
Φ(h′, h) = f1P |h′ − h|+ f21{h′ 6=h}Ph. (1.4.1)
Note that there are both linear and fixed components in the adjustment cost function.
The linear component f1P |h′ − h| captures common practices in the housing market
that require, for instance, commissions paid to realtors to be equal to a fraction of the
value of the house being sold. The fixed component f21{h′ 6=h}Ph, which is in terms of
a percentage value of the minimum size house, captures other costs associated with
housing transactions, such as registration fees and search costs.26
26By paying the cost, housing stock can be adjusted to any future level h′ ∈ {0, [h,+∞)}. The
assumption that the fixed cost component applies to adjustments that are minor relative to the
existing housing stock essentially prevents homeowners from making small improvements to their
houses.
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1.4.1.3 Definition of equilibrium
Denote C as the aggregate non-housing consumption and denote B as the aggre-
gate bonds savings. Given a starting distribution of households Λ0 and a sequence
of aggregate state variables {Yt, pit, Ht}, a competitive equilibrium is then defined
as: sequences of individual value and policy functions {V it (ε, β˜i, b, h; Λt, Yt, pit, Ht),
bit
′
(ε, β˜i, b, h; Λt, Yt, pit, Ht), s
i
t
′
(ε, β˜i, b, h; Λt, Yt, pit, Ht), and h
i
t
′
(ε, β˜i, b, h; Λt, Yt, pit, Ht)};
pricing functions P (Λt, Yt, pit, Ht) and R(Λt, Yt, pit, Ht)}, such that, at each period t,
1. Given V it+1, {V it , bit′, hit′}i∈{B,T} solve household’s problem.
2. Markets clear at all times.
(i) Housing market:
∫
Λt
∑
i h
i
t
′
(ε, β˜, b, h; Λt, Yt, pit, Ht) = Ht+1
(ii) Rental market:
∫
Λt
∑
i s
i
t
′
(ε, β˜, b, h; Λt, Yt, pit, Ht) = Ht+1
(iii) Bond market:
∫
Λt
∑
i b
i
t
′
(ε, β˜, b, h; Λt, Yt, pit, Ht) = Bt+1
(iv) Goods market:
∫
Λt
∑
i Φ(h
i
t, h
i
t+1) + δPtHt + Ct = Yt + rtBt
3. Λt+1 is generated by {bit′, hit′}i∈{B,T} and exogenous processes ε and β˜i.
Note that the formula
∫
Λt
∑
i Φ(h
i
t, h
i
t+1) summarizes the total transaction costs in-
curred by homeowners for adjusting the housing stock, which depends on both the
total transaction volume and the transaction frequency (see Equation [1.4.1]). There-
fore, according to the goods market clearing condition (2iv), prices Pt and Rt depend
on both the transaction volume and the transaction frequency of housing stock. This
observation has implications for the computation of the model.
Moreover, the analysis will focus on transition path resulting from temporary
shocks. Accordingly, I assume that exogenous state is consistent with the economy
eventually reaching a stationary equilibrium where aggregate state variables are all
time-invariant, i.e., we only consider cases when {Yt, pit, Ht} = (Y¯ , p¯i, H¯) after a finite
number of periods.
1.4.1.4 Computation strategy
Since the considered economy will always reach stationarity after in finite periods,
the solution starts with solving the stationary equilibrium associated with (Y¯ , p¯i, H¯).
With stationarity, the equilibrium conditions in the above section imply an economy
with a stationary distribution Λ∗ in which households behave optimally and markets
always clear with constant house price and rental price P ∗ and R∗. Note that, to
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solve their individual problems, households in the stationary economy only need to
know market prices and returns for both bonds and housing. Since P ∗ and R∗ are
sufficient statistics to determine the return on housing, the problem is reduced to
finding the pair of prices P ∗ and R∗ that can clear all the markets when households
all behave optimally. Details on how to solve the stationary equilibrium can be found
in Appendix 1.D.1.
The next step is to find how the economy will evolve before entering stationarity
(on the transition path). Note that solving the household optimization problem along
the transition path requires adding time to the state variables listed in the steady-
state problem described earlier in the paper because both current-period states and
future states affect households’ optimal decisions. The computation is still done by
a fixed point iteration procedure. Unlike in the steady-state equilibrium, instead of
iterating over a set of stationary aggregate variables, the algorithm now iterates over
the sequences of prices Pt, bond savings Bt, transaction volumes Ωt, and transaction
frequencies Ft along which the optimal decisions of households clear all the three
markets. Given a sequence of those aggregate variables, the dynamic programming
problem can be solved recursively, moving backward in time from time period T .
Details of the computational procedure can be found in Appendix 1.D.2.
1.4.1.5 Household decision rules
As discussed in the basic model in Section 1.3.5, the cross-sectional difference
in housing demand responsiveness is the key to generating an interaction between
housing market outcomes and inequality. Therefore, I show next to what extent the
quantitative model features this differential responsiveness in housing demand.
I first discuss the housing decision for non-homeowners, for whom bond is the only
financial asset to begin with. Their decision rule is similar to that in Figure 1.3.1:
there is a threshold amount (depending on the exact household type) of liquid assets
such that, if assets exceed the threshold, non-homeowners become first-time home-
owners. Also, the larger the initial liquid assets are, the less likely a household is to
borrow for the purpose of financing a housing purchase.
As for homeowners, Figure 1.4.1 from the baseline calibration in the next section
plots their housing adjustment decisions as a function of initial housing and liquid
wealth, across 4 different types, employed or unemployed, top earners or bottom earn-
ers (holding time preference parameter constant at its middle value). A homeowner
can stay put, upgrade, downsize, or completely sell off her housing stock (thus exiting
the housing market).
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Figure 1.4.1: Housing adjustment functions
(a) Employed bottom earners (b) Employed top earners
(c) Unemployed bottom earners (d) Unemployed top earners
Notes: The figure illustrates the equilibrium optimal housing adjustment policy as functions of initial
housing wealth and bond wealth. The plots in Panel (a) and Panel (c) correspond to a medium
patient bottom earner (β˜ = β˜m).
One key feature of the decision rules is that bottom earners have much larger
inaction zones – i.e., unresponsive housing demand; while top earners adjust their
housing stock much more frequently – i.e., responsive housing demand. The unre-
sponsive housing demand from the bottom earners is also reflected in the feature
that when the amount of liquid assets is small, the housing tenure decision depends
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on the initial level of housing wealth non-monotonically. Consider, for instance, an
unemployed homeowner with liquid assets equal to about thirty percent of annual in-
come (i.e., a bottom earner). If the initial house value is really small, the homeowner
pays the adjustment cost and, because of his low liquid assets, completely quits the
housing market. If the initial house value is in the middle range, the homeowner does
not change house size since, given the modest size, quitting the housing market is too
big an adjustment, while downsizing a bit is not economical given the sizable fixed
adjustment costs. If the initial house size is large, there is enough room to optimally
downsize the housing stock instead of completely selling it off.
Moreover, across all types of households, larger liquid assets increase the chance
of upgrading one’s housing stock, and transaction costs create a region of inaction
where the housing stock is constant. If liquid wealth falls below a certain level, the
household either downsizes or exits the housing market. Moreover, when a household
does adjust her housing stock, the size of the adjustment also depends on her liquid
wealth level.
1.4.2 Calibration with data before 2002
Parameters of the model are calibrated using data from the Chinese economy
before 2002, and the calibrated model are then used to study the dynamics of the
economy between 2002 and 2012.
The calibration involves mainly two stages. The first stage is to set the parame-
ters that can either be directly observed or be estimated from the data. Important
parameters in this category includes, individual income process, employment process,
and housing market frictions.
The second stage is to calibrate the unobservable parameters in the model: pref-
erence parameters mostly. The model is first solved with the assumption that the the
Chinese economy is at a stationary equilibrium in the year of 2002.27 The preference
parameters are then chosen such that the cross-sectional properties on household as-
sets of household finances in the model best matches that of the data in the year
2002.
1.4.2.1 Calibration results
Table 1.4.1 summarizes the parameters used in the baseline model (the estimated
and the calibrated parts). Detailed descriptions of the calibration procedure follow
27Alternative calibration without the stationarity assumption will be considered in future sensi-
tivity analysis.
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in the main text.
Table 1.4.1: Summary of Parameters
Description Parameter Value Source/Target
Conventional values
Relative risk aversion σ 1.00 Standard value
Total endowment Y 1.00 Normalization
Total housing stock H 1.00 Normalization
Estimated from the data
Risk free interest rate r 0.02 People’s Bank of China
Top 10% wage share pi 0.26 Top 10% wage sharea
Transition matrix of employment process Πε,ε′ - Giles et al. (2005)
Mean endowment for bottom earner yB 0.90 Derived from Πε,ε′
Mean endowment for top earner yT 2.86 Derived from Πε,ε′
Unemployment replacement rate ω 0.07 China Labor Statistical Yearbook
Minimum size housing h 0.57 First quartile valuea
Borrowing constraint against housing λh 0.60 Down payment requirement
Linear transaction cost f1 0.03 Association of Realtors
Calibrated in the model
Depreciation rate δ 0.03 Wu et al. (2012)
Utility share of housing service ϕ 0.24 Bond share in total: 0.23a
Discount factor for top earners β˜T 0.97 Top 10% asset-over-income: 10.5a
Medium discount factor for bot earners β˜Bm 0.96 Aggregate asset-over-income: 5.4
a
Discount factor variation for bot earnersb ∆β˜B 0.01 Wealth gini: 0.48a
Transition matrix of discount factor Πβ˜,β˜′ - See main text
Borrowing constraint against income λy 0.10 Aggregate loan-to-value: 0.05a
Fixed transaction cost f2 0.12 Housing-transaction-over-GDP: 0.06
a: Calculated using CHIP 2002. See Appendix 1.C for detailed procedure.
b: The discount factor grids are symmetric; i.e., ∆β˜B = β˜Bh − β˜Bm = β˜Bm − β˜Bl .
Endowments Both output and the housing stock are normalized to be 1. I set pi to
26%, according to the top 10% wage income share in CHIP 2002. Wage income is the
data counterpart for the exogenous endowment in the model. The reason to choose the
top 10% as the top earners is because the income share of the top 5% in China is too
low compared to the other countries in Panel (a) in Figure 1.1.1 (the calculated top 5
percent income share in China at 2002, while it is 30% at the same time in the United
States). The normal endowment levels for bottom earners and top earners, y¯B and
y¯T respectively, are then set to meet the conditions that (1− u)y¯B + uy¯B = (1− µ)Y
and (1 − u)y¯T + uy¯T = µY , where u denotes the aggregate unemployment rate and
µ = 0.1.
The employment process Πε,ε′ is chosen so that the average duration of an unem-
ployment spell is two years and the unemployment rate u is 10%, which is roughly in
line with the findings about China’s unemployment rate in Giles et al. (2005). The
transition matrix of the employment status is as follows (rows indicate the current
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state, and columns indicate next period’s state; both the first row and the first column
correspond to ε = 1 – i.e., employment):[
17/18 1/18
1/2 1/2 .
]
The unemployment insurance replacement rate ω is set to be 7%. This level of
unemployment insurance is in line with the data. According to the China Labor
Statistical Yearbook 1999 to 2005, the overall replacement rate from unemployment
insurance is about 14% of the worker’s wage, and the maximum duration of benefits
for unemployment insurance recipients is 2 years (the same as the unemployment
spell in the model). However, the China Labor Statistical Yearbook also reports that
about half of all unemployed workers were eligible for unemployment benefits from
the unemployment insurance system from 1999 to 2005. Thus, I set ω to be 7% (half
of the 14%), the same for both the top and the bottom earners.
Preferences The baseline risk aversion parameter is set at γ = 1. The utility share
of housing service ϕ is set at 0.24 to match the housing wealth and bonds wealth
split among all households in CHIP 2002. I calibrate β˜T to be 0.9657 according to
the net asset-over-income ratio (10.5) of the population’s top 10% wealthiest. The
shock to the patience level of bottom earners, β˜B, takes on values from a symmetric
grid, (β˜Bl = 0.9427, β˜
B
m = 0.9527, β˜
B
h = 0.9627), with 80% of the bottom earners
adopting the middle value and 10% each adopting the extreme points in the invariant
distribution. The expected duration of the extreme discount factors is 50 years. As
in Krusell and Smith (1998), this is meant to capture, albeit in a somewhat crude
way, a dynastic element in the evolution of preferences. Transitions can only occur
to adjacent values, where the transition probability from either extreme value to the
middle grid is 1/50 and from the middle grid to either extreme value is 1/400. This
Markov chain for β˜B has been chosen to match the aggregate wealth-over-income
ratio (5.4) and the Gini coefficient (0.48) of the wealth distribution. The transition
matrix of β˜ is as follows (rows indicate the current state, and columns indicate next
period’s state; both the first row and the first column correspond to β˜ = β˜l; both the
second row and the second column correspond to β˜ = β˜m):49/50 1/50 01/400 199/200 1/400
0 1/50 49/50 .

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Market arrangements The risk-free interest rate r is set as the one year bank
deposit rate in 2002 taken from the People’s Bank of China. The minimum-size
house (h) is set according to the housing asset value at first quartile among all the
homeowners in CHIP 2002. This value is roughly 2 times the average annual wage
income among all the homeowners in CHIP 2002. The maximum loan-to-value ratio
restriction is set at λh = 0.60, corresponding to a constant down payment requirement
of 40%.28 The maximum loan-to-future-income ratio restriction λy is chosen to be
0.10.29 The two borrowing requirements in the model together determine the overall
tightness of credit conditions in the model, generating an aggregate loan-to-value
ratio of 5% consistent with CHIP 2002.
Note that the mortgage option setup in the model allows households to draw on
a home equity line of credit (subject to a loan to income criterion). Thus, loans are
essentially payment-option mortgages with a required interest rate payment and a
pre-approved home equity line of credit. In principle, this means that a borrower can
choose to only cover mortgage interest payments but not to pay down principal every
period. However, mortgage loans in China are all installment loans: equal installments
of the loan must be paid each period before maturity, although early retirement is
allowed. It turns out that this is not a problem for the model. Households usually
do borrow when they make new housing purchases, but they pay back their debts
gradually afterward. This is because unemployment shocks and sizable adjustment
costs in housing assets induce households to desire a certain amount of liquid wealth
buffer. Moreover, the tight loan to income criterion further dampens the effect of a
home equity line of credit since the borrowing constraints become much tighter when
households are unemployed.
The depreciation rate of the housing asset δ is set to 0.03, to approximate both the
maintenance and depreciation cost of holding housing wealth.30 I choose f1 = 0.03 to
roughly approximate the amount of commissions for realtors when transacting houses,
28The minimum down payment requirement for first home purchases in China is strictly regulated
by the People’s Bank of China. It has changed over time but within a narrow band between two
levels: 30% or 40%. Mortgages to finance purchases of second homes can be subject to even higher
down payment requirements.
29In China, the most important factor considered by the bank for mortgage approval is usually the
applicant’s income (no official credit record system exists until 2006). However, there is no clear-cut
loan to income criterion universally set for all the banks. Guidelines from bank regulators usually
require that a borrower’s ratio of monthly mortgage payment to income should be lower than 50%.
For a comprehensive discussion of residential mortgages in China, see Fang et al. (2015).
30There is no direct source to calculate the depreciation rate of housing in China. Previous
literature routinely assumes a depreciation rate of 2.5%–3%. See Wu et al. (2012) and Chivakul et
al. (2015), for example.
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and I calibrated f2 = 0.12 to target the housing transaction volume-over-GDP ratio
in 2002 calculated according to data from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Overall, the adjustment cost function is used to approximate various realistic costs
associated with transacting houses in a simplified way.31 The setup serves the purpose
of generating lumpiness in housing that has a differential impact across wealth groups.
This feature is essential for the mechanism in the paper.
1.4.2.2 Calibration validity check
In order to check the performance of the calibration, I analyze the match of several
important untargeted data moments, the distribution of wealth and its composition
in particular.
Wealth distribution Table 1.4.2 examines the wealth distribution in 2002 pro-
duced by the model. Compared to the data, the model matches almost all the mo-
ments (only gini coefficient was explicitly targeted in the calibration).
Table 1.4.2: Comparison of distribution of wealth
% of wealth held by top Fraction with Gini
1% 5% 10% 20% 30% wealth< 0 coefficient
Model (baseline) 10% 24% 36% 55% 66% 1% 0.48
Data (CHIP 2002) 8% 23% 35% 53% 64% 2% 0.48
Notes: The wealth distribution in the data is calculated from CHIP 2002. Appendix 1.C contains
more details about the calculation procedure.
Note that, when compared to the US data, wealth concentration is at a much
lower level in China.32 Although this might be a reflection of the true inequality
level difference between the two economies, it might also due, at least in part, to the
underrepresentation of the top richest households in CHIP 2002.33 However, those at
the top who are missing from the survey data are unlikely to hold mainly housing in
31There are more than 20 different fees and taxes associated with housing transactions in China.
Moreover, fees and taxes differ substantially according to the type of transaction and ownership
rights (houses in China have different types of ownership rights due to institutional reasons). Details
of those fees and taxes can be found at http://esf.fang.com/zt/201403/esfjysfmx.html (in
Chinese, provided by a NYSE listed private realtor company SouFunHoldings).
32According to the SCF 2001, the net worth shares of the top 1 and 5 percent wealthy households
in the US are 32% and 57%, respectively.
33Xie and Jin (forthcoming) find that, after supplementing CFPS 2012 with data from the China
Rich List reports, wealth concentration in China is comparable to that of the United States, at least
according to measures of top wealth shares.
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their portfolios since they tend to have access to assets with better returns.34 Thus,
overlooking the richest households here is unlikely to affect the results in this paper.
Figure 1.4.2: Comparison of cross-sectional asset composition
(a) Housing-wealth-over-income ratio (b) Bond wealth share among homeowners
Notes: Panel (a) plots the distributions of net housing-wealth-over-income ratio both in the model
and in the data. Each distribution is normalized by dividing its maximum value, so that the range
is between 0 and 1. Panel (b) plots the distributions of bond wealth share in total wealth among
homeowners. To be consistent with the model, bond wealth in the data is defined as fixed bank
deposits, and total wealth is defined as bank deposits plus net housing wealth. The two data
distributions in both panels are obtained from CHIP 2002.
Cross-sectional asset composition Since the difference in cross-sectional port-
folio choices is central to the paper’s mechanism, it is important to examine how
well the model matches with the real portfolio composition in the data. Panel (a) in
Figure 1.4.2 shows that the model does a good job of capturing the fact that most
households own similar housing wealth, a manifestation of the minimum size friction.
Panel (b) in Figure 1.4.2 shows that liquidity conditions vary a lot among homeown-
ers, both in the data and in the model. Households in the model ideally desire to
hold a balanced composition between liquid wealth and housing wealth. Although
housing assets earn a higher return, liquid wealth is more suitable for the purpose
34The rate of return to capital has stayed comfortably over 20% throughout 1993 to 2005, according
to Bai et al. (2006). Although these high corporate returns are not available to normal households,
the wealthiest do have access to them.
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of smoothing temporary income shocks. The model can produce a wide range of liq-
uidity conditions because, due to the adjustment costs, households opt for depleting
liquid wealth when making new housing purchases, and gradually accumulating it
back to the ideal level afterward.
1.4.3 The transition after 2002
In this section, I conduct the following transition experiment: starting from the
calibrated economy in 2002 (as calibrated in Section 1.4.2) as Λ0, I set aggregate
income Yt and top income share pit to be the same as the data between 2002 and 2012
and to stay constant after 2012.35 I then solve the transition equilibrium. The main
goal of this transition exercise is to quantitatively evaluate how much the proposed
mechanism in this paper can account for the dynamics of house prices in China, along
with the dynamics of aggregate saving as well as wealth inequality (in terms of wealth
gini).
1.4.3.1 Results
In this section, I study the economy’s transition from 2002 until 2012. I par-
ticularly focus on the outcomes of three aggregate variables: house price, wealth
inequality and aggregate saving rate.
In the three panels I present below in Figure 1.4.3, the starting point is the initial
2002 steady state; the solid line denotes the transition path outcomes of the baseline
model, the dotted line with circles denotes the data, and the dashed line denotes the
transition path outcomes of a counterfactual model where income growth is taken
from the data but the inequality stays at its 2002 level. This simulation separates
the contributions of the two aggregate shocks, informing the role played by inequality
shocks. Note that I only present the transitional dynamics until 2012, since the
economy pretty much starts monotonically converging to the new steady state by
then and the transition to new steady state afterward is very gradual.36
The main object of interest is the evolution of house prices. In particular, the
central question of the paper is whether the large-scale housing price appreciation
can be accounted for by the relatively parsimonious model setup within a rational
expectation equilibrium framework. Panel (a) in Figure 1.4.3 shows the model’s
prediction for house price dynamics along the transition path (solid line), presented
35Alternative experiments will be considered in future sensitivity analysis.
36The steady-state aggregate variables are close to their levels in the year 2020 although the full
transition will take about 20 more periods forward.
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as the aggregate price-over-income ratio relative to the initial steady state. Note that
aggregate income in the model is assumed to grow at 8% annually between 2002 and
2012, and at 0% afterward in the baseline setting.
The results show that the amplification mechanism of the baseline model is suffi-
cient for rationalizing a large run-up of house prices. In particular, the growth rate
of house prices in the baseline model is significantly higher than the growth rate of
income during early periods of the transition and then gradually drops below income
growth and even becomes negative toward the end of the time period examined. The
existing data show a similar price-over-income trend in the first phase of the model
outcome although the data trend begins less abruptly and is sustained over a longer
period than that in the model.37 As will be discussed in the next section, this differ-
ence might be reconcilable by incorporating more realistic features such as continued
income growth or urbanization.
Panel (b) and Panel (c) in Figure 1.4.3 show that the hump-shaped house price-
over-income dynamics is accompanied by similar patterns in the evolutions of wealth
inequality and the aggregate saving rate in the baseline model.38 Again, the outcomes
of the baseline model are a bit more dramatic than the data counterpart, for similar
reasons as argued above. Overall, the results in Figure 1.4.3 show that the baseline
model can roughly account for both the trend dynamics and the changes in magnitude
for all the three aggregate variables in consideration.
The role played by the inequality shocks can be seen by comparing the outcomes
of the baseline model and those of the counterfactual model. In all the three panels in
Figure 1.4.3, the results of the counterfactual model are qualitatively similar to those
of the baseline model, but are much mitigated in the absolute levels. This suggests
that the strength of the mechanism at work in this model crucially depends on the
evolution of the inequality measure in the economy, which is largely controlled by the
top income share pi in the model. Thus, the inequality shocks fed into the baseline
model are not only empirically relevant but also important for amplifying the extent
of the housing market responses and matching them with the observed magnitude of
house price run-ups.
37I focus on the data trend here since the raw data is volatile, especially due to the interruption
of the 2008 economic crisis, while the model outcomes are smooth since I only consider a one-time
period of anticipated temporary shocks.
38In the baseline model, wealth inequality only falls a bit after the early surge and remains at a
much higher level than the initial steady state afterward. This is not the case for the saving rate
and the price-over-income ratio. The is because the baseline model assumes that the increase in
top income share pit is permanent. In the absence of permanent pit shocks, wealth inequality in the
counterfactual model also returns to its original steady-state level eventually.
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Figure 1.4.3: Transitional dynamics
(a) Aggregate housing-price-over-income ra-
tio (b) Top 10% wealth share (c) Aggregate saving rate
Notes: The price-over-income data trend is taken from Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.1. The data in Panel (b) is calculated by author from the same sources
as those in Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.1. See Appendix 1.C for more details. The data before 2009 for Panel (c) is taken from Yang et al. (2013), where
the saving rates are calculated from Urban Household Surveys conducted by National Bureau of Statistics of China. For the years 2010 and 2012, the
saving rates are calculated by author from the same sources as those in Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.1. Note that the model does not attempt to explain
the level of the saving rate in the data (due to its fairly simplified assumptions); so only the relative changes in the saving rates are compared here.
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1.4.3.2 Mechanisms
In the following, I investigate the mechanism behind the baseline model outcome.
As discussed in earlier parts of the paper, one key feature of the model is the dif-
ferential responsiveness in housing demand across wealth groups. The differential
responsiveness turns out to be crucial for the transitional analysis, too. In particular,
it implies an endogenous feedback loop between house prices and wealth inequality.
It is exactly this feedback loop that causes house prices to overreact to temporary
shocks. The general intuition about the mechanism is the following.
The feedback mechanism is initiated by expected income growth, which will ul-
timately lead to house price appreciation. Due to potential capital gains, a period
of high premium in housing is thus anticipated among households. In response, the
most responsive wealthy households stock up on housing wealth initially, causing a
surge in house prices. Due to the skewed housing wealth distribution, the price surge
causes a higher dispersion in capital income and thus higher wealth inequality fol-
lows. Higher wealth inequality, in turn, helps sustain the growth in house prices.
This is because, while housing demand from wealthy households saturates, demand
from households with modest wealth starts to pick up after a short delay. Even with
a high premium, transaction frictions and liquidity constraints still limit less-wealthy
households’ response in the housing market. Accordingly, the inequality gap between
wealthy housing investors and the rest continues to widen as house prices keep creep-
ing up. This creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop between house price and wealth
inequality.
The loop ends eventually, when most of the capital gains (due to income growth)
in the housing market are realized. The return premium sinks close to its steady-state
level, wealthy households begin to draw down their over-sized housing stock, and at
about the same time, households that initially had meager resources are able to enter
the housing market after continued saving. Housing wealth becomes more dispersed
as house prices adjust back to trend.
Figure 1.4.4 plots the transitional dynamics for the housing premium and the buyer
distribution in the baseline model, to help confirm the above intuition. According to
the top graph in Figure 1.4.4, the housing premium stays high only for early periods
when there are high capital gains in housing. Although the high premium dwarfs
the transaction costs in housing, early buyers who are able to enjoy the whole high
return periods are still mostly households from the top wealth tertile. This is because
tight borrowing limits and a high entry barrier prevents households with low wealth
from responding quickly. Therefore, most of the initial housing demand comes from a
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portfolio shift from bonds to housing among the responsive wealthy. Households with
relatively plentiful resources can tap into some of the high returns in the housing
market during later periods of the high return phase, with modest saving efforts.
Households with initial low resources (mostly non-homeowners) are forced to save
more and wait longer to enter the housing market.
Figure 1.4.4: Housing premium and buyer distribution during transition
Notes: The housing premium in period t is calculated as RtPt +
Pt
Pt−1
− δ − r. Each tertile buyer
share in period t is obtained by accruing all the households who purchased housing assets (either by
upgrading or making first-time purchases) in period t according to wealth tertile in period t.
The transition dynamics of house prices and the buyer distribution make it clear
that aggregate saving can increase due to a strong saving motive for housing purchases
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from households with few resources. However, the initial sharp rise in aggregate saving
is also partly due to the portfolio re-balancing behavior of the wealthy. As explained
earlier, households in the model desire a certain level of liquid wealth. After the initial
portfolio shift toward housing wealth, while waiting for the capital gain in housing
asset to fully realize, the wealthy need to save up more liquid wealth since it is still
the better form of buffer against idiosyncratic income shocks.
In sum, the model rationalizes a house price run-up relative to income growth
and its adjustment back to trend in a perfect foresight equilibrium with one-time
shocks. It also explains increased wealth concentration and a rising aggregate saving
rate. The mechanism links portfolio choices of the wealthy and the poor with house
price dynamics and expectations, stressing the role of responsive investment behavior
among wealthy households.
1.4.3.3 Discussion
In this section, I discuss some of the missing elements in the baseline transition
exercise, additional sensitivity analyses, and potential extensions.
Other demand factors The baseline transition exercise only considers one-time
anticipated income shocks (both growth and inequality), abstracting from changes
in many other demand factors. Although this choice makes our results clean for
interpretation, other demand factors might play important roles in the housing boom.
We briefly discuss the implications of other demand factors here.
In particular, this paper does not consider changes in credit conditions.39 This
choice is consistent with the empirical evidence. Although the amount of mortgage
borrowing did increase over the years in China, the regulation has not changed much,
in the sense that both the mortgage interest rates and down payment requirements
vary within a relatively small range (see Fang et al. (2015) for more details). One
might worry that borrowing from the shadow banking sector might mean that some
lenders actions may work independently from official regulations. However, according
to the two sources of household survey data analyzed in this paper (CHIP 2002 and
39Recent literature explaining the early 2000s US housing booms focuses on credit expansions
(see, for example, Kiyotaki et al. (2011), Sommer et al. (2013), and Favilukis et al. (forthcoming)).
Housing market outcomes are sensitive to credit conditions in those models because house prices
are mainly driven by consumption demand among the majority poor agents. Due to the very little
cross-sectional variation in wealth across low income agents, small changes in credit availability
can cause large groups of identical, low income, low wealth households to move between renting
and homeownership. However, the large swings in homeownership often produced by those models
contradict the data.
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CFPS 2012), the loan-to-value ratio at the household level remained low in the two
survey waves, about 5% in both 2002 and 2012, which suggests that shadow financing
is not a significant concern. If we allowed a controlled relaxation in credit conditions
during the transition exercise, the model would be able to produce larger housing
booms.
The large-scale urbanization process, rural-urban migration in particular, is a more
relevant exogenous demand factor. According to the two latest National Population
Censuses, the urban population in China increased at an average annual rate of
about 4%. Chen and Song (2014) find that urbanization accounts for 80.4% of the
total urban population growth. Moreover, among the urbanized population, rural-
urban migration accounts for more than half. This means that including urbanization
factors would introduce a large number of poor households who need to save up a long
time for housing purchases to the model. Accordingly, the mechanism in the paper
would get strengthened. In particular, this would likely cause the housing boom to
last longer.
This paper does not consider demographic factors either. In particular, life-cycle
components are not explicitly modeled. The intergenerational link is strong in China
in the sense that parents are usually able and willing to provide financial support
to their children’s home purchases.40 This means that the “actual” housing demand
in China might present less of a life-cycle pattern than a standard life-cycle housing
demand model would imply. This is partly supported by the empirical observation
that the saving behavior does not vary significantly along the life-cycle dimension.41
Thus life-cycle does not seem to be a factor of the first order for housing market
outcomes in the short and medium run.42
Aggregate uncertainty The paper does not model aggregate uncertainty. Due
to the modeling approach of this paper (which treats housing as a lumpy financial
asset), adding aggregate uncertainty can be expected to strength the mechanism in the
model. Since housing becomes a risky asset in the presence of aggregate uncertainty, it
can be expected that housing would be compensated with a risk premium in addition
to the illiquidity premium. The lumpiness of housing would thus increase. This
40This is partly because of the Chinese tradition that children support parents in their old age
(and sometimes even live in the same house).
41According to Chamon and Prasad (2010), the age profile of savings among Chinese households
has an unusual pattern in recent years, with younger and older households having relatively high
savings rates.
42Curtis et al. (2015) show that long-run demographic change in China can significantly affect the
aggregate household saving rate.
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might amplify the differential responsiveness in housing demand. Taking aggregate
uncertainties into account would also help the model in matching the volatility in
house prices in the data.
Supply side factors Finally, housing supply is fixed in the model.43 Allowing for
housing production is unlikely to affect the qualitative result of this paper either,
especially since land is an important factor in housing construction. As discussed
earlier, according to Wu et al. (2015), house price growth in China is driven by rising
land values, not by construction costs. However, incorporating housing production
can be an important future avenue to explore. The cross-sectional variation in hous-
ing supply elasticities could be an important factor in accounting for the regional
variations in house price growth.
In sum, the qualitative results from the baseline transition experiment are ex-
pected to hold even considering various additional elements.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper develops a heterogeneous agent equilibrium model to study the inter-
action of inequality, income growth, and house price dynamics. Important features
of the housing market environment are explicitly captured: housing delivers returns
both in terms of rental dividends and capital gains; market frictions make housing
adjustment lumpy. House prices and rents (and therefore the financial rate of return
on housing) are jointly determined in equilibrium. The modeling approach of the pa-
per allows housing purchases to be purely financial decisions. Thus, housing market
outcomes are closely linked to cross-sectional household portfolio saving decisions:
prices and inequality endogenously interact.
The model can account for the positive empirical relationship between inequal-
ity and house prices. More importantly, a transitional equilibrium analysis of the
Chinese economy can rationalize its observed house price growth accompanied by a
rise in the private savings rate. Key mechanisms behind the results are based on the
differential responsiveness in housing demand across wealth groups, which is due to
the differential impact of the lumpy housing.
43Combined with the fixed population mass, the model essentially assumes exogenous changes in
housing demand are met by the supply side. This turns out not to be a bad assumption. According
to Wu et al. (2015), in the aggregate, the growth in households demanding housing units driven
by fundamentals roughly matches with new housing construction in urban China, although with
considerable regional variation.
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This work contributes to the housing literature by illustrating a new price forma-
tion mechanism, which highlights the role played by the investment motive among
the wealthy.44 Another important contribution is that the paper provides a tractable
quantitative model that are suitable to study housing market outcomes in China.
Moreover, the theory in this paper shows that market frictions can have differential
impact cross-sectionally, increasing inequality. Inequality can in turn amplify market
frictions. This adds to our understanding of a broader topic: how inequality and
macroeconomic forces can interact.
At its current stage, this research only focuses on explaining the mechanisms be-
hind certain housing market outcomes. Important welfare and policy implications are
the next step. For example, the interaction between inequality and return premium
in the housing market directly speaks to the efficient provision of housing services
in a steady state. If housing supply is explicitly modeled, increased inequality might
boost housing production and ultimately improve welfare. Moreover, in the short run,
low-income households can be priced out of the housing market due to the feedback
loop between house prices and wealth inequality. This highlights the potentially large
welfare cost to low-income households during fast economic growth.
Possible extensions of this work may have applications beyond explaining hous-
ing market outcomes. For example, one could develop a related model to explain
the cross-sectional pattern in debt-to-income ratios and its implication on aggregate
default risk. In an environment in which heterogeneous households face investment
opportunities with different risk-return perspectives and different investment costs,
wealthy households can afford to load on riskier and costlier assets with a low debt-to-
income ratio, earning high returns. While the wealthy households bid up the prices for
high-return assets, the poor households are either “trapped” in risk-free assets with
meager returns or forced to borrow a lot (relative to income) and bear higher default
risks. The mechanism can potentially explain the cross-sectional debt-to-income ratio
patterns in the United States and shed light on the development of financial crises.
44This mechanism might be an important force behind the recent housing boom in the United
States: evidence from the SCF shows that the housing assets owned by wealthy households increased
much more dramatically than the rest of the housing stock during the housing price run-up in the
early 2000s.
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1.A Appendix: Additional stylized facts about inequality,
house prices and rents
Panel (a) of Figure 1.1.1 in Section 1.1 presents the raw correlation between top
income share growth and the appreciation of house prices across countries. In this
section, I explain more details of the data source and variable construction. I also
conduct some robustness checks on these correlations by controlling for some factors,
such as income and population growth and housing supply elasticity. Moreover, I do
the same analysis with data across states in the United States. Lastly, I also show
that rents do not co-move with top income shares. But due to limitations on data
availability, the analysis with rental data is limited only to the US cross-state level.
US cross-state housing prices, rents and inequality The theory in this paper
suggests that housing price positively correlates with inequality, and it consists with
the cross country data. It would be more convincing to see whether the data shows
the same consistency at a more disaggregate level since housing market conditions
might vary considerably more across countries. Therefore I do the same analysis as
that of Panel (a) of Figure 1.1.1 using data across states in the United States, and the
result is shown in Panel (a) of Figure 1.A.1. The same positive correlation is found
at a high significant level.
The theory in this paper suggests that rents depend mostly on average resources
instead of the inequality level. It is important to verify this result to justify the model
setup in this paper. However, at the cross-country level we lack a long enough series
of rents data, especially if we want them to be comparable. Thus, the analysis using
rental data is limited to only the US cross-state level. Panel (a) of Figure 1.A.1 plots
the correlation between growth in the top 5 percent income share and rental prices
across states in the United States.
As can be seen in Figure 1.A.1, rents do not co-move with top income shares.45
This observation is consistent with the theory posited in this paper.
45There is a hint of a positive correlation between those two in the raw data, but it’s not significant.
Moreover, after we add the controls as in Panel (c) of Figure 1.A.2, the hint of correlation is
completely gone.
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Figure 1.A.1: US cross-state analysis of inequality, housing prices, and rents
(a) Housing prices and inequality (b) Rents and inequality
Notes: In Panel (a), US cross-state (nominal) house prices are from FHFA All-Transactions
Indexes; US cross-state top 5% income shares are from Frank-Sommeiller-Price Series (in-
come excludes capital gains) as described in Frank et al. (2015). For each observation in Panel (a),
the average growth rates are obtained by averaging the yearly growth rates over the entire sample
periods. In Panel (b), the inequality measure is the same as that of Panel (a). US cross-state (nom-
inal) rents are taken from Historical Census of Housing Tables (decennial), provided by the
US Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division. Gross rent is the monthly
amount of rent plus the estimated average monthly cost of utilities and fuels. Monthly rents were
computed for specified renter-occupied units paying cash rent. This category excludes one-family
houses on ten or more acres.
The choice of house price indexes Every house price index is representative
in its own way and has different strengths and weaknesses. Even within the same
geographic area, house price indexes from different sources can differ significantly,
depending on construction methodology, sample composition, and data aggregation.
Therefore, sometimes it is crucial to choose the appropriate index according to specific
purposes.
The focus of this paper is on the relationship between house prices and inequality.
One of the paper’s central empirical and theoretical arguments is that the investment
motives of wealthy households play important roles in driving house price dynamics.
Since wealthy households tend to purchase more expensive houses than the rest of the
population, using a value-weighted index, in which expensive houses have a greater
influence on estimated price changes, will naturally bias the results of the analysis.
This is especially true if more expensive houses have different price dynamics than
45
less expensive ones.46 Therefore, for this study, it is important to choose a house price
index that weights price trends equally for all residential properties. To this end, I
choose the all-transactions index produced by the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) for the US cross-state analysis.
The FHFA indexes are available from 1976 to the present for all US states; this
makes them great for cross-section analysis. Each state-level index is constructed
using a weighted, repeat sales method that compares transaction prices of the same
property over time. This method is preferred because it avoids composition biases
from quality changes in the stock of houses in transaction.
For the cross-country analysis, I try to use house price indexes that are consistent
with the US FHFA index methodology. These types of indexes are identified and
compiled for many countries in the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’s International
House Price Database as described in Mack and Mart´ınez-Garc´ıa (2011). For the
purpose of this study, I use the house price indexes expressed in real terms to control
for potential correlation between changes in inequality and the overall price level in
one country.
Robustness checks with other data sources The weakness of the FHFA index
is that its underlining sample composites only houses purchased with conforming
mortgages, and this might understate the sensitivity of house prices to alternative
credit linking to investment purposes, especially those cash transactions. Moreover,
in specific regions and during certain times, housing purchases with sub-prime, jumbo,
and other non-conforming loans can contribute significantly to changes in house prices
as shown by some researchers. To address these issues, I repeat the same analysis
using an alternative index: the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI), which is also
available across all US states, although extending back only to 1996. ZHVI also uses
repeat-sales methods to address composition biases, making it conceptually similar to
the FHFA index, with the additional advantage of a broader sample coverage.47 The
results of the analyses are similar when using either the FHFA index or the ZHVI for
the same time periods. Similarly, for the cross-country analysis, the robustness of the
46In an ongoing project, from various data sources, my coauthor and I document that the price
dynamics of houses from different price ranges does differ. In particular, more expensive houses tend
to appreciate faster than the rest of the houses.
47Details of the ZHVI construction methodology can be found at http://www.zillow.com/
research/zhvi-methodology-6032/. In general, ZHVI is in nature similar to the S&P/Case-
Shiller indexes, but with subtle differences in sample collection (see http://cdn1.blog-media.
zillowstatic.com/3/ZHVI-InfoSheet-04ed2b.pdf for a detailed comparison of the two indexes).
I choose ZHVI because it has better geographic coverage.
46
result is verified by using an alternative set of comparable house price indexes from
the BIS Residential Property Price database.
The choice of inequality measures The inequality measure in the empirical part
of this paper focuses on households at the upper end of the income distribution. Ac-
cording to the theory of the paper, the more relevant dimension to look at should
be household wealth. This mismatch happens because there is insufficient compa-
rable wealth data at the cross-section over time (see Saez and Zucman (2014) for
an account of the series of wealth distribution only within the United States using
capitalized income tax data). Cross-sectional data on income distribution has been
better documented; thanks to the recent effort by Alvaredo et al. (2015) and Frank
et al. (2015). Thus, the measurement for inequality in this paper is consistently the
top income (excluding capital incomes) shares.
Control for average income growth and housing supply elasticity Some
important factors that affect the dynamics of house prices might also affect changes
in inequality. Two obvious ones are average income and housing supply elasticity.
Figure 1.A.2 conducts the same correlation analysis as in Panel (a) of Figure 1.1.1
in Section 1.1 and Figure 1.A.1 in this section with additional elements to control
for those factors. In particular, I add cross-sectional series on personal disposable
income per capita to control for changes in average income and population growth.
Consistent with the cross-country house prices data, cross-country disposable income
per capita series are expressed in real terms. Moreover, I also try to control for cross-
sectional differences in housing supply elasticity, although in very crude ways. For
both cross-country and cross-state analysis, the supply elasticity measures I have are
only for a cross section and thus could not account for changes in supply elasticity
itself over time. This is only going to be problematic if changes in the supply elasticity
correlate with changes in inequality, which is not considered evidently the case in the
literature.
As can be seen in Figure 1.A.2, the positive association between top income share
growth and appreciation of house prices remains significant after those controls. It
even gets stronger at the cross-country level. Moreover, the no correlation result still
holds for the case of rental prices. This evidence provides us with more confidence in
the causal relationship between inequality and house prices.
47
Figure 1.A.2: The same analysis with controls
(a) Cross-country housing price & inequality (b) Cross-state housing price & inequality (c) Cross-state rents and inequality
Notes: House prices, rents, and inequality measures are exactly the same as those in Panel (a) of Figure 1.1.1 in Section 1.1 and Figure 1.A.1. Income is
measured by personal disposable income per capita, with the same panel structure as the price and inequality data. The average growth rates of income
are obtained by averaging the yearly growth rates over the entire sample periods. Supply elasticity measures are available only as a cross-section. In
Panel (a), cross-country personal disposable income per capita (real) series are taken from Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’s International House
Price Database as described in Mack and Mart´ınez-Garc´ıa (2011); cross-country housing supply elasticities are cross-sectional estimates from Caldera
and Johansson (2013). In Panel (b) and (c), US cross-state (nominal) personal disposable income per capita series are from BEA Regional Economic
Accounts ; US cross-state housing supply elasticities are approximated by the cross-sectional Wharton Land-Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI) from
Gyourko et al. (2008).
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1.B Appendix: Equilibrium characterization of the basic model
Before characterizing the equilibrium, we first recast the definition of equilibrium in
more detail in the following.
Definition of equilibrium The steady-state stationary equilibrium associated with
µ, pi, Y , r, λh, H and h is defined as: a set of prices R and P , a set of policy functions
b(y,R, P ), h(y,R, P ) and x(y,R, P ) for young households, as well as a stationary
distribution λ(y, b, h), such that
1. Given R and P , b(y,R, P ), h(y,R, P ) and x(y,R, P ) solve the young household’s
problem defined in (1.3.1).
2. The stationary distribution λ(y, b, h) is induced by µ, ϕ, Y , r, H and h and
b(y,R, P ), h(y,R, P ), x(y,R, P ).
3. Markets clear.
(a)
∫∫
λ(y,b,h)
h(y, b, h) = H
(b)
∫∫
λ(y,b,h)
s(y, b, h) = H
1.B.1 Equilibrium with R
P
= r
Although housing has a minimum size friction than bonds, equilibrium with R
P
= r
does exit, providing the condition that the risk free interest rate is sufficiently high
and the saving motive is sufficiently strong. For equilibrium with R
P
= r, there is
no strict portfolio choice problem. Regardless of the income level y, the solution to
problem (1.3.1) is simply
x =
1
1 + β
y, b+ Ph =
β
1 + β
y,
subject to constraints (1.3.2) and (1.3.3).
Combining the above optimal consumption decision with the rental market clear-
ing condition (3b), we can recover R; i.e.,
1
2
1
1 + β
ϕY +
1
2
(1 + r)β
1 + β
ϕY = RH ⇒ R = (1 + βr
1 + β
)
ϕY
2H
.
Note that in the above derivation we used the condition that Rs = ϕx. R increases
with r, due to a pure wealth effect from the older generation. But the increase is less
than one for one, since there is still a substitution effect from the younger generation.
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House price simply follows from the no arbitrage condition between bonds and
housing:
P = (
1
r
+
β
1 + β
)
ϕY
2H
.
P decreases with r due to the fact that equilibrium R grows less than one for one
with the growth of r. This makes housing less attractive than bonds. Note that in
this case income inequality does not affect either P or R. This is the result of the log
utility specification: the marginal propensity to consume does not change along the
wealth dimension.
The equilibrium existence condition further requires that housing asset market
clearing condition (3a), constraint (1.3.2), and (1.3.3) are satisfied. Those conditions
imply:
λhPh ≤ β
1 + β
piY
µ
and λhPH ≤
{
β
1+β
pi Y
2
if λhPh >
β
1+β
(1−pi)Y
(1−µ)
β
1+β
Y
2
otherwise
.
Plugging the above conditions into the equilibrium pricing functions, we have the
following two cases.
Case One: both bottom and top earners can afford the minimum house when the
parameters satisfy the following condition:
K > ϕλh and r ≥ max
{
1 + β
β
ϕλh
K − ϕλh ,
1 + β
β
ϕλh
1− ϕλh
}
,
where K ≡ 2 (1−pi)H
(1−µ)h , which measures the strength of inequality and market friction.
This is the case where both inequality and market friction are small.
Case Two: only top earners can afford the minimum house when the set of parameters
either satisfies the following condition:
K < ϕλh and r ≥ 1 + β
β
ϕλh
pi − ϕλh ,
or satisfies the following condition:
K > ϕλh and
1 + β
β
ϕλh
K − ϕl ≥ r ≥
1 + β
β
ϕλh
pi − ϕλh .
Note that in one situation bottom earners could not afford the minimum house be-
cause of the high levels of inequality and market friction; in the other situation, the
reason is due to the relatively low interest rate level.
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1.B.2 Equilibrium with R
P
> r
For equilibrium with R
P
> r, due to the minimum size friction in housing ownership
and the borrowing constraint, optimal portfolio choice depends on income level y.
Moreover, whenever the optimal portfolio consists of non-zero housing, constraint
(1.3.2) will bind; i.e., it is in the household’s interest to fully utilize the collateralized
borrowing opportunity. In the following, we first derive the policy functions for the
situation where R
P
> r.
Policy functions First, note that constraint (1.3.3) necessarily binds for house-
holds with sufficiently low income. In particular, let’s denote
y ≡ λhPh
as the income level at which the minimum house is affordable only with zero con-
sumption. Then for households with an income level lower than y, they are forced to
save in terms of bonds, and the solution to problem (1.3.1) for 0 < y ≤ y is simply
x =
1
1 + β
y, h = 0, b =
β
1 + β
y.
Second, for households with high enough income, constraint (1.3.3) will not bind. Due
to the assumed log preference, the cutoff income level can be conveniently identified
as
y¯ ≡ 1 + β
β
y.
Thus, the solution to problem (1.3.1) for y ≥ y¯ is simply
x =
1
1 + β
y, h =
βy
1 + β
1
λhP
, b = (1− λh)Ph.
For households with an income level in the middle range y ≤ y ≤ y¯, they are unable
to optimally choose more than h units of housing assets. Moreover, due to the log
preference, their optimal decision must be either choosing exactly h units of housing
or opting for zero housing.
If a household decides to choose h units of housing, its current consumption will
suffer from its over-saving, she but the household can enjoy a higher return from its
savings. In the end, the household’s lifetime utility level will be
ln(y − y) + β ln (y(1 + ρ)) ,
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where
ρ ≡ r + 1
λh
(
R
P
− r)
denotes the net financial rate of return from holding the housing asset.
If a household chooses zero housing, the optimal consumption-saving decision
would be the same as for those households with an income lower than y, and the
associate utility level would be
ln(
1
1 + β
y) + β ln
(
β(1 + r)
1 + β
y
)
.
Denote d(y) as the difference between the two utility levels, or, in simplified form,
d(y) = ln
(
(1 + β)
y − y
y
)
− β ln
(
β(1 + r)y
(1 + β)y(1 + ρ)
)
.
It can be shown that d(y) monotonically increases with y when y ∈ [y, y¯]. Moreover,
d(y) = −∞ and d(y¯) > 0. This ensures that the solution to the equation d(y∗) = 0 is
unique, and d(y) < 0 if and only if y < y∗. Therefore, it’s optimal to purchase h units
of housing for households with income levels between y∗ and y¯, while households save
only in bonds when they have an income level below y∗; i.e.,
h(y,R, P ) =

β
1+β
y
λhP
if y ≥ y¯
h if y∗ < y < y¯
0 otherwise
, b(y,R, P ) =

− β
1+β
(1−λh)y
λh
if y ≥ y¯
−(1− λh)Ph if y∗ < y < y¯
β
1+β
y otherwise
.
Characterizing the equilibrium With the policy functions identified above, equi-
librium prices can be derived using market clearing conditions (3a) and (3b). In the
following, we discuss three different equilibrium outcomes case by case.
Case One: When (1−pi)Y
(1−µ) ≥ y¯, asset market clearing condition (3a) implies
βY
2(1 + β)λh
= PH ⇒ P = βY
2(1 + β)λhH
.
Rental market clearing condition (3b) implies
ϕY
2(1 + β)
+
βϕY (1 + ρ)
2(1 + β)
= RH ⇒ R
P
=
ϕ
1− ϕ
(
λh(
1
β
+ 1) + (λh − 1)r
)
.
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Equilibrium rental price can then be derived as
R =
ϕβY
2(1− ϕ)(1 + β)H
(
(
1
β
+ 1) +
(λh − 1)
λh
r
)
Note that neither prices nor returns depend on any inequality measure in this case.
However, for this type of equilibrium to exist, we need a relatively equal income
distribution, small market friction h, and a low interest rate. In particular, those
conditions imply the following:
K ≥ 1 and r < ϕλh(1 + β)
β(1− λhϕ) .
Case Two: When piY
µ
> y¯ > (1−pi)Y
(1−µ) ≥ y∗, asset market clearing condition (3a) implies
βpiY
2(1 + β)λh
+
(1− µ)
2
Ph = PH ⇒ P = βpiY
(1 + β)λh(2H − (1− µ)h).
Rental market clearing condition (3b) implies
piY +
βpiY
(1 + β)
ρ+ (1− pi)Y + (1− µ)Phρ = 2RH
ϕ
⇒ R
P
=
ϕ
1−mϕ
(
λh(
1
β
+ 1)n+ (λh − 1)rm
)
.
Equilibrium rental price can then be derived as
R =
ϕβY
(1−mϕ)(1 + β)(2H − (1− µ)h)
(
(
1
β
+ 1)n+
(λh − 1)
λh
rm
)
,
where m ≡ (1 + (1− µ)1−λh
λh
h
2H
) and n ≡ (1− (1− µ) h
2H
) 1
pi
.
Note that in this case an increase in either the top earner’s income share pi or the
bottom earner’s population share 1 − χ will cause house prices to increase. This is
a case in which income inequality is modest compared to the amount of the housing
market friction. The equilibrium outcome is that the bottom earners participate in the
housing market but are liquidity constrained; i.e., y¯ > (1−pi)Y
(1−χ) ≥ y∗. The equilibrium
condition requires the following:
βpi
1− (1− µ)h/H/2 ≤ K(1+β) ≤
pi(1 + β)
1− (1− µ)h/H/2, r <
ϕλh(1 + β)n
β(1− λhϕm) and ϕm < 1.
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Case Three: When piY
µ
> y¯ > y∗ > (1−pi)Y
(1−µ) , asset market clearing condition (3a)
implies
βpiY
2(1 + β)λh
= PH ⇒ P = βpiY
2(1 + β)λhH
.
Rental market clearing condition (3b) implies
ϕY + βϕ (piY (1 + ρ) + (1− pi)Y (1 + r)) = 2(1 + β)RH
⇒ R
P
=
ϕ
1− ϕ
(
λh(
1
β
+
1 + r
pi
)− r
)
.
Equilibrium rental price can then be derived as
R =
ϕβpiY
2(1− ϕ)(1 + β)H
(
(
1
β
+
1 + r
pi
)− r
λh
)
.
Note that both prices and returns only depend on the inequality measure pi. However,
for this type of equilibrium to exist, we need a relatively unequal distribution and a
big market friction h. In particular, the equilibrium conditions require the following:
K ≤ βφy
∗
(1 + β)y
and r <
ϕl(1 + β)
β(pi − lϕ) .
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1.C Appendix: Institutional background and data for China
1.C.1 Backgrounds
Before 1978 China had a centrally planned socialist economy in which the own-
ership of land (and housing) was nationalized and public rental housing was the
predominate form of urban housing provision. Little has been changed about China’s
housing welfare system during early 1980s, after China’s major reform in 1978. It
was not until 1988 that the Chinese constitution was amended to allow for land
transactions, which set the legal stage for the privatization of housing in China.
In the mid-1990s, the Chinese central government identified the final goal of hous-
ing reform as the creation of a new urban housing system that suited socialist market
economics: “commodity housing” was allowed for market transaction. Moreover, em-
ployees in the state sector were encouraged to purchase full or partial property rights
of their current apartment units at subsidized prices. However, the housing reform of
this period did not manage to completely shift the system away from state-provided
housing. Commodity housing was still relatively rare during this period.
An important milestone in housing policy occurred in 1998, when the central
government announced that welfare housing distribution in urban China would be
abandoned at the end of 1998 and completely replaced by market provision. Market
provision of housing surged after 1998: the share of private housing units among all
completed housing units almost doubled in 4 years, increasing from about 30% in
1998 to over 50% in 2002 (Wu et al. (2014)). Moreover, during the same period, the
People’s Bank of China lowered the mortgage interest rate five times to encourage
home purchases (Fang et al. (2015)).
According to Walder and He (2014), in 2002, 78% of all households in urban China
owned their homes with partial or full property rights and only 16% continued to live
in rent-subsidized work unit housing: the housing privatization program was roughly
complete. For more discussion about the housing market development in China after
the early 2000s, readers are referred to Fang et al. (2015) and Wu et al. (2015).
1.C.2 Household income and wealth data in China
The availability of household-level data from China is limited. One common data
source being used in the literature to study questions related to cross-sectional income
in China is the annual Urban Household Survey (UHS) conducted by the National
Bureau of Statistics (for example, see Piketty and Qian (2009); Chamon and Prasad
(2010); and Yang et al. (2013) for example). However, UHS does not adequately
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account for household wealth.
One of the few options for detailed information on both household income and
household wealth during 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century is the Chinese
Household Income Project (CHIP). Due to increasing interest in household finance
and the wealth distribution in China, more efforts have been made in data collection,
and several sources are now available after the end of the first decade of the 21st
century. The China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), which this paper adopts, has
arguably the best quality data for the purpose of this study.48
In the following section, I describe the two data sources in more detail. In the
interest of saving space, this appendix does not present detailed calculation procedures
for all of the distributional statistics used in the main text of this paper; however,
these calculations are available upon request.
The Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) The Chinese Household In-
come Project, carried out by a team of international economists in collaboration with
China’s National Bureau of Statistics, has conducted a series of national surveys cov-
ering the years 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2007. Each wave of CHIP contains both a
rural survey and an urban survey, and the implementation is largely consistent across
waves, with the 2007 wave as an exception. In this study, we only use the urban
survey in each wave.
The urban surveys collect detailed information on household wealth and its com-
ponents, including financial assets, market value of private housing, production assets,
and value of durable consumer goods. In particular, the housing value in CHIP is
estimated by asking households to assess the market value of their owned housing.
This is similar to the procedure used by the Survey of Consumer Finance.
One major drawback of CHIP is that it does not contain sample weights. For more
details about CHIP, such as its sample size, sampling procedure, and geographical
coverage, readers are referred to Shi and Zhao (2007).
The China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) The China Family Panel Studies
(CFPS) are a nationally representative, annual longitudinal survey of Chinese com-
munities, families, and individuals. The survey was launched in 2010 by the Institute
48Another major household survey that aims to capture Chinese household wealth and that has
recently become available is the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), which is conducted by
the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China. However, the CHFS data suggest a
wealth-over-income ratio that is too high (as high as about 20, according to some initial analysis of
CHFS 2012). Xie and Jin (forthcoming) make more comparisons between the CHFS and the CFPS.
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of Social Science Survey of Peking University, China. The data on a follow-up survey
conducted in 2012 are also available. Like CHIP, during each wave CFPS conducts
two separate surveys for rural and urban areas. In this study, we only use the urban
survey in each wave.
The CFPS dataset contains comprehensive measurements of assets, including
housing assets, financial assets (which are further broken down into subcategories,
such as fixed bank deposits, stocks, and mutual funds, etc.), business assets, detailed
items of durable goods, and liabilities from housing and other sources. As in CHIP, in
CFPS information on housing values is obtained by directly asking homeowners how
much their houses are worth. Some missing housing values are imputed according
to the size of the house and unit value for similar housing types. Dropping those
imputed values do not affect any of the data moments used in this paper.
Detailed sampling weights are available for each wave of CFPS as well as for
cross-sectional analysis between 2010 and 2012 waves. A detailed account of the
advantage of CFPS in capturing Chinese household wealth can be found in Xie and
Jin (forthcoming).
1.C.3 Income inequality and house prices in China
Panel (b) in Figure 1.1.1 show four series of income inequality measures in urban
China: income and wage shares of the top 5 and top 10 percent. Note that, unlike
the income-tax based cross-sectional income data used in panel (a) of Figure 1.1.1,
administrative income statistics for China are not available. Existing data on income
distribution in China are largely based on household surveys (see Piketty and Qian
(2009)). Income inequality measures based on household surveys are often less com-
parable to those based on administrative sources. Moreover, the income concentration
in China at 2002 (calculated by author) is much lower than most countries in Panel
(a) in Figure 1.1.1 (the top 5 percent income share is 14% in China at 2002, while
it is 30% at the same time in the United States); thus, I show four different income
inequality series for China. Section 1.3.5 discusses the wealth inequality comparison
between China and the United States.
Panel (b) in Figure 1.1.1 also presents the residential land prices series in urban
China, together with a series of per capita income. Note that I only present here a
land price index because reliable house prices data is publicly unavailable for China.49
49 According to China’s official house price indices, the average housing price (urban) appreciation
is only mild compared to aggregate income growth. However, these indices are mistrusted and
widely criticized due to the lack of quality adjustments in their construction. Constant quality price
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To simplify the discussion, I will refer to this land price index as an approximation
of house prices in the rest of the paper.50 All the income inequality measures grew
significantly during the considered time periods. In particular, the income share of
the top 5 percent grew from 14% to 26% between 2002 and 2012: in other words,
it has almost doubled. During the same time, house prices grew significantly faster
than the already fast income growth.
The source for the years 2002 and 2003 is the Ministry of Land and Resources
of China. The trend is constructed by HP filtering the raw data with frequency
parameter λ = 6.25.
In Panel (b), the residential land price indexes are Wharton/NUS/Tsinghua Chi-
nese Residential Land Price Indexes taken from Deng et al. (2014). Note that I only
present here a land price index because reliable house prices data is publicly un-
available for China. See footnote 49 for more details. Real per capita income is the
Average Wage of Employed Persons in Urban Units taken from National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS) of China (deflated by the Urban Household Consumer Price Index).
series developed by academic researchers mostly appreciate at a faster pace than aggregate income,
although with regional variations. See Wu et al. (2014), Deng et al. (2014), Wu et al. (2015) and
Fang et al. (2015) for more details. Still, a well trusted aggregate house price index is not publicly
available for China. The residential land price index presented here is relatively more developed and
taken from Deng et al. (2014).
50In general, land prices can be very different from house prices. However, house prices and land
prices go hand in hand in China during the time periods considered in this paper. According to
Fang et al. (2015) and Wu et al. (2015), house prices growth roughly matches with the growth in
land prices in China over the past decade. Moreover, Wu et al. (2015) show that house prices growth
in China is driven by rising land values, not by construction costs.
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1.D Appendix: Computation
1.D.1 Solving for the stationary equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium is formally defined by the conditions presented in Sec-
tion 1.3.3, with the assumption that {Yt, pit, Ht}alwaysstayconstantas(Y¯ , p¯i, H¯). The
additional assumption implies an economy with a stationary distribution Λ∗ over (ε,
β˜i, b, h, i) in which households behave optimally and markets always clear with prices
{P ∗, R∗}. We approximate the distribution Λ∗ by an economy with a finite number
of households, each characterized by its individual type (ε, β˜i, b, h, i).
Note that, to solve their individual problems, households in this economy only
need to know market prices and returns for both bonds and housing. Since P ∗
and R∗ are sufficient statistics to determine the return on housing, the problem is
reduced to finding the pair of prices P ∗ and R∗ that can clear all the markets when
households all behave optimally. However, directly searching for the equilibrium price
pair {P ∗, R∗} can be very time consuming because it involves repeatedly re-solving
individual optimization problems over all the combinations of {P , R} and simulating
data to check for market clearing conditions. This is especially the case since in the
price searching process it is hard to find an updating rule that can make P and R
monotonically converge due to their intercorrelation.
A more efficient approach is to use the goods market clearing condition (2iv)
to identify the correlation between P and R, along with other aggregate state vari-
ables: aggregate savings in bonds A, housing transaction volume (Ω), and the housing
transaction frequency (F ), and ultimately to eliminate one of the two prices. Here
we choose to eliminate the rental price R. By treating R as a residue from condi-
tion (2iv), and searching for a stationary combination of the other aggregate variables
{P ∗, A∗, Ω∗, F ∗}, it is easy to find a monotonically converging price updating rule
when utilizing the downward sloping demand property. The algorithm outlined in
the following describes this computation procedure in detail:
Let {P k, Ak,Ωk, F k} represent the kth guess of the set of aggregate state variables.
Step 1, Guess a set of aggregate variables {P k, Ak,Ωk, F k}.
Step 2, Given the set of aggregate variables, solve for the households’ optimal deci-
sion rules {bki , hki }i∈{B,T}. This step of the algorithm requires solving the households’
value functions V ki . To find V
k
i , I first approximate the household’s continuation
value function with a set of interpolation grids for (b, h). I then use a value func-
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tion iteration procedure to solve the household’s parametric dynamic programming
problem as defined in Section 1.3.3. Note that, by imposing {P k, Ak,Ωk, F k} in the
household optimization problem, we can derive Rk according to the goods market
clearing condition (2iv).
Step 3, Using the above obtained optimal decisions, we simulate the economy using
M households and Z periods. M needs to be large enough and Z needs to be long
enough such that the simulated economy becomes stationary within Z periods. In
practice, M is chosen to be 100, 000 and Z is set at 1, 000.51
Step 4, Calculate relevant aggregate statistics in the ending period of the simulation
when the economy is stable. In particular, we collect total demand for housing assets
and total demand for housing rentals in order to check equilibrium conditions.
Step 5, Check whether housing asset market clearing condition (2iii) and housing
rental market clearing condition (2ii) are satisfied.52 If not, update the guess for
the set of aggregate variables {P k, Ak,Ωk, F k} and go back to Step 1. Note that
the updating rule can be straightforwardly set according to the downward sloping
demand property since we only have one price in the set of aggregate variables.
1.D.2 Solving for the transition path equilibrium
This appendix describes the computation method to solve for the perfect foresight
transition path equilibrium between two steady states, as described in Section 1.4.1.
As solving for the steady-state equilibrium, the computation is done by a fixed
point iteration procedure. The main difference is that, instead of iterating over a set
of stationary aggregate variables, we now need to iterate over a set of sequences of
aggregate state variables.
Moreover, there is a setup stage when we need to get the following objects ready:
a sample distribution Λ0 over (ε, β˜
i, b, h, i) drawn from the initial steady state, an
initial guess of the length for the transition period T , and the value functions from
the new steady-state equilibrium from period T onward.
After the setup stage, the algorithm begins by setting the relevant aggregate vari-
ables in periods t = 0 and t = T equal to their initial and final steady-state values.
51Note that we divide those M households into bottom earner group and top earner group, ac-
cording to their population share. When M is set at 100, 000, the economy usually stabilizes after
about 100 periods, starting from reasonable initial conditions. We set Z = 1, 000 for extra caution.
52Note that the good market clearing condition (2iv) is automatically satisfied by the derivation
of Rk.
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Next, a guess is made for the remaining sequences of aggregate state variables along
the transition path. The transition path is found using the following algorithm:
Let {P kt , Akt ,Ωkt , F kt }t=T−1t=1 represent the kth guess of the set of sequences of aggregate
state variables along the transition path.
Step 1, Guess a set of aggregate variables {P kt , Akt ,Ωkt , F kt }t=T−1t=1 .
Step 2, Given the set of aggregate variables, solve for the households’ optimal decision
rules at each time period t ≤ T − 1. Note that the decision rules can be solved
backward, starting from period T−1, taking the sequence of aggregate state variables
{P kt , Akt ,Ωkt , F kt }t=Tt=1 and ending period value functions as given. Similarly as in solving
the steady-state equilibrium, in each period, we first need to derive Rkt according
to goods market clearing condition before we can solve for the households’ optimal
decision rule.
Step 3, Using the above obtained sequences of optimal decisions, we simulate the
initial distribution Λ0 along the transition path from period t = 1 to period t = T −1.
Step 4, Calculate relevant aggregate statistics in each period, based on the simulation
results.
Step 5, Check whether market clearing conditions in each period are satisfied. If not,
update the guess for the set of aggregate variables {P kt , Akt ,Ωkt , F kt }t=T−1t=1 and go back
to Step 1.
Finally, we update the length of the transition period T if necessary. We only need
to do this if the converged aggregate state variables in period t = T − 1 do not
match with those in period T , the new steady-state values. In practice, any T ≥ 50
will result in the same computed equilibrium, within a given level of the convergence
precision.
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CHAPTER 2
The Welfare and Distributional Effects of Fiscal
Uncertainty: a Quantitative Evaluation
Coauthored with Ru¨diger Bachmann, Jinhui Bai, and Minjoon Lee
This study explores the welfare and distributional effects of fiscal un-
certainty using a neoclassical stochastic growth model with incomplete
markets. In our model, households face uninsurable idiosyncratic risks in
their labor income and discount factor processes, and we allow aggregate
uncertainty to arise from both productivity and government purchases
shocks. We calibrate our model to key features of the U.S. economy,
before eliminating government purchases shocks. We then evaluate the
distributional consequences of the elimination of fiscal uncertainty and
find that, in our baseline case, welfare gains decline with private wealth
holdings.
2.1 Introduction
One consequence of the financial crisis has been the perception of high policy
uncertainty in both the U.S. and in Europe. In one study, Baker et al. (2015) analyze
Internet news and find a (causal) relationship between high policy uncertainty and
subdued aggregate economic activity. In another study, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.
(2011) find large contractionary effects of fiscal uncertainty on economic activity
accompanied by inflationary pressure, especially when the nominal interest rate is at
the zero lower bound. These findings are reinforced by a 2012 Economic Policy Survey
among business economists (Economic Policy Survey (2012)): “the vast majority of a
panel of 236 business economists ‘feels that uncertainty about fiscal policy is holding
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back the pace of economic recovery’.” Finally, Azzimonti (2014) shows that, in recent
decades, political polarization in the U.S. has increased, which may lead to heightened
fiscal uncertainty.1
Most of the existing research on fiscal uncertainty has focused on the aggregate
effects of short-run fluctuations of uncertainty on various macroeconomic variables
(see below for a more detailed discussion of the literature). However, this literature
has not explored the welfare and distributional consequences of fiscal uncertainty.2
In this paper, we provide such an analysis and address the following question: how
large are the welfare costs of fluctuations in government purchases for different wealth
households?
To do so, we follow the approach of Krusell and Smith (1998) and use an incom-
plete market model where heterogeneous households face uninsurable idiosyncratic
risks in their labor income and discount factor processes. We then calibrate this model
with U.S. data, in particular data on U.S. wealth inequality. Our model has aggre-
gate uncertainty arising from both productivity and government purchases shocks.
We thus specify government purchases shocks as the only fundamental source of fis-
cal uncertainty. In line with the data, we further assume that government purchases
shocks are independent of aggregate productivity and employment conditions. Gov-
ernment purchases enter the utility function of the households as separable goods.3
Because the government partially funds its expenditures through taxation, pur-
chases fluctuations generate uncertain household tax rates. To capture the distri-
butional effects of fiscal shocks through taxation, we model key features of the pro-
gressive U.S. income tax system. In a progressive tax system, aggregate government
purchases fluctuations may lead to changes in the distribution of household-specific
tax rates and thus to idiosyncratic after-tax income uncertainty. We also employ an
empirical tax revenue response rule, which includes government debt and is estimated
from U.S. data.
To eliminate fiscal uncertainty, we follow Krusell and Smith (1999) and Krusell et
al. (2009), start from a stochastic steady state of the economy with both productivity
and government purchases shocks, and remove the fiscal shocks at a given point
in time by replacing them with their conditional expectations, while retaining the
aggregate productivity process. We then compute the transition path towards the
1McCarty et al. (2006) makes a similar point in the political science literature.
2We follow the widespread use in the recent literature and treat “fiscal uncertainty” and “fiscal
volatility” as synonymous in this paper.
3We consider other utility specifications with complementary and substitutable private-public
good relationships, respectively, in extensions to the baseline calibration.
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new stochastic steady state in full general equilibrium. Based on the quantitative
solution for this transition path, we then compare the welfare of various household
groups in the transition-path equilibrium to their welfare level with both aggregate
shocks in place.
Our results show that the magnitude of aggregate welfare costs from fiscal shocks
is comparable to that of the welfare costs of business cycle fluctuations reported in
Lucas (1987, 2003), even though in our model aggregate (spending) fluctuations lead
to idiosyncratic after-tax income uncertainty. The welfare gains of eliminating fiscal
uncertainty are decreasing in household wealth. However, alternative implementa-
tions of the progressive U.S. federal income tax system and the empirical tax revenue
response rule may reverse this pattern. We also find that in two counterfactual tax
systems, a linear income tax system and a lump sum tax system, the welfare gains
of eliminating fiscal uncertainty increase with household wealth. An investigation
of the reasons behind these distributional results uncovers the mechanisms through
which fiscal uncertainty influences economic welfare. We conclude that the details
of the (progressive) tax system determine which wealth group experiences the tax
uncertainty burden caused by government purchases shocks, and thus benefits the
most from the elimination of these shocks.
Since uncertain tax rates pre-multiply income levels, they generate – loosely speak-
ing – multiplicative after-tax income risk.4 Just as with the additive endowment risk
in early incomplete market models, this after-tax income risk leads households to
self-insure through precautionary saving. Wealth-rich households can thus achieve a
higher degree of self-insurance relative to wealth-poor households. Indeed, we find
that wealth-rich households show less consumption volatility both before and after
the elimination of fiscal uncertainty. They also experience a smaller reduction in con-
sumption fluctuations due to the policy change. Consequently, from a precautionary
saving perspective, wealth-poor households should gain more when fiscal uncertainty
is eliminated.
However, due to the multiplicative nature of the after-tax income risk, the tax-
rate uncertainty induced by government purchases fluctuations also creates a rate-
of-return risk to savings, which in turn impacts the quality of capital and bonds as
saving vehicles.5 From this perspective, eliminating fiscal uncertainty facilitates the
intertemporal transfer of resources, and thus benefits the wealth-rich, who have more
4This is cleanest in a linear tax system. However, even in a progressive tax system, the fluctuating
average tax rates work like multiplicative after-tax income risk.
5Angeletos and Calvet (2006), in a seminal contribution on risk in incomplete markets, discuss
this tension between labor endowment risk and rate-of-return uncertainty.
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resources to save. Which of the two effects dominates, depends – as we will show – on
the details of the implementation of the progressive tax system in the model. If the
tax rate uncertainty induced by government purchases fluctuations is concentrated
on households in the middle of the wealth distribution, the precautionary saving
effect dominates, and the welfare gains are decreasing in household wealth. Under
an implementation where the wealth-rich households are significantly exposed to the
tax-rate volatility caused by fiscal uncertainty, the quality-of-saving-vehicle channel
starts to matter more, and the distributional welfare gain pattern might be reversed.
Finally, the distributional effects of eliminating fiscal uncertainty can depend on
general equilibrium price changes.6 The precautionary saving and quality-of-saving-
vehicle channels lead to endogenous responses of the aggregate capital stock along the
transition path, changing both the pre-tax capital rate-of-return and real wages. In
our baseline specification, the aggregate capital stock declines after the elimination of
fiscal uncertainty. This favors the wealth-rich through higher pre-tax rates of return,
but disadvantages the wealth-poor through lower pre-tax real wages.
In addition to our baseline, we consider three counterfactual fiscal regimes: a bal-
anced budget with a progressive tax system, a linear tax system, and a lump-sum
tax system, with the latter two allowing for government debt. In another variation,
we show that when private and public consumption are complements, the overall
welfare gains from eliminating government purchases fluctuations are higher, because
a higher government purchases level leads to a higher marginal utility of private
consumption when taxes are high (because government purchases are high). That
is, taxes are high when households would receive substantial utility from additional
private consumption, making government purchases fluctuations all the more un-
pleasant. Finally, motivated by recent policy discussions of the possible permanence
of heightened fiscal uncertainty, we examine the welfare consequences if we double
the historical government purchases volatility level. Our results suggest that the wel-
fare effects of fiscal uncertainty are symmetric between zero and twice the pre-crisis
volatility of government purchases.
In addition to its substantive contributions, our study makes a technical con-
tribution to the literature. Specifically, we merge the algorithm for computing the
deterministic transition path in heterogeneous-agent economies from Huggett (1997)
and Krusell and Smith (1999), and the algorithm for computing a stochastic recursive
equilibrium in Krusell and Smith (1998), to show that an approximation of the wealth
6There is also a direct utility effect because households are risk averse with respect to government
purchases fluctuations.
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distribution and its law of motion by a finite number of moments can also be applied
to a stochastic transition path analysis. Recall that after fiscal uncertainty is elim-
inated, our economy is still subject to aggregate productivity shocks. This solution
method may prove useful for other quantitative studies of stochastic transition-path
equilibria.
Related Literature
Besides the general link to the literature on incomplete markets and wealth in-
equality (see Heathcote et al. (2009) for an overview), our study is most closely related
to three strands of literature.
First, our paper contributes to research on the welfare costs of aggregate fluctu-
ations (see Lucas (2003) for a comprehensive discussion). As in Krusell and Smith
(1999), Mukoyama and Sahin (2006) and Krusell et al. (2009), we quantify the welfare
and distributional consequences of eliminating macroeconomic fluctuations. However,
while these studies focus on TFP fluctuations, we examine the welfare consequences
of eliminating fluctuations in government purchases. Our study complements theirs
by examining fluctuations due to fiscal policy, arguably a more plausible candidate
shock to be (fully) eliminated by a policy maker – they are, after all, the result of a
policy decision.
Second, our paper relates to the recent literature about the effects of economic
uncertainty on aggregate economic activity. Most of the research in this stream of
literature has focused on the amplification and propagation mechanisms for persis-
tent, but temporary uncertainty shocks, which are typically modeled and measured
as changes to the conditional variance of traditional economic shocks. These uncer-
tainty shocks include second-moment shocks to aggregate productivity, and policy
and financial variables, which are often propagated through physical production fac-
tor adjustment costs, sticky prices, or financial frictions (see e.g., Arellano et al.
(2012), Bachmann and Bayer (2013, 2014), Baker et al. (2015), Basu and Bundick
(2012), Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2012), Born and Pfeifer (2014), Croce et al.
(2012), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011), Gilchrist et al. (2014), Kelly et al. (2014),
Mumtaz and Surico (2015), Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013), Nodari (2014), Pastor and
Veronesi (2012, 2013), and Stokey (2015)). Other studies investigate the effects of
uncertainty in the time-varying parameters of monetary or fiscal feedback rules (Bi
et al. (2013), Davig and Leeper (2011), and Richter and Throckmorton (2015)). Our
study complements this literature by focusing on the welfare and distributional effects
of a permanent elimination of fiscal fluctuations.
Finally, our work contributes to the growing body of literature on macroeconomic
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policy in environments with heterogeneous agent (Auclert (2015), Bachmann and
Bai (2013), Bhandari et al. (2013), Boehm (2015), Brinca et al. (2015), Ferriere and
Navarro (2014), Gornemann et al. (2012), Gomes et al. (2013), Heathcote (2005),
Kaplan and Violante (2014), Li (2013) and McKay and Reis (2013)). There is also
a budding empirical literature on the distributional consequences of policy actions:
see Coibion et al. (2012) for the case of monetary policy, and Giorgi and Gambetti
(2012) for the case of fiscal policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 discusses its calibration. Section 4 describes our solution method. Section
5 presents the baseline findings on the welfare and distributional effects of elimi-
nating government purchases fluctuations, while Section 6 investigates these welfare
and distributional effects in alternative model specifications. We close in Section 7
with final comments and relegate the details of the quantitative procedure to various
appendices.
2.2 Model
Following Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993), we model an incomplete market
setting where a continuum of infinitely-lived heterogeneous households face uninsur-
able idiosyncratic risks in their labor efficiency processes. We also include aggregate
productivity shocks as well as shocks to a household’s discount factor, as in Krusell
and Smith (1998). We then add aggregate uncertainty from government purchases
shocks. In our model exposition, we focus our discussion on the fiscal elements.
2.2.1 The private sector
Our households are ex-ante identical, with preferences given by:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, Gt) , (2.2.1)
where βt denotes the cumulative discount factor between period 0 and period t. In
particular, βt = β˜βt−1, where β˜ is an idiosyncratic shock following a three-state,
first-order Markov process. Furthermore, ct denotes private consumption, and Gt the
public good provided by the government (government purchases).
The strictly concave flow utility function has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
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with respect to a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) aggregate of c and G,
u (ct, Gt) =
(
θc1−ρt + (1− θ)G1−ρt
) 1−γ
1−ρ − 1
1− γ , (2.2.2)
where γ is the risk aversion parameter and 1/ρ is the elasticity of substitution between
c and G. We discuss the details of the Gt-process in the next subsection.
Our households also face idiosyncratic employment shocks. We denote the em-
ployment process by ε, which follows a first-order Markov process with two states
{0, 1}. ε = 1 denotes that the household is employed, providing a fixed amount of
labor l˜ to the market, and is paid the market wage, w. ε = 0 represents the unem-
ployed state of a household who receives an unemployment insurance payment that
equals a fraction ω of the current wage income of an employed household.
We represent the aggregate production technology as a Cobb-Douglas function:
Yt = ztF (Kt, Lt) = ztK
α
t L
1−α
t , (2.2.3)
where Kt is aggregate capital, Lt is aggregate labor efficiency input, and zt is the
aggregate productivity level. zt follows a two-state (zg, zb) first-order Markov process,
where zg and zb denote aggregate productivity in good and bad times, respectively.
Note that, because of the law of large numbers, Lt equals (1 − ut)l˜, where ut is the
unemployment rate. We also allow the unemployment rate to take one of two values:
ug in good times and ub in bad times. In this way, ut and zt move perfectly together.
We now specify the standard aggregate resource constraint:
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt, (2.2.4)
where Ct represents aggregate consumption, and δ the depreciation rate.
The markets in our model are perfectly competitive. Labor and capital services are
traded on spot markets each period, at factor prices r(Kt, Lt, zt) = αztK
α−1
t L
1−α
t − δ
and w(Kt, Lt, zt) = (1 − α)ztKαt L−αt . In addition, we assume that the households
can trade one-period government bonds on the asset market in each period t. For
computational tractability, we follow Heathcote (2005) and assume that government
bonds pay the same rate-of-return as physical capital in all future states in t + 1.
Because of the assumed perfect substitutability between capital and bonds, each
household has access to effectively only one asset in self-insuring against stochastic
shocks. We use a to denote a household’s total asset holdings, i.e., the sum of physical
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capital and government bonds.
2.2.2 Fiscal uncertainty and the government budget
Our model has three government spending components: government purchases,
Gt, aggregate unemployment insurance payments, Trt, and aggregate debt repay-
ments, (1 + rt)Bt. Government purchases are the only fundamental source of fiscal
uncertainty. They follow an AR(1) process in logarithms:
log (Gt+1) = (1− ρg) log (G) + ρg log (Gt) + (1− ρ2g)
1
2σgg,t+1, (2.2.5)
where ρg is a persistence parameter, log (G) is the unconditional mean of log (Gt),
g,t+1 is an innovation term which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance
one, and σg is the unconditional standard deviation of log (Gt). Note that the gov-
ernment purchases process is independent of the process for aggregate productivity.
As is well known and as we show below, government purchases are roughly acyclical
in U.S. quarterly data.
The aggregate unemployment insurance payment, Trt = utωwtl˜, depends on both
the unemployment rate, ut, and the size of the unemployment insurance payment for
each household, ωwtl˜.
We assume that government spending at time t is financed through a combination
of aggregate tax revenue, Tt, and new government debt, Bt+1. As in Bohn (1998)
and Davig and Leeper (2011), we model the aggregate tax revenue net of transfers
(as a fraction of GDP) as an (increasing) function of the debt-to-GDP ratio, making
the debt-to-GDP ratio stationary. We can thus specify the following fiscal rule for
determining tax revenue:
Tt − Trt
Yt
= ρT,0 + ρT,Y log(
Yt
Y
) + ρT,B
Bt
Yt
+ ρT,G
Gt
Yt
, (2.2.6)
where (ρT,0, ρT,Y , ρT,B, ρT,G) is a vector of positive coefficients and Y is a constant
number equal to the unconditional mean of GDP in the ergodic distribution.7 Fur-
thermore, ρT,Y captures the automatic stabilizer role of the U.S. tax system when
ρT,Y > 0, and ρT,B and ρT,G reflect the capability of the endogenous revenue adjust-
ment system in maintaining long-run fiscal sustainability. Note that our fiscal rule
implies that the government purchases level (relative to GDP) and the GDP gap are
7Y serves as a normalization to make the coefficients of the fiscal rule scale-free. Also, while
ρT,B > 0 is necessary for the debt-to-GDP ratio to be stationary, this condition is not imposed.
Instead, all coefficients in equation (2.2.6) are estimated from the data, and this estimated ρT,B just
turns out to be positive.
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the main non-debt determinants of the primary surplus.
Given the total tax revenue in (2.2.6), we can use the government budget con-
straint to determine the dynamics of aggregate government debt Bt+1:
Bt+1 = (1 + rt)Bt + (Gt + Trt − Tt). (2.2.7)
2.2.3 The progressive tax system
Because the distribution of the tax burden across households is important for
quantifying the distributional effects of fiscal policies, we model the tax system to
approximate the current U.S. tax regime as realistically as possible while maintaining
a certain tractability. Specifically, the government uses a flat-rate consumption tax
and a progressive income tax to raise the aggregate tax revenue Tt. The consumption
tax is given by:
τ c(ct) = τcct. (2.2.8)
This specification allows the model to capture sources of tax revenue other than
income taxes, which in turn provides a total income tax burden that is in line with
the data.
Following Castan˜eda et al. (2003), we specify the progressive income tax function
as:
τ y (yt) =
τ1
[
yt −
(
y−τ2t + s
)− 1
τ2
]
+ τ0yt if yt > 0
0 if yt ≤ 0,
(2.2.9)
where (τ0, τ1, τ2, s) is a vector of tax coefficients and yt is taxable household income;
or yt = rtat + wtεtl˜.
8 The first term in the above equation is based on Gouveia and
Strauss’ (1994) characterization of the effective federal income tax burden of U.S.
households. The federal income tax accounts for about 40% of federal government
revenue and is the main driver of progressivity in the U.S. tax system (Piketty and
Saez, 2007). The linear term, τ0yt, is used to capture any remaining tax revenue,
including state income taxes, property taxes and excise taxes.
With these tax specifications, a household’s budget constraint can be written as:
(1 + τc)ct + at+1 = at + yt − τ y (yt) + (1− εt)ωw(Kt, Lt, zt)l˜. (2.2.10)
Note that equation (2.2.6) specifies a fiscal rule to calculate the aggregate govern-
8Unlike in Castan˜eda et al. (2003), where households cannot borrow and thus cannot have nega-
tive income, yt can be negative in our model in rare cases, so that we have to specify the tax function
also for the case of yt < 0.
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ment tax revenue. Equations (2.2.8) and (2.2.9), on the other hand, model the con-
crete tax instruments with which the government collects the aggregate tax revenue.
These two sets of equations are compatible only if we treat one of the parameters
in equation (2.2.9) as an endogenous tax instrument, to be determined in equilib-
rium, rather than a fixed tax parameter. Following Conesa and Kru¨ger (2006) and
Conesa et al. (2009), we choose, in the baseline specification, s for this endogenous
parameter, st, and denote the resulting tax function by τ
y(yt; st). Adjusting s means
that the overall progressivity of the tax system becomes the main tax instrument to
raise the tax revenue required by the fiscal rule, while the top marginal (average) tax
rates are approximately constant at τ0 + τ1.
9 This adjustment allows us to satisfy the
empirical fiscal rule that describes aggregate U.S. tax adjustments well, and, more
importantly, ensures the stationarity of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Consequently, we
take the empirical fiscal rule as given and endogenously adjust one aspect of the tax
system to make the two sets of equations compatible as in Davig and Leeper (2011)
and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011).
Given our tax function specification, we can now specify total tax revenue as
follows:
Tt = τcCt +
∫ 1
0
[
τ0yi,t + τ1
(
yi,t −
(
y−τ2i,t + st
)− 1
τ2
)]
∗ 1(yi,t > 0)di. (2.2.11)
Equation (2.2.11) defines an implicit function of st. Recall that Tt is governed by
Gt, Yt, Bt, and Trt through the fiscal rule specified in equation (2.2.6). This means
that, for a given inherited level of bond holdings, Bt, st fluctuates in response to
changes in both Gt and the income distribution. As a result, in our baseline model
the aggregate uncertainty in Gt translates into idiosyncratic tax rate uncertainty.
2.2.4 The household’s decision problem and the competitive equilibrium
In this subsection, we discuss the household’s dynamic decision problem, which
is determined by both the idiosyncratic state vector (a, ε, β˜) and the aggregate state
vector (Γ, B, z,G), where Γ denotes the measure of households over (a, ε, β˜). We
9Both the derivative of equation (2.2.9) and equation (2.2.9) divided by yt converge to τ0 + τ1 for
large yt. In Section 6, we examine two alternative specifications, where we let τ0 and τ1, respectively,
be the tax instruments that adjust endogenously.
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begin by letting HΓ denote the equilibrium transition function for Γ:
10
Γ′ = HΓ(Γ, B, z,G, z′). (2.2.12)
We next let HB denote the (exogenous) transition function for B, as described in
equation (2.2.7):
B′ = HB(Γ, B, z,G). (2.2.13)
Finally, we let S denote the equilibrium function for the endogenous tax parameter
s, which is implicitly determined in equation (2.2.11):
s = S(Γ, B, z,G). (2.2.14)
The dynamic programming problem faced by a household can now be written as
follows:
V (a, ε, β˜,Γ, B, z,G;HΓ, S) = max
c,a′
{u(c,G)+β˜E[V (a′, ε′, β˜′,Γ′, B′, z′, G′;HΓ, S)|ε, β˜, z, G]}
subject to:
(1 + τc)c+ a
′ = a+ y − τ y (y; s) + (1− ε)ωw(K,L, z)l˜
y = r(K,L, z)a+ w(K,L, z)εl˜,
a′ ≥ a,
Γ′ = HΓ(Γ, B, z,G, z′),
B′ = HB(Γ, B, z,G),
s = S(Γ, B, z,G),
where ε and β˜ follow the processes specified in Section 2.2.1, G follows the process
specified in equation (2.2.5), and a is an exogenously set borrowing constraint. Finally,
we can summarize the optimal saving decision for households in the following policy
function:
a′ = h(a, ε, β˜,Γ, B, z,G;HΓ, S). (2.2.15)
Our recursive competitive equilibrium is then defined as: the law of motion HΓ,
11
10Note that z′, but not G′, is an argument of HΓ. This is because, in our setting, which reflects
the setting in Krusell and Smith (1998), the future z affects the employment transition process,
while the G-process is independent of other processes. Note that we also leave time subscripts and
switch into recursive notation now.
11Note that since HB is exogenously determined by equation (2.2.7), it is not an equilibrium
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individual value and policy functions {V, h}, pricing functions {r, w}, and the S-
function for the endogenous parameter s, such that:
1. {V, h} solve the household’s problem.
2. {r, w} are competitively determined.
3. S satisfies equation (2.2.11) with the fiscal rule (2.2.6) replacing Tt.
4. HΓ is generated by h.
The economy without a fluctuating Gt is identical, except for the deterministic
Gt-process.
2.3 Calibration
In this section, we discuss our model calibration beginning with basic parameters.
The frequency of our model economy is quarterly. We parameterize the model to
match important aggregate and cross-sectional statistics of the U.S. economy (Table
2.3.1).
2.3.1 Basic parameters
We set the relative risk aversion parameter γ = 1, and the elasticity of substitution
between private consumption and the public good 1/ρ = 1. To calibrate the weight of
private consumption in the utility function, θ, we assume that the Lindahl-Samuelson
condition holds for our economy in the long-run. This means that there is efficient
provision of public goods, i.e., there are equalized marginal utilities from private and
public goods. Mathematically, this is represented as
∫ 1
0
(1−θ)/Gt
θ/cit
di = 1, on average
over many time periods. With this procedure, θ is calibrated to 0.722.
We take other parameter values directly from Krusell and Smith (1998): the
depreciation rate is δ = 0.025, the capital elasticity of output in the production
function is α = 0.36, and labor supply is normalized to l˜ = 0.3271. We allow our
aggregate productivity process, zt, to take on two values, zg = 1.01 and zb = 0.99,
with unemployment rates of ug = 0.04 and ub = 0.1, respectively. The transition
matrix for zt is as follows: [
0.875 0.125
0.125 0.875 ,
]
object.
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Table 2.3.1: Summary of parameters
Parameter Value Description Source / Target
Taken from the literature
1/ρ 1.00 Substitutability between c and G Standard value
γ 1.00 Relative risk aversion Standard value
α 0.36 Capital share Standard value
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate Standard value
l˜ 0.3271 Hours of labor supply of employed Normalization
(zl, zh) (0.99, 1.01) Support of aggr. productivity Krusell and Smith (1998)
Πz,z′ See text Transit matrix of aggr. productivity Krusell and Smith (1998)
(ug , ub) (4%, 10%) Possible unemployment rates Krusell and Smith (1998)
Πεε′|zz′ See text Transit matrix of emp. process Krusell and Smith (1998)
ω 0.10 Replacement rate Krusell and Smith (1998)
(τ1, τ2) (0.258, 0.768) Progressive tax function Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Estimated from the data
τ0 5.25% Income tax parameter
τc 8.14% Consumption tax rate
ρT,B 0.0173 Debt coefficient of fiscal rule
ρT,Y 0.2820 Output coefficient of fiscal rule
ρT,G 0.4835 Government purchases coefficient
(Gl/Gm, Gh/Gm) (0.951, 1.049) Size of the G-shock
ΠG,G′ See text Transit matrix of the G-process
Calibrated in the model
θ 0.7221 Weight on private consumption Lindahl-Samuelson condition
Gm 0.2319 Middle grid of the G-process Mean G/Y (20.86%)
a -4.15 Borrowing constraint Share with negative wealth (11%)
ρT,0 0.1007 Intercept of tax revenue rule Mean B/Y (30%)
β˜m 0.9919 Medium value of discount factor Mean K/Y (2.5)
β˜h − β˜m, β˜m − β˜l 0.0046 Size of discount factor variation Gini coeff. (0.79)
Πβ˜,β˜′ See text Transit matrix of discount factor Share of top 1% wealthy (30%)
where rows represent the current state and columns represent the next period’s state.
The first row and column correspond to zg. The transition matrix for the employment
status, ε, is a function of both the current aggregate state (z) and the future aggregate
state (z′). There are thus four possible cases, (zg, zg), (zg, zb), (zb, zg), and (zb, zb),
corresponding to the following employment status transition matrices:12[
0.33 0.67
0.03 0.97 ,
] [
0.75 0.25
0.07 0.93 ,
] [
0.25 0.75
0.02 0.98 ,
] [
0.60 0.40
0.04 0.96 ,
]
where the first row and column correspond to ε = 0 (unemployed).
We calibrate the borrowing constraint and the idiosyncratic time preference pro-
cess to match key features of the overall wealth distribution in the U.S. The borrowing
constraint is set to a = −4.15 to match the fraction of U.S. households with negative
wealth holdings, 11%.13
β˜ takes on values from a symmetric grid, (β˜l = 0.9873, β˜m = 0.9919, β˜h = 0.9965).
In the invariant distribution, 96.5% of the population is in the middle state, and 1.75%
12The numbers are rounded to the second decimal point.
13We check that the total resources available to a household, taking into account unemployment
insurance benefits and the borrowing limit, are never negative under this calibration.
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is distributed across each of the extreme points. The expected duration of the extreme
discount factors is set at 50 years, to capture a dynastic element in the evolution of
time preferences (Krusell and Smith (1998)). In addition, transitions occur only
across adjacent values, where the transition probability from either extreme value to
the middle grid is 1/200, and the transition probability from the middle grid to either
extreme value is 7/77200. This Markov chain for β˜ allows our model to generate a
long-run U.S. capital-output ratio of 2.5, and a Gini coefficient for the U.S. wealth
distribution of 0.79, as reported by Krusell and Smith (1998). It also allows our model
to match the wealth share of the top 1% (Krusell and Smith (1998)). An accurate
calibration of this moment is important because, as we will show, the welfare effects
of fiscal uncertainty for top wealth holders, characterized by high levels of buffer-stock
savings and high capital income, can be quantitatively rather different from those for
other households.
2.3.2 Fiscal parameters
Regarding the fiscal parameters, we set the unemployment insurance replacement
rate, ω, to 10% of the current market wage income, in line with the data. From Stone
and Chen (2014) we know that the overall replacement rate from unemployment
insurance is about 46% of a worker’s wage, and its average pre-2008 benefits duration
is 15 weeks. This translates to about 53% of a worker’s quarterly wage. In our case,
since we spread the unemployment benefits through the agent’s whole unemployment
period and the average duration of unemployment in the model is about 2 quarters,
this translates to about 27% of the quarterly wage level. Moreover, from Auray et
al. (2014) we know about 60% out of all the unemployed workers were eligible for
unemployment benefits from 1989 to 2012, and that about 75% of those eligible for
benefits actually collected them. Thus, we set our unemployment insurance payment
to be 10% of the market wage.14
To estimate the parameters related to fiscal policy and individual tax rates, we use
U.S. quarterly data from 1960I to 2007IV. We restrict the data window up to 2007IV
because, arguably, fiscal policy was special during and after the Great Recession and
for calibration purposes we want to focus on “normal” times. We provide the details
14Our calibration also matches the aggregate data on unemployment insurance well: 0.0049 for the
average unemployment insurance to output ratio (0.0041 in the data), and 0.0021 for its standard
deviation, after removing a linear trend (0.0019 in the data). In both the model and the data, the
unemployment insurance-to-output ratio is countercyclical. Also note that in Krusell and Smith
(1998), the unemployment insurance is treated as a fixed amount, ψ, calibrated to be about 10% of
the long-run quarterly wage.
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of our fiscal parameter estimation in Appendix 2.A. Here we briefly outline the general
procedure.
For the government purchases process, we use the Rouwenhorst method (Rouwen-
horst (1995)) to construct a three-state first-order Markov chain approximation to the
AR(1) process of the linearly detrended log(G) series.15 The middle grid point of the
G-process, Gm, is calibrated using the average G/Y -ratio in the data; see Appendix
A.1 for the details.
To determine the parameters of our fiscal tax revenue rule, we first estimate the
federal revenue rule as in Bohn (1998) and Davig and Leeper (2011), and the state
and local rule without debt. We then take the weighted average of the federal rule
and the state and local rule to get the general government tax revenue function, the
empirical counterpart of our model. We describe the details of this procedure in
Appendix A.2.
For the consumption tax parameters and the linear part of the income tax function,
we follow standard procedures and calculate the time series of the corresponding tax
rates from the quarterly NIPA data (see, e.g., Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011) and
Mendoza et al. (1994)). We then take the time-series average values to obtain the
following tax rates: τc = 8.14% and τ0 = 5.25%; see Appendix A.3 for the details.
To model the progressivity of the U.S. tax system, we set the parameters of the
progressive part of the income tax function to the values estimated by Gouveia and
Strauss (1994) for U.S. data from 1989 (see Castan˜eda et al. (2003) and Conesa and
Kru¨ger (2006)), the last year in their sample. Recall that the progressive part of the
income tax has the following form:
τ1
[
y − (y−τ2 + s)− 1τ2 ] . (2.3.1)
Note that equation (2.3.1) is linearly homogeneous in y, if s is readjusted appro-
priately. Consequently, doubling one’s income would lead to a doubling of the tax
revenue collected from this income, if s adjusts to the new scale. Since the units of s
are an innocuous choice, we can use the estimated numbers from Gouveia and Strauss
(1994), (τ1, τ2) = (0.258, 0.768).
16 As mentioned earlier, s is an equilibrium object
15Kopecky and Suen (2010) show that the Rouwenhorst method has an exact fit in terms of
five important statistical properties: unconditional mean, unconditional variance, correlation, con-
ditional mean and conditional variance. The last two properties are important for our elimination
of fiscal uncertainty, where both the conditional mean and variance matter for the transition-path
equilibrium.
16Note that the estimation in Gouveia and Strauss (1994) is carried out on annual federal income
tax data, whereas our model frequency is quarterly. Given the nonlinear nature of the tax function
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determined by the fiscal rule.
2.3.3 The wealth distribution and business cycle moments
In this section, we examine the wealth distribution and the business cycle mo-
ments, focusing on the fiscal variables, generated by our calibrated model. For our
model to be a suitable laboratory for the experiment of eliminating fiscal uncertainty,
and for producing reliable quantitative answers to our welfare and distributional ques-
tions, it should broadly match these aspects of the data.
Table 2.3.2 compares the long-run wealth distribution generated by our model with
both the data and the model results in Krusell and Smith (1998). From Table 2.3.2,
we see that our wealth distribution is a good match for the U.S. wealth distribution,
especially for those in the top 1 percent.
Table 2.3.2: Wealth distribution
% of wealth held by top Fraction with Gini
1% 5% 10% 20% 30% wealth< 0 coefficient
Model 31% 59% 72% 81% 87% 11% 0.79
K&S 24% 54% 72% 87% 91% 11% 0.81
Data 30% 51% 64% 79% 88% 11% 0.79
Notes: The wealth distribution in the data is taken from Krusell and Smith (1998).
Household wealth in our model is the sum of physical capital and government
bonds.
Table 2.3.3 provides the results of a comparison between the key business cycle
moments generated by the model and those from the data. This comparison includes
output, tax revenue, and government purchases volatility and persistence. We calcu-
late the same moments for the output ratios of tax revenue, government purchases
and federal government debt. Finally, we examine the co-movements of these series
with output and government purchases.
From Table 2.3.3, we see that our baseline model is successful in matching most of
the business cycle moments, with the exception of output volatility (which is about
70% larger in the model). Even without fiscal uncertainty, as in Krusell and Smith
(1998), the model produces higher output fluctuations than found in the data, while
the introduction of fiscal uncertainty does not contribute substantially to the volatility
of output. To check whether our welfare results are affected by this feature of the
model, we conduct a robustness check where we recalibrate the aggregate productivity
(equation 2.3.1), this may raise a time aggregation issue. We therefore estimate the implied tax
function from simulated annual income and annual tax payment data (aggregated from simulated
quarterly observations). The results from this estimation are very close to those from the annual
data.
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Table 2.3.3: Business cycle moments
A: Data (1960 I - 2007 IV)
Y T-Tr G (T-Tr/Y) (G/Y) (B/Y)
Standard deviation 0.0149 0.0543 0.0134 0.0123 0.0083 0.0772
Autocorrelation 0.8616 0.8134 0.7823 0.9045 0.9573 0.9945
Corr(Y,X) 1 0.7242 0.0992 0.4791 -0.3826 -0.0472
Corr(G,X) 0.0992 0.0352 1 0.0345 0.4806 -0.0281
B: Model simulation
Y T-Tr G (T-Tr/Y) (G/Y) (B/Y)
Standard deviation 0.0235 0.0415 0.0123 0.0063 0.0086 0.0403
(0.0018) (0.0041) (0.0025) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0151)
Autocorrelation 0.5841 0.5870 0.6978 0.8185 0.8254 0.9754
(0.0561) (0.0558) (0.0582) (0.0572) (0.0546) (0.0305)
Corr(Y,X) 1 0.9892 -0.0013 0.6939 -0.6433 -0.1791
(0) (0.0043) (0.1294) (0.1044) (0.0940) (0.1537)
Corr(G,X) -0.0013 0.1316 1 0.2488 0.3804 -0.0086
(0.1294) (0.1296) (0) (0.1116) (0.1079) (0.0571)
Notes: In Panel A, Y, T − Tr and G are HP-filtered (with a smoothing parameter of 1600) real log
series of output, tax revenue net of transfers and government purchases, respectively. (T − Tr)/Y ,
G/Y and B/Y are linearly detrended output ratios of tax revenue net of transfers, government pur-
chases and federal government debt, respectively. The data sources are documented in Appendix A.2.
In Panel B, all variables are defined and filtered the same way as those in Panel A. The reported
numbers are the average values from 1,000 independent simulations of the same length as the data
(192 quarters). We show the standard deviations across these simulations in parentheses.
process so that the model matches the output volatility in the data, leaving our
baseline results unchanged.
2.4 Computation
2.4.1 Stochastic steady state
To compute the model’s equilibrium with two aggregate shocks, we use the approx-
imate aggregation technique proposed by Krusell and Smith (1998).17 This technique
assumes that households act as if only a limited set of moments of the wealth dis-
tribution matters for predicting the future of the economy, and that the aggregate
result of their actions is consistent with their perceptions of how the economy evolves.
However, in contrast to Krusell and Smith (1998), we find that higher moments of
the wealth distribution are necessary in our model with progressive taxation. That is,
17The solution method for the stochastic steady state of the model with only aggregate produc-
tivity shocks is the same, except that Gt = Gm,∀t.
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the accurate description of our economy’s evolution requires a combination of average
physical capital and the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution.
Furthermore, the optimization problem in our model requires households to know
the endogenous tax parameter, s. We therefore approximate the function S, as de-
fined in equation (2.2.14), with a parameterized function of the same moments that
represent the wealth distribution.18 We can now state the following functional forms
for HΓ and S:
19
log(K ′) =a0(z,G) + a1(z,G)log(K) + a2(z,G)B + a3(z,G)(log(K))2 + a4(z,G)B2
+ a5(z,G)B
3 + a6(z,G)log(K)B + a7(z,G)Gini(a), (2.4.1)
Gini(a′) =a˜0(z,G) + a˜1(z,G)log(K) + a˜2(z,G)B + a˜3(z,G)(log(K))2 + a˜4(z,G)B2
+ a˜5(z,G)B
3 + a˜6(z,G)log(K)B + a˜7(z,G)Gini(a), (2.4.2)
log(s) =b0(z,G) + b1(z,G)log(K) + b2(z,G)B + b3(z,G)(log(K))
2 + b4(z,G)B
2
+ b5(z,G)B
3 + b6(z,G)log(K)B + b7(z,G)Gini(a), (2.4.3)
where K denotes the average physical capital, and Gini(a) denotes the Gini coefficient
of the wealth distribution. We compute the equilibrium using a fixed-point iteration
procedure from the parameters in equations (2.4.1)-(2.4.3) onto themselves; see Ap-
pendix 2.B.1 for the details of the computational algorithm and Appendix 2.B.2 for
the estimated equilibrium laws of motions.
A check of the one-step-ahead forecast accuracy yields R2s above 0.999997 for HΓ
(equations (2.4.1) and (2.4.2)), and above 0.9992 for S (equation (2.4.3)). However, as
den Haan (2010) points out, high R2-statistics are not necessarily indicative of multi-
step-ahead forecast accuracy. Hence, we also examine the 10-year ahead forecast
errors of our model. This check shows that our forecast errors are small and unbiased;
see Appendix 2.B.2 for the details.
2.4.2 Transition-path equilibrium
To study the welfare effects of eliminating fiscal uncertainty, we start with the
ergodic distribution of the two-shock equilibrium. From time t = 1, we let Gt follow
18This is in the same spirit as the bond price treatment in Krusell and Smith (1997).
19These specific functional forms perform best among a large set of (relatively parsimonious)
functional forms tested.
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its deterministic conditional mean along the transition path until it converges to Gm.
While we do not take a stance on how this stabilization is brought about (Lucas
(1987) and Krusell et al. (2009)), we do note that, in contrast to stabilizing aggregate
productivity shocks, the Gt-process is arguably under more direct government control.
As stated, during the transition periods Gt follows a time-dependent deterministic
conditional-mean process until it converges to Gm, i.e.,
Gt = [1(G1 = Gl),1(G1 = Gm),1(G1 = Gh)] Π
t−1
GG′
GlGm
Gh
 , (2.4.4)
where ΠGG′ is the transition probability matrix of the G-process in the two-shock
economy discussed in Appendix 2.A. Note that, depending on G1, the Gt-paths will
have different dynamics. For example, if G1 = Gm, Gt will stay at Gm for all t ≥ 1,
and the economy will immediately transition to its long-run G level. However, if the
economy starts the transition away from Gm, Gt converges to Gm over time through
the deterministic process described in (2.4.4). In this case, the counterfactual economy
will go through transitional dynamics to eventually reach the productivity-shock-only
stochastic steady state.
Recall the assumption that the government purchases process is independent from
other stochastic processes, which implies that none of the other exogenous stochastic
processes changes during or after the elimination of the fiscal shocks. Therefore, our
counterfactual economy features aggregate productivity shocks both during and after
the transition. This creates a new technical challenge in addition to those present
in previous transition path analyses of heterogeneous-agent economies (e.g., Huggett
(1997) and Krusell and Smith (1999)). While these studies model a deterministic
aggregate economy along the transition path, our stochastic setting with aggregate
uncertainty produces an exponentially higher number of possible aggregate paths as
the length of the transition period increases. This feature precludes computation of
the equilibrium for all possible realizations of aggregate productivity shocks.
To address this challenge, we extend the approximate aggregation technique for
our two-shock equilibrium to the transition-path setting: that is, we postulate that
time-dependent prediction functions govern the evolution of the economy on the tran-
sition path, through the following set of laws of motions:
Γt+1 = H
trans
Γ,t
(
Γt, Bt, zt
)
, (2.4.5)
st = S
trans
t
(
Γt, Bt, zt
)
, (2.4.6)
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where t denotes an arbitrary period along the transition path. At the end of the
transition path, the laws of motions converge to those in our one-shock equilib-
rium. Consequently, solving for the transition-path equilibrium is equivalent to
finding the appropriate approximations for (2.4.5) and (2.4.6), such that the re-
alized evolution of the economy is consistent with the postulated evolution; see
Appendix 2.B.3 for the details of the algorithm. We find that the same functional
forms we use for the stochastic steady state economy yield accurate predictions also
for the transition-path equilibrium. That is, for every period on the transition path,
we achieve a similar forecast accuracy as in the stochastic steady state two-shock
economy; see Appendix 2.B.4 for the details.
2.5 Results
Following Lucas (1987), we measure the welfare costs of fiscal uncertainty as the
proportional change in a household’s life-time consumption (Consumption Equivalent
Variation or λ), such that:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1 + λ)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, G˜t)], (2.5.1)
where ct is consumption in the baseline economy with Gt-fluctuations, while c˜t is
consumption in the counterfactual economy with a deterministic G˜t-process.
2.5.1 Baseline results
To obtain our baseline results, we first calculate welfare gains conditional on
wealth, employment status and time preference for every sample economy in the
transition-path computation,20 using the value functions from our two-shock and
transition-path equilibria.21 We then average these across the sample economies,
including all possible values of G1, the government purchases level when fiscal uncer-
tainty is eliminated. The results, presented in Table 2.5.1, can thus be interpreted as
the ex-ante expected welfare gains from eliminating fiscal uncertainty.
20To start the transition-path simulation, we draw a large set (16,000) of independent joint distri-
butions over (a, ε, β˜) from the simulation of the two-shock equilibrium; see Appendix 2.B.3 for the
details.
21The right side of (2.5.1) is the value function from the transition-path equilibrium. Given the
log-log utility assumption in the baseline calibration, the left side of (2.5.1) can be expressed using
the value function from the two-shock equilibrium and λ; see Appendix 2.B.5 for the details of the
derivation.
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Table 2.5.1: Expected welfare gains λ (%)
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.0298 0.0303 0.0307 0.0307 0.0304 0.0301 0.0290 0.0240 0.0242
ε = 1 0.0298 0.0302 0.0306 0.0307 0.0304 0.0301 0.0290 0.0240 0.0242
ε = 0 0.0299 0.0304 0.0309 0.0308 0.0305 0.0302 0.0290 0.0240 0.0242
β˜ = β˜l 0.0290 0.0293 0.0293 0.0291 0.0289 0.0287 0.0275 0.0240 0.0226
β˜ = β˜m 0.0299 0.0312 0.0310 0.0307 0.0304 0.0301 0.0291 0.0241 0.0236
β˜ = β˜h 0.0262 0.0316 0.0313 0.0309 0.0304 0.0300 0.0272 0.0232 0.0266
Notes: The wealth groups are presented in ascending order from left to right. The welfare num-
ber for a particular combination of ε (or β˜) and a wealth group is calculated as follows: we
first draw a large set (16,000) of independent joint distributions over (a, ε, β˜) from the simula-
tion of the two-shock equilibrium. These distributions are used to start the computation of the
transition-path equilibria. For each sample economy, we then find all the individuals that fall
into a particular wealth×employment status or wealth×preference category, and calculate their
welfare gain according to equation (2.5.1). We then take the average over the individuals in a
particular category to find the welfare numbers for a given sample economy. To arrive at the
numbers in this table, we finally take the average across all the 16,000 samples.
The results in Table 2.5.1 show that the aggregate welfare gain, i.e., the average
welfare change across the whole population, is about 0.03%, comparable in size to
the results in Lucas (1987) and Krusell et al. (2009). We further find that the welfare
gains decrease with wealth, employment status does not affect the welfare changes,
and time preferences do not present a clear welfare gain pattern. In the next sub-
section, we examine the mechanisms affecting the welfare gains along the wealth
dimension.
2.5.2 The mechanisms
Our analyses show that the decreasing-with-wealth welfare gain pattern is the re-
sult of three interacting channels: a direct utility change channel, a saving channel,
and a general equilibrium price channel. In the direct utility change channel, the
utility gains resulting from household risk aversion with respect to government pur-
chases fluctuations are isolated. In the saving channel, two types of fiscal risk arising
from tax rate fluctuations interact: an after-tax-wage risk and an after-tax-rate-of-
return risk. These risks have a different effect on the precautionary saving behavior
of households and the quality of both capital and bonds as saving vehicles. Finally, in
the general equilibrium price channel, factor price changes along the transition path
are reflected.
In the following sub-sections, we discuss each channel in turn. Given the separa-
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bility of private and public goods in our baseline calibration, we can exactly separate
the direct utility channel from the other two. By contrast, we cannot exactly separate
the saving channel from the general equilibrium price channel.
2.5.2.1 The direct utility change channel
Since a household’s utility over G is strictly concave, eliminating fluctuations in
G leads to a direct increase in expected lifetime utility. To isolate this direct utility
gain, we compute a λc such that:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1 + λc)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, Gt)], (2.5.2)
where ct, c˜t, and Gt are defined in the same way as before. That is, we calculate the
amount of private consumption compensation required to achieve the same lifetime
utility under the uncertain G-process as from consumption in the transition-path
equilibrium. Since the stochastic G-process enters both sides of equation (2.5.2), λc
isolates the joint effect of the saving and general equilibrium price channels. Thus,
the difference between λ and λc measures the direct utility channel. Furthermore,
with a separable flow utility function, λc can be computed using the following simpler
equation:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtlog((1 + λc)ct)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtlog(c˜t)]. (2.5.3)
The results, presented in Table 2.5.2, show positive, albeit smaller consumption-
related welfare when fiscal uncertainty is eliminated. Thus, we conclude that the di-
rect utility channel is quantitatively important for the overall level of welfare changes,
but, distributionally, there is a more pronounced decline in welfare gains as private
wealth increases.
2.5.2.2 The saving channel
Fluctuations in government purchases lead to more volatile individual tax rates,
resulting in greater after-tax labor and capital income risk. Consequently, the ef-
fect of eliminating this uncertainty depends on a household’s (heterogeneous) degree
of self-insurance against income risks. As in other Bewley-type incomplete market
economies, our households engage in precautionary saving. Wealthier households
can better insure themselves against after-tax income risk. As a result, wealth-poor
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Table 2.5.2: Expected welfare gains from private consumption, λc (%)
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.0087 0.0095 0.0097 0.0096 0.0093 0.0090 0.0078 0.0028 0.0030
ε = 1 0.0087 0.0095 0.0097 0.0096 0.0093 0.0090 0.0078 0.0028 0.0030
ε = 0 0.0088 0.0096 0.0098 0.0097 0.0094 0.0091 0.0078 0.0028 0.0030
β˜ = β˜l 0.0086 0.0089 0.0088 0.0086 0.0084 0.0082 0.0070 0.0036 0.0021
β˜ = β˜m 0.0088 0.0101 0.0099 0.0096 0.0093 0.0090 0.0080 0.0030 0.0025
β˜ = β˜h 0.0044 0.0098 0.0095 0.0091 0.0086 0.0082 0.0054 0.0014 0.0048
Notes: The welfare numbers in this table are calculated as those in Table 2.5.1, using (2.5.3)
instead of (2.5.1).
households should be more likely to benefit from the elimination of uncertainty.
However, the tax-rate uncertainty induced by the G-shocks also creates a rate-
of-return risk on after-tax capital income, affecting the quality of both capital and
bonds as saving vehicles. This rate-of-return risk makes households’ intertemporal
transfer of resources riskier. Since wealth-rich households have more exposure to this
rate-of-return risk, they should be more likely to benefit from the elimination of fiscal
uncertainty.
In short, the saving channel effects can favor the wealth-poor or the wealth-rich,
depending on whether the precautionary saving or the quality-of-assets effect domi-
nates. The strength of the quality-of-assets effect depends on how much individual
tax-rate uncertainty fluctuations in government purchases generate for the wealth-rich
households.
We illustrate the distributional effects from precautionary saving through changes
in the volatility of consumption for different wealth levels. Although the quality of
assets as saving vehicles also influences consumption volatility, we nevertheless believe
this volatility appropriately captures the overall ability of households to self-insure
through precautionary saving. Table 2.5.3, Panel A, presents the volatilities of β˜(ε)-
and wealth-specific consumption time series for our two-shock economy (measured as
the variance of log consumption).22 These results show that household consumption
22The wealth percentiles in Table 2.5.3 are constructed differently than those in Table 2.5.1
and 2.5.2. Recall that, in Table 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, we calculate wealth percentiles for each sample
economy. By contrast, for Table 2.5.3, we calculate wealth percentiles from the long-run ergodic dis-
tribution of the stochastic two-shock economy. This is more appropriate for analyzing consumption
changes for a certain wealth percentile over time, as the associated wealth level remains constant.
To compute the type-specific consumption volatilities, we proceed in several steps: First, for each
combination of ε, β˜ and wealth, we collect the consumption data of a household with that partic-
ular characteristic. We do so for every period of the simulation used in the stochastic steady state
equilibrium computation. We then construct a set of ε-, β˜- and wealth-specific consumption time
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Table 2.5.3: Consumption volatility (×100)
Percentile 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
A: The two-shock economy
All 0.120 0.110 0.102 0.095 0.087 0.040 0.014
ε = 0 0.222 0.125 0.109 0.100 0.091 0.041 0.014
ε = 1 0.113 0.109 0.102 0.095 0.087 0.040 0.014
β˜ = β˜l 0.112 0.096 0.088 0.084 0.078 0.037 0.012
β˜ = β˜m 0.121 0.110 0.103 0.096 0.087 0.040 0.014
β˜ = β˜h 0.123 0.115 0.105 0.099 0.092 0.045 0.016
B: Difference between the two-shock and the one-shock economy
All 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
ε = 0 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
ε = 1 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
β˜ = β˜l 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.010 0.004
β˜ = β˜m 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
β˜ = β˜h 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.012 0.005
Notes: Consumption volatility is measured as the variance of log consumption
and calculated as follows: for each combination of ε, β˜, and wealth (see foot-
note 22 for how the wealth percentiles are calculated), we collect the consump-
tion data of a household with that particular characteristic. We do so for every
period of the simulation used in the stochastic steady state equilibrium compu-
tation and then construct a set of ε-, β˜-, and wealth-specific consumption time
series. Next, we calculate the volatility of these disaggregate consumption time
series and take the weighted (by the unconditional probability of each state)
average over ε (β˜) to get the numbers conditional on β˜ (ε). To compute the
consumption volatility for the one-shock economy, we use the stochastic steady
state equilibrium simulation with only aggregate productivity shocks.
volatility is decreasing along the wealth dimension, which is consistent with the notion
that wealthier households have less to gain from the elimination of fiscal uncertainty,
as they are already better insured in the two-shock economy. Furthermore, the results
in Panel B show that the difference in consumption volatilities between the two-shock
and one-shock economies is substantially lower for our wealth-rich households.23
We next analyze the quality-of-assets effect by examining the change in saving
behavior, across wealth groups, after the elimination of fiscal uncertainty. Reduced
needs for saving (self-insurance) would indicate that the precautionary saving effect
series. Next, we calculate the volatility of these disaggregate consumption time series and take the
weighted (by the unconditional probability of each state) average over ε (β˜) to obtain the volatilities
conditional on β˜ (ε).
23For the unemployed households, the relationship is not monotone in wealth. This is because
wealth-poor unemployed households have negligible income, so they are not exposed to much tax-
rate uncertainty until they are re-employed. They thus experience a relatively smaller volatility
reduction between the two and one-shock economies.
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Figure 2.5.1: Policy function comparison - saving
Notes: This figure shows the difference between the first-period policy function for saving from the
transition equilibrium (with G1 = Gm) and that from the two-shock equilibrium (with G1 = Gm),
evaluated at the long-run averages of (K,B), z = zg, ε = 1, and β˜ = β˜m.
dominates, increased demand for saving would indicate a stronger quality-of-assets
effect. The results in Figure 2.5.1 show a reduction in saving in the first period
of the transition-path equilibrium compared to the two-shock equilibrium across all
wealth classes.24 Figure 2.5.1 also shows that the quality-of-assets effect is eventually
increasing in wealth, but never dominates the precautionary saving effect. We will
show in Section 2.6.1 that this dominance is specific to the baseline tax system as
it depends on which tax instrument is used to raise the tax revenue required by the
fiscal rule. Recall, that we use the parameter s in the progressive tax function for
the cyclical tax revenue adjustment, and that τ0 and τ1 are constants. Since the
marginal tax rate faced by the wealth-rich is close to τ0 + τ1, it is largely invariant to
fluctuations in aggregate productivity or government purchases. Consequently, the
wealth-rich face little tax-rate uncertainty in the baseline two-shock economy.
24The policy function difference for saving is evaluated at G1 = Gm, the long-run averages of
(K;B), z = zg, ε = 1 and β˜ = β˜m. However, similar patterns hold for other combinations of state
variables.
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2.5.2.3 General equilibrium price channel
Figure 2.5.2: Expected aggregate capital path comparison
Notes: This figure shows the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path
in the transition-path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium. We use the same 16,000 sample
economies and the same sequences of z-shocks (for both the transition and the two-shock aggregate
capital paths) as in the transition-path computation and then take the average. The G-shock
sequences in the two-shock simulations are constructed in such a way that the cross-sectional joint
distribution of (z,G)-shocks in each period is close to the invariant joint distribution.
We next examine the general equilibrium channel. In our model with a represen-
tative neoclassical firm, factor price changes follow aggregate capital stock changes.
If the elimination of fiscal uncertainty lowers the aggregate capital stock, then pre-
tax capital returns, all else being equal, will increase relative to wages. Because
wealth-rich (wealth-poor) households have higher (lower) capital income shares, the
wealth-rich (wealth-poor) households will benefit (lose) from this relative factor price
change. As a result, changes in the aggregate capital stock will have distributional
effects.
To examine the direction of the general equilibrium price channel for our baseline
scenario, we compute the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capi-
tal path in the transition-path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium. The results
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in Figure 2.5.2 show that the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-path
equilibrium is slightly lower than it is in the two-shock equilibrium. We conclude that
the general equilibrium factor price changes favor wealth-rich households. Recall that
the overall distributional effect from the elimination of fiscal uncertainty favors the
wealth-poor households. Overall, we see then that the saving channel dominates the
general equilibrium price channel.
Table 2.5.4: Expected welfare gains from private consumption, λc (%), conditional
on G1
G1 = Gl
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.0140 0.0155 0.0156 0.0153 0.0149 0.0145 0.0128 0.0059 0.0031
ε = 1 0.0140 0.0154 0.0156 0.0153 0.0149 0.0144 0.0128 0.0059 0.0031
ε = 0 0.0142 0.0156 0.0158 0.0155 0.0151 0.0146 0.0129 0.0059 0.0031
β˜ = β˜l 0.0144 0.0149 0.0148 0.0145 0.0141 0.0138 0.0118 0.0064 0.0025
β˜ = β˜m 0.0141 0.0160 0.0158 0.0153 0.0149 0.0145 0.0129 0.0059 0.0025
β˜ = β˜h 0.0091 0.0167 0.0165 0.0160 0.0154 0.0149 0.0112 0.0051 0.0051
G1 = Gm
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.0087 0.0095 0.0097 0.0096 0.0094 0.0091 0.0078 0.0027 0.0028
ε = 1 0.0087 0.0095 0.0097 0.0096 0.0093 0.0091 0.0078 0.0027 0.0028
ε = 0 0.0088 0.0097 0.0099 0.0097 0.0094 0.0091 0.0079 0.0027 0.0028
β˜ = β˜l 0.0086 0.0089 0.0089 0.0087 0.0085 0.0082 0.0071 0.0036 0.0021
β˜ = β˜m 0.0088 0.0101 0.0099 0.0097 0.0094 0.0091 0.0080 0.0029 0.0024
β˜ = β˜h 0.0043 0.0097 0.0094 0.0090 0.0086 0.0081 0.0053 0.0013 0.0046
G1 = Gh
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.0034 0.0034 0.0037 0.0038 0.0037 0.0036 0.0028 -0.0001 0.0031
ε = 1 0.0033 0.0034 0.0037 0.0038 0.0037 0.0036 0.0028 -0.0001 0.0031
ε = 0 0.0034 0.0035 0.0039 0.0039 0.0037 0.0036 0.0028 -0.0001 0.0031
β˜ = β˜l 0.0027 0.0028 0.0027 0.0027 0.0026 0.0025 0.0022 0.0007 0.0019
β˜ = β˜m 0.0034 0.0040 0.0040 0.0038 0.0037 0.0036 0.0030 0.0001 0.0026
β˜ = β˜h 0.0001 0.0029 0.0026 0.0023 0.0020 0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0018 0.0050
Notes: The welfare numbers in this table are calculated as in Table 2.5.2, but separately for G1 =
Gl, Gm, Gh, using 8,000 simulations for G1 = Gm and 4,000 simulations each for G1 = Gl, Gh.
2.5.3 Distributional analysis conditional on G1
Finally we examine the welfare gains from eliminating fiscal uncertainty condi-
tional on G1, the level of government purchases at the time the policy change is insti-
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tuted. The results in Table 2.5.4 for λc reveal similar overall decreasing-with-wealth
welfare gain patterns. However, when G1 = Gh, the welfare gains are essentially flat
implying that the general equilibrium price channel must be stronger in this case.
This interpretation is consistent with the results in Figure 2.5.3, regarding the per-
centage difference between the expected aggregate capital path in the transition-path
equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium, conditional on G1. For G1 = Gh, we find
the steepest decline in aggregate capital after the elimination of fiscal uncertainty,
but an ultimately flat welfare gain pattern. By contrast, for G1 = Gl, the aggre-
gate capital path is flatter in the transition to a new stochastic steady state, but the
welfare gains show the steepest decline.
Figure 2.5.3: Expected aggregate capital path comparison, conditional on G1
Notes: This figure shows the percentage difference between the expected aggregate capital path
in the transition-path equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium conditional on G1. We use the
same 16,000 sample economies and the same sequences of z-shocks (for both the transition and the
two-shock aggregate capital paths) as in the transition-path computation and then average by G1:
8,000 simulations for G1 = Gm, and 4,000 simulations each for G1 = Gl, Gh. Note that, due to our
conditioning on G1 and the subsequent smaller sample sizes, the expected aggregate capital paths
in Figure 2.5.3 are more volatile compared to those in Figure 2.5.2.
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2.6 Alternative specifications and additional experiments
In this section, we examine the welfare and distributional consequences of elimi-
nating fiscal uncertainty under the following alternative model specifications: different
flow utility functions, different adjustments to the progressive tax function, counter-
factual fiscal regimes, and a model without TFP uncertainty. In addition, we examine
our results when we double fiscal uncertainty, as well as when the elimination of fiscal
uncertainty is accompanied by a sudden change in the level of government purchases.
In each case, we re-calibrate parameter values when necessary to preserve target
moment-data consistency. We summarize the welfare change results in terms of λc in
Table 2.6.1. Table 2.C.1 in Appendix 2.C reports the corresponding λ-measures.
2.6.1 Alternative specifications
Non-separable utility. Recall that our baseline specification assumes a separa-
ble flow utility function in private and public consumption (ρ = 1), which implies
that government purchases uncertainty affects the household decisions only indirectly,
through equilibrium tax rate changes. By contrast, if public and private consumption
are non-separable, then this uncertainty has a direct effect on the consumption-saving
decision, since the government purchases level affects the marginal utility of private
consumption.25 We thus examine two alternative specifications where public con-
sumption is an Edgeworth substitute (complement), ρ = 0.5 (ρ = 1.5), to private
consumption.26
The results in rows 2 and 3 of Table 2.6.1 show that when G and c are comple-
ments (substitutes), the welfare gains from the elimination of fiscal uncertainty are
larger (smaller) than in the baseline scenario. This is because the positive conditional
comovement between G and taxes in the estimated fiscal rule makes uncertainty in G
more costly when c and G are complements.27 Since households face higher tax rates
(lower disposable income) when G and the marginal utility of private consumption are
high, the utility gain from fiscal uncertainty elimination in the case of complements
is larger than in the separable case. An analogous argument applies when G and c
are substitutes.
25See Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) for an overview of utility specifications for public consumption.
26To calculate λc with a non-separable utility function, we calculate the left side of (2.5.2) as a
discounted sum of flow utilities under various values of λc, using the equilibrium policy function.
We then find a value of λc that satisfies the equation numerically, using a bisection search.
27In the estimated fiscal rule, the tax-output ratio responds to the government-purchases-output
ratio with a coefficient of ρT,G = 0.484; see Appendix A.2. for the details.
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Table 2.6.1: Expected welfare gains from private consumption, λc (%), under different
model specifications
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
Baseline 0.0087 0.0095 0.0097 0.0096 0.0093 0.0090 0.0078 0.0028 0.0030
Non-separable Utility Function
Substitute (ρ = 0.5) -0.0002 -0.0017 0.0008 0.0018 -0.0013 0.0027 -0.0030 -0.0078 -0.0011
Complement (ρ = 1.5) 0.0385 0.0267 0.0292 0.0346 0.0293 0.0459 0.0473 0.0372 0.0355
Different Tax Function Adjustment
Adjusting τ0 0.0084 0.0083 0.0086 0.0087 0.0084 0.0082 0.0077 0.0091 0.0135
Adjusting τ1 0.0082 0.0081 0.0085 0.0085 0.0082 0.0079 0.0076 0.0101 0.0159
Counterfactual Fiscal Regimes
Balanced Budget 0.0076 0.0097 0.0093 0.0087 0.0083 0.0079 0.0068 -0.0002 -0.0015
Linear Tax 0.0072 0.0067 0.0068 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070 0.0071 0.0103 0.0163
Lump-sum Tax 0.0073 0.0070 0.0070 0.0070 0.0069 0.0068 0.0071 0.0129 0.0204
Additional Experiments
Constant TFP 0.0084 0.0091 0.0093 0.0092 0.0090 0.0087 0.0077 0.0034 0.0040
Double Volatility of G -0.0071 -0.0081 -0.0083 -0.0081 -0.0077 -0.0073 -0.0061 -0.0011 -0.0012
Sudden change in G 0.0114 0.0148 0.0143 0.0135 0.0127 0.0119 0.0094 0.0001 -0.0015
Tax function adjustments. Recall that, in our baseline specification, the tax
function parameter s is determined endogenously to satisfy the government’s fiscal
rule (equation (2.2.6)), while the linear (τ0) and top marginal (τ1) tax rates in the
progressive tax function are fixed. In this case, a fluctuating s does not generate
substantial tax-rate uncertainty for the very rich households as their marginal tax
rate is close to the upper bound τ0 + τ1 = const. By contrast, it is the tax rates for
the middle of the income distribution that respond the most to changes in s.
We therefore consider the following two alternative adjustments in the tax func-
tion: adjusting τ0, the linear part in the income tax function, and adjusting τ1, the
parameter that governs the taxes for the top income brackets.28 In both cases, s is
fixed at its long-run average from the baseline stochastic two-shock economy. The
simulated distributions of both τ0 and τ1 are symmetrically centered around their
values in the baseline scenario (i.e., the ones estimated from the data).
The results in rows 4 and 5 of Table 2.6.1 show that other tax function adjustments
yield similar overall welfare gains as the baseline case. However, unlike in the baseline
scenario, the welfare gain for the top 5% of households is larger than the average
welfare gain.
Since our wealth-rich are still better insured against fiscal uncertainty, the pre-
cautionary saving aspect does not drive our different distributional results: when we
compute the analogue of Table 6 for our two alternative cases, the wealth-rich still
28In the first case, all the households face the same tax rate changes in terms of absolute magnitude.
However, in relative terms, the tax rate change is decreasing with income level. In the second case,
all the households face the same percentage change in their tax rates. However, in terms of absolute
magnitude, the tax rate change is increasing with income level.
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experience the lowest reduction in consumption volatility. In addition, the general
equilibrium channel in our two alternatives favors the wealth-poor households: the ag-
gregate capital stock increases after the elimination of fiscal uncertainty, which leads
to higher wages and a lower pre-tax capital rate-of-return. However, when τ0 or τ1 are
adjusted to satisfy the fiscal rule, the wealth-rich face a higher tax rate uncertainty
when government purchases fluctuate. They thus enjoy larger gains from a reduction
in rate-of-return risk. We therefore conclude that the quality of capital (bonds) as a
saving vehicle increases after the elimination of fiscal uncertainty, meaning that the
wealth-rich benefit more.
Figure 2.6.1: Policy function comparisons - saving, adjusting τ1
Notes: This figure shows the difference between the first-period policy function for saving from the
transition equilibrium (with G1 = Gm) and that from the two-shock equilibrium (with G1 = Gm),
evaluated at the long-run averages of (K,B), z = zg, ε = 1, and β˜ = β˜m.
We illustrate this in Figure 2.6.1. From Figure 2.6.1, we see that there is a
reduction in saving in the first period of the transition-path equilibrium compared to
the two-shock equilibrium until approximately the 90th wealth percentile.29 However,
29Figure 2.6.1 is the analog of Figure 2.5.1 for the τ1-adjustment case. The τ0-adjustment case
looks very similar to the τ1-adjustment case.
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this saving reductions for less wealthy households is weaker than in the baseline
case. In addition, the wealth-rich now increase their saving after the elimination of
fiscal uncertainty. Thus, in this case, the quality-of-assets mechanism dominates the
precautionary saving mechanism for wealth-rich households.
The different welfare gain patterns in the baseline scenario vis-a`-vis the τ1/τ0-
adjustments have important policy implications: the distributional effects of eliminat-
ing fiscal uncertainty depend on which wealth group experiences the tax uncertainty
burden that is caused by government purchases shocks.
Counterfactual fiscal regimes. We next use three counterfactual fiscal regimes
and examine their respective welfare results. This analysis will shed additional light on
the mechanisms behind the welfare effects of the elimination of fiscal uncertainty. In
our first regime, a balanced budget scenario, we dispense with the fiscal rule (equation
(2.2.6)) and assume that government spending is financed exclusively through tax
revenue. In our next two regimes, a linear (lump-sum) tax scenario, we keep the
fiscal rule but change the progressive tax system to a linear (lump-sum) tax, τ1 = 0
(τ0 = 0 and τ2 = −1). The linear tax rate (the lump-sum tax amount) are then
endogenously determined to satisfy the fiscal rule. Note that the lump-sum tax is
imposed only on employed households to avoid negative after-tax incomes.30
We present the results of this set of analyses in rows 6 to 8 of Table 2.6.1. Overall,
the welfare gains are similar to those obtained in our baseline analysis. Distribution-
ally, the negative slope of the welfare gains along the wealth dimension is steeper in
the balanced-budget regime. The results in Table 2.6.2 show the changes in consump-
tion volatility between the two and one-shock economy for the balanced budget case
(Panel B) compared to those in the baseline case (Panel A). In particular the balanced
budget volatility changes for the wealth-rich are quite small, reflecting the negative
correlation between the aggregate tax rate ((T − Tr)/Y ) and the rate-of-return to
capital (Table 2.6.3). By contrast, our baseline case has a positive correlation be-
tween the aggregate tax rate and the rate-of-return to capital, which is higher in the
one-shock case.31 In short, since in the balanced-budget regime the wealth-rich tend
30We note that this treatment is slightly different from all the other cases, where tax payments
are zero if and only if y ≤ 0. With lump sum taxes, this could potentially introduce a discontinuity
in the budget constraint of the unemployed at y = 0 (for the employed, it must hold that y− T ≥ 0
at the borrowing limit, and thus, a fortiori, for all employed households).
31The reason for the different sign of these correlations lies in the different cyclicality of the aver-
age tax rate (net of transfers) in the two models (the rate-of-return to capital is always procyclical,
independent of the fiscal regime). In the baseline model, just as in the data, the average tax rate
is procyclical because the estimated fiscal rule captures automatic stabilizers: ρT,Y > 0. In the
balanced budget regime, by contrast, the cyclicality of the average tax rate is essentially determined
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Table 2.6.2: Consumption volatility differences between the two-shock and the one-
shock economy
Percentile 1% 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 99%
A: Baseline
All 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
ε = 0 0.022 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
ε = 1 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
β˜ = β˜l 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.010 0.004
β˜ = β˜m 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.011 0.004
β˜ = β˜h 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.026 0.024 0.012 0.005
B: Balanced budget
All 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.001
ε = 0 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.001
ε = 1 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.001
β˜ = β˜l 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.001
β˜ = β˜m 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.004 0.001
β˜ = β˜h 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.001
Notes: Panel A is Panel B in Table 2.5.3. Panel B is calculated here the same
way as Panel A (see notes to Table 2.5.3), but from the balanced budget sim-
ulations.
to have higher tax rates when the rate-of-return to capital is low, they enjoy a smaller
consumption volatility reduction.
Table 2.6.3: Correlation between the aggregate tax rate and the capital rate-of-return
A: Baseline B: Balanced Budget
two-shock one-shock two-shock one-shock
Corr(r,(T − Tr)/Y ) 0.8307 0.8971 -0.5760 -0.7895
(0.0666) (0.0495) (0.1506) ( 0.0942)
Notes: r and (T − Tr)/Y are the rate-of-return to capital and the ratio of tax revenue
net of transfers to output from model simulations, both linearly detrended. The corre-
lations are the average values from 1,000 independent simulations of the same length
as the data (192 quarters). We show the standard deviations across these simulations
in parentheses.
Turning next to the linear tax case, we find that the welfare gains are increasing in
wealth, just as in the case of τ1- or τ0-adjustment, as seen in row 7 of Table 2.6.1. In-
deed, the mechanism is the same: in a linear tax regime, using the tax rate for cyclical
tax adjustment increases the after-tax rate-of-return uncertainty for the wealth-rich.
by its denominator, aggregate output, because aggregate taxes are given by the government pur-
chases level, which is assumed to be unrelated to the business cycle. This underscores the empirical
importance of having a fiscal rule and including debt in our analysis.
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Consequently, the elimination of this uncertainty provides them with a better saving
vehicle. Indeed, when we compare the saving policy function between the two-shock
and the transition-path equilibrium, we find an almost identical pattern as that in
the τ1-adjustment case (Figure 2.6.1).
Finally, our results for the lump-sum tax case (row 8 of Table 2.6.1) show that
the welfare gains are again increasing in wealth. We also find again that the policy
function comparison between the transition-path and the two-shock equilibrium looks
similar to that in Figure 2.6.1. In other words, the rich save more when fiscal un-
certainty is eliminated. However, since for the lump-sum tax case there is no change
in the after-tax capital return uncertainty after the elimination of fiscal uncertainty,
a different mechanism than for the linear tax (τ1-adjustment) case must be at work.
Indeed, the aggregate capital stock decreases after the elimination of uncertainty in
the lump-sum tax case, that is, the general equilibrium factor price effect favors the
wealth-rich. Overall, since there is no distortion from high tax rates, the higher return
makes capital more attractive as a saving vehicle after the elimination of uncertainty,
leading to benefits for the wealth-rich. The only difference is that the quality-of-asset
change is an increase in the average expected return instead of a decrease in the return
volatility.
No TFP uncertainty. Recall that our baseline scenario adopts the same TFP and
unemployment processes as used in Krusell and Smith (1998). However, these choices
produce an output volatility in the model that is 70% larger than that in the data
(Section 2.3.3). To examine whether this difference affects our welfare results, we
match the output volatility in the data by keeping TFP constant (at z = 1), but
allowing unemployment rate fluctuations. The results in row 9 in Table 2.6.1 are
similar to those from the baseline model, suggesting that the excess output volatility
in our model does not influence our welfare results.
2.6.2 Additional experiments
Transition to a higher level of fiscal uncertainty. As mentioned, one topic that
has received vigorous debate is how permanently heightened fiscal policy uncertainty
might impact aggregate economic activity and welfare. To address this question,
we let the economy transition to a level of fiscal uncertainty which is twice that
in our baseline economy. Appendix 2.C provides the details of the computational
implementation of this experiment.
The penultimate row in Table 2.6.1 shows the welfare changes from this magnified
95
uncertainty experiment. As in the baseline experiment, higher fiscal uncertainty leads
to a welfare loss for every wealth group, with wealth-rich households experiencing a
smaller loss. Overall, the numbers suggest that, at least for the range between zero
and twice the pre-crisis level of fiscal volatility, the welfare effects of fiscal uncertainty
are roughly symmetric.
Sudden change in the level of government purchases. In a final experiment,
we examine the consequences of a concomitant sudden change in the government pur-
chases level by letting government purchases move to and stay at their unconditional
mean value, Gm, immediately after the elimination of fiscal uncertainty. We view this
and the baseline scenario, where government purchases gradually converge to their
long-run level, as two extreme ways of how fiscal uncertainty can be eliminated.
From the results in the last row of Table 2.6.1, we see that the unconditional
welfare gains with a sudden change in the level of government purchases are similar
but not identical to those in the baseline case, suggesting that the effect of a sudden
change in G is not symmetric between G1 = Gl and G1 = Gh (the G1 = Gm-case is
the same as in the baseline scenario).
By contrast, the results in Table 2.6.4 show that the welfare changes conditional
on G1 = Gl and G1 = Gh are one order of magnitude larger than those in the baseline
case (Table 2.5.4). For the G1 = Gl-case, the welfare changes are increasing in the
wealth level, while the opposite pattern holds for the case of G1 = Gh. However,
these patterns are not driven by the elimination of fiscal uncertainty per se. The
sudden change in the level of government purchases (and hence taxation) leads to a
faster aggregate capital stock adjustment and a larger effect on welfare. For instance
in the G1 = Gl-case, the sudden increase in government purchases leads to a faster
decrease in aggregate capital, output, and average welfare. However, since lower
aggregate capital levels (higher pre-tax rates of return) favor the wealth-rich capital
income earners, the welfare change pattern increases with wealth. Following a similar
intuition, the distributional effect for the G1 = Gh-case is reversed.
2.7 Conclusion
The recent recession and the economy’s slow recovery have sparked a debate over
the economic effects of fiscal uncertainty. Commentators have argued that uncertainty
over future taxation and spending policies negatively affects contemporary economic
outcomes. In this study, we quantify the welfare costs of fiscal uncertainty and their
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Table 2.6.4: Expected welfare gains from private consumption, λc (%), conditional
on G1, sudden change in G
G1 = Gl Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All -0.3864 -0.5347 -0.5032 -0.4653 -0.4372 -0.4089 -0.3128 0.0591 0.3914
ε = 1 -0.3862 -0.5362 -0.5041 -0.4655 -0.4374 -0.4092 -0.3134 0.0590 0.3914
ε = 0 -0.3877 -0.5263 -0.4954 -0.4628 -0.4345 -0.4060 -0.3056 0.0602 0.3913
β˜ = β˜l -0.5197 -0.5606 -0.5458 -0.5158 -0.4839 -0.4556 -0.3308 -0.0158 0.2921
β˜ = β˜m -0.3908 -0.5110 -0.4927 -0.4648 -0.4372 -0.4091 -0.3194 0.0443 0.3696
β˜ = β˜h -0.0065 -0.4392 -0.4149 -0.3848 -0.3572 -0.3274 -0.1639 0.1501 0.4899
G1 = Gh Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
All 0.4146 0.5748 0.5407 0.5000 0.4692 0.4383 0.3347 -0.0642 -0.4033
ε = 1 0.4144 0.5764 0.5416 0.5002 0.4694 0.4385 0.3352 -0.0641 -0.4033
ε = 0 0.4164 0.5665 0.5333 0.4977 0.4666 0.4356 0.3279 -0.0646 -0.4036
β˜ = β˜l 0.5554 0.5995 0.5835 0.5501 0.5154 0.4847 0.3511 0.0154 -0.3067
β˜ = β˜m 0.4194 0.5508 0.5304 0.4995 0.4692 0.4385 0.3417 -0.0486 -0.3818
β˜ = β˜h 0.0102 0.4786 0.4509 0.4173 0.3868 0.3541 0.1764 -0.1602 -0.4991
distribution in a neoclassical stochastic growth environment with incomplete markets.
In our model, aggregate uncertainty arises from both productivity and government
purchases shocks. Government spending is financed by a progressive tax system,
modeled after important features of the U.S. tax system. We calibrate the model
to U.S. data and evaluate the welfare and distributional consequences of eliminating
government purchases shocks.
Our baseline results show that the welfare gains of eliminating fiscal uncertainty
are decreasing in wealth. However, we also find that the effects of eliminating fiscal
uncertainty depend on the fiscal regime and which group’s after-tax rate-of-return to
capital is affected the most by fiscal uncertainty. We also find that the welfare gains
of eliminating fiscal uncertainty are higher when public and private consumption are
complements.
While our study provides insight into the impact of eliminating fiscal uncertainty,
it should be viewed as a first step towards a comprehensive analysis of the welfare and
distributional implications of fiscal uncertainty. Future research could explore how
our results change if nominal frictions that cause relative price distortions are added
to the model. It could also examine wait-and-see effects. There is also no role in our
model for a direct influence of government purchases on the unemployment process
and thus cyclical idiosyncratic risk. Including this feature in a future quantitative
analysis would require the development of a statistical model of how government pur-
chases influence idiosyncratic unemployment processes, but such a model is elusive in
the literature. Instead, since government purchases appear to be independent of the
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cycle in U.S. post-war data, we have also used this assumption in the model. Further-
more, we have chosen to place exogenous uncertainty fundamentally within the level
of government purchases, while the uncertainty of individual tax rates is derived from
our model. Among fiscal data, we view the official aggregate data on government
purchases as cleanest and least subject to construction choices, but recognize that
the data on tax rates collected in Mertens (2013) could provide an alternative route.
Finally, we model government purchases as a symmetric autoregressive process. How-
ever, future research could examine fiscal uncertainty in an economy facing the risk
of very large government purchases as a very rare and dramatic event.
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2.A Appendix: Estimation of the fiscal parameters
Quisque ullamcorper placerat ipsum. Cras nibh. Morbi vel justo vitae lacus tin-
cidunt ultrices. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit. In hac
habitasse platea dictumst. Integer tempus convallis augue. Etiam facilisis. Nunc
elementum fermentum wisi. Aenean placerat. Ut imperdiet, enim sed gravida sollic-
itudin, felis odio placerat quam, ac pulvinar elit purus eget enim. Nunc vitae tortor.
Proin tempus nibh sit amet nisl. Vivamus quis tortor vitae risus porta vehicula.
For the calibration, we use quarterly data from 1960I to 2007IV.
2.A.1 Government purchases process
We first construct a real government purchases (G) series by deflating the “Govern-
ment consumption expenditures and gross investment” series (from NIPA table 3.9.5,
line 1) with the GDP deflator (from NIPA table 1.1.9, line 1). We then estimate an
AR(1) process for the linearly detrended real log(G) series. We use the Rouwenhorst
method (see Rouwenhorst (1995)) to approximate this zero-mean AR(1) process with
a three-state Markov Chain. This gives us a transition probability matrix, and a
grid in the form (−m,0,m), where m represents the percentage deviation from the
middle grid point. The middle grid point of the G-process, Gm, is then calibrated to
match the time series average of nominal G over nominal GDP from U.S. national
accounting data (nominal GDP is from NIPA table 1.1.5, line 1), 20.86%. The grid
for G is given by (Gl, Gm, Gh), where Gh = (1+m)Gm and Gl = (1−m)Gm, and the
discretized G-process on [0.2205, 0.2319, 0.2433] has the following transition matrix:0.9607 0.0389 0.00040.0195 0.9611 0.0195
0.0004 0.0389 0.9607 .

2.A.2 Fiscal rule
2.A.2.1 Methodology and estimation results
We first estimate the fiscal rule separately at two levels of government: the federal
government level and the state/local level, allowing for debt only at the federal level.32
We then construct a composite rule, using the share of federal government purchases
in total government purchases.
32When we estimate one equation, using the sum of federal and the state-local level data, the
estimation result implies a non-stationary government debt process.
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The empirical specification for the federal fiscal rule is based on Bohn (1998) and
Davig and Leeper (2011) and takes the following form:
T Ft − TrFt
Yt
= ρFT,0 + ρ
F
T,B
Bt
Yt
+ ρFT,Y log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + ρFT,G
GFt
Yt
, (2.A.1)
where:
Yt: Nominal GDP (Line 1 of NIPA table 1.1.5).
T Ft −TrFt : Federal government current receipts (Line 1 of NIPA table 3.2) minus
federal government transfer expenditure (Line 25 of NIPA table 3.2).
Bt: Market value of privately held gross federal debt at the beginning of a quarter:
data are from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (http://www.dallasfed.
org/research/econdata/govdebt.cfm).
Y¯t: Nominal CBO potential GDP: data are from the CBO website (http://www.
cbo.gov/publication/42912).
GFt : Nominal federal government consumption expenditures and gross investment
(Line 23 of NIPA table 1.1.5).
At the state and local level, we drop the debt-to-GDP ratio term, yielding the
following equation for the state and local level:
T SLt − TrSLt
Yt
= ρSLT,0 + ρ
SL
T,Y log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + ρSLT,G
GSLt
Yt
, (2.A.2)
where:
T SLt − TrSLt : State and local government receipts (Line 1 of NIPA table 3.3)
minus state and local government transfer expenditure (Line 24 of NIPA table
3.3).
GSLt : Nominal state and local government consumption expenditures and gross
investment (Line 26 of NIPA table 1.1.5).
We then linearly detrend all ratio variables, except for log(Yt/Y¯t), before estimat-
ing equations (2.A.1) and (2.A.2).
Table 2.A.1 summarizes the estimation results.
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Table 2.A.1: Estimated coefficients of the fiscal rule
constant Bt/Yt log(Yt/Y¯t) Gt/Yt
Federal -0.009 0.017 0.321 0.146
(0.001) (0.004) (0.032) (0.096)
State and local 0.001 – -0.039 0.771
(0.001) – (0.015) (0.063)
2.A.2.2 The composite fiscal rule
The composite fiscal rule used in our model is given by:
Tt − Trt
Yt
= ρT,0 + ρT,B
Bt
Yt
+ ρT,Y log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + ρT,G
Gt
Yt
= ρT,0 + ρ
F
T,B
Bt
Yt
+ (ρFT,Y + ρ
SL
T,Y )log(
Yt
Y¯t
) + (γFρFT,G + (1− γF )ρSLT,G)
Gt
Yt
,
(2.A.3)
where γF is calibrated as the average share of federal government purchases within
total government purchases: 0.46. This yields the following fiscal rule parameters:
ρT,B = 0.017, ρT,Y = 0.282, ρT,G = 0.484.
We use ρT,0 to match the average debt-to-GDP ratio in the data: 30%.
2.A.3 Consumption and income tax parameters
For the consumption tax function and the linear part of the income tax function,
we use the average tax rate calculated from the data.
To be specific, the average tax rate on consumption is defined as:
τc =
TPI − PRT
PCE − (TPI − PRT ) , (2.A.4)
where the numerator is taxes on production and imports (TPI, NIPA table 3.1, line 4)
minus state and local property taxes (PRT, NIPA table 3.3, line 8). The denominator
is personal consumption expenditures (PCE, NIPA table 1.1.5, line 2) net of the
numerator. We calculate the average τc,t over our sample period as our τc parameter:
8.14%.
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For income taxes, we use the state level tax revenue to approximate the linear part:
τ0 =
PIT + CT + PRT
Taxable Income
, (2.A.5)
where PIT (NIPA table 3.3, line 4) is state income tax, CT (NIPA table 3.3, line 10)
is state tax on corporate income, and PRT (NIPA table 3.3, line 8) is state property
taxes. Note that we exclude the social insurance contribution in the numerator since
we do not have social security expenditures in the model. The denominator is GDP
minus consumption of fixed capital (NIPA table 1.7.5, line 6), since our model has a
depreciation allowance for capital income. Averaging τ0,t from 1960I to 2007IV yields
τ0 = 5.25%.
2.B Appendix: Computational algorithm
Quisque ullamcorper placerat ipsum. Cras nibh. Morbi vel justo vitae lacus tin-
cidunt ultrices. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit. In hac
habitasse platea dictumst. Integer tempus convallis augue. Etiam facilisis. Nunc
elementum fermentum wisi. Aenean placerat. Ut imperdiet, enim sed gravida sollic-
itudin, felis odio placerat quam, ac pulvinar elit purus eget enim. Nunc vitae tortor.
Proin tempus nibh sit amet nisl. Vivamus quis tortor vitae risus porta vehicula.
2.B.1 Computational algorithm for the two-shock stochastic steady state
economy
Step 0: We first select a set of summary statistics for the wealth distribution, {K,
Gini(a)}, and fix the functional form of the equilibrium rules in equations (2.4.1)-
(2.4.3). We then set the interpolation grids for (a,K,Gini(a), B) to be used in the
approximation of the household’s continuation value function and policy function.
We use an initial guess of coefficients {a00, . . . , a07}, {a˜00, . . . , a˜07}, {b00, . . . , b07} to obtain
initial conjectures for {H0Γ, S0}, and set up a convergence criterion ε = 10−4.
Step 1: At the nth iteration, imposing {HnΓ , Sn} in the household optimization prob-
lem, we use a value function iteration to solve the household’s parametric dynamic
programming problem as defined in Section 2.2.4. From this process, we obtain the
continuation value function V n(a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z,G;HnΓ , S
n).
Step 2: We next simulate the economy using NH households and T periods. In
each period t of the simulation, we first calculate the equilibrium seq,nt using equation
(2.2.11) and {HnΓ}. Then we solve the household’s optimization problem for the
current (Knt , Gini
n
t (a), B
n
t , z
n
t , G
n
t , s
eq,n
t ) using V
n(a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z,G;HnΓ , S
n)
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as the continuation value function and {HnΓ , HB}. This is a one-shot optimization
problem. The aggregate states in the next period follow from our aggregation of the
optimal household decisions. From this step, we collect the time series {Knt , Ginint (a),
Bnt , z
n
t , G
n
t , s
eq,n
t }Tt=1.
Step 3: With these time series, we obtain separate OLS estimates of {aˆn0 , . . . , aˆn7},
{ˆ˜an0 , . . . , ˆ˜an7}, {bˆn0 , . . . , bˆn7}, for each z and G combination, which, with a slight abuse
of notation, we summarize as (HˆnΓ , Sˆ
n).
Step 4: If |HnΓ − HˆnΓ | <  and |Sn − Sˆn| < , we stop. Otherwise, we set
Hn+1Γ = αH × HˆnΓ + (1− αH)×HnΓ
Sn+1 = αS × Sˆn + (1− αS)× Sn
with αH , αS ∈ (0, 1], and go to Step 1.
Step 5: Finally, we check whether the R2s (the multiple-step-ahead forecast errors)
of the final OLS regressions are sufficiently high (small) for the equilibrium rules to
be well approximated. If they are not, we change the functional forms in Step 0 and
repeat the algorithm.
In Step 1, we iterate on the value function until it converges at a set of collocation
points, chosen to be the grid points of (a,K,Gini(a), B) defined in Step 0. In each
step of the value function iteration, we use multi-dimensional cubic splines on this
interpolation grid to approximate the continuation value function. For each colloca-
tion point of the state variables (a,K,Gini(a), B) as well as the exogenous aggregate
state variables (z,G), we use {HnΓ , Sn, HB} to infer the values of (K ′, Gini′(a), B′, s).
Given the aggregate variables (K ′, Gini′(a), B′, s), we maximize the Bellman equation
numerically along the a′-dimension using Brent’s method, as described in Press et al.
(2007). The same method is used in the numerical optimization part of Step 2.
In Step 2, we useNH = 90, 000 households and run 12 parallel simulations of length
T = 18, 000 each.33 Following Krusell and Smith (1998), we also enforce that at each
t these 90,000 households are distributed according to the stationary distribution of
the Markov chains governing ε and β. We thus avoid introducing artificial aggregate
uncertainty due to small deviations from the law of large numbers. To eliminate
sampling error, we use the same series of aggregate shocks for all iterations and all
model simulations.
33Although each simulation has 19,000 periods, we discard the initial 1,000 observations in the
estimation.
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The algorithm is implemented in a mixture of C/C++ and MATLAB, which are
then connected through MATLAB’s CMEX interface.34
2.B.2 Results for the stochastic steady state
2.B.2.1 Estimated laws of motions for the two-shock equilibrium
HΓ for aggregate capital in good times (state zg), with low (Gl), medium (Gm),
and high (Gh) government purchases levels are, respectively (in the above order):
log(K ′) = 0.1422 + 0.9125log(K)− 0.0019B + 0.0124(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gl)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0007log(K)B + 0.0007Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1374 + 0.9151log(K)− 0.0017B + 0.0120(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gm)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0006log(K)B + 0.0007Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1223 + 0.9265log(K)− 0.0014B + 0.0098(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gh)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0006Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999.
HΓ for aggregate capital in bad times (state zb), with low, medium, and high govern-
ment purchases levels are, respectively:
log(K ′) = 0.1116 + 0.9299log(K)− 0.0016B + 0.0094(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gl)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0006log(K)B + 0.0010Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1084 + 0.9313log(K)− 0.0015B + 0.0093(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0009Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.0983 + 0.9385log(K)− 0.0012B + 0.0079(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (Gh)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0004log(K)B + 0.0008Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999.
34On a 12-core 2.67 GHz Intel Xeon X5650 Linux workstation, the typical run time for the value
function iteration lies around several hours (it gets shorter as the initial guess gets more accurate),
while that for one simulation loop is about 40 minutes. Starting from a guess close to the equilibrium,
it takes about 40 iterations to converge.
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HΓ for the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution in good times (state zg), with
low, medium, and high government purchases levels are, respectively:
Gini(a′) = −0.0300 + 0.0087log(K) + 0.0024B + 0.0017(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gl)
− 0.0000B3 − 0.0008log(K)B + 0.9975Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
Gini(a′) = −0.0455 + 0.0213log(K) + 0.0026B − 0.0009(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0009log(K)B + 0.9975Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
Gini(a′) = −0.0431 + 0.0194log(K) + 0.0025B − 0.0005(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gh)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0008log(K)B + 0.9976Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999.
HΓ for the Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution in bad times (state zb), with low,
medium, and high government purchases levels are, respectively:
Gini(a′) = −0.0747 + 0.0472log(K) + 0.0025B − 0.0066(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gl)
− 0.0000B3 − 0.0009log(K)B + 0.9992Gini(a), R2 = 0.999998,
Gini(a′) = −0.0853 + 0.0559log(K) + 0.0027B − 0.0083(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0010log(K)B + 0.9992Gini(a), R2 = 0.999998,
Gini(a′) = −0.0804 + 0.0519log(K) + 0.0027B − 0.0075(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (Gh)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0010log(K)B + 0.9992Gini(a), R2 = 0.999998.
S in good times (state zg), with low, medium, and high government purchases levels
are, respectively:
log(s) = 8.3647− 8.3407log(K)− 0.5945B + 2.0612(log(K))2 + 0.0095B2 (Gl)
+ 0.0012B3 + 0.3437log(K)B − 0.0907Gini(a), R2 = 0.99992,
log(s) = 11.4913− 10.8071log(K)− 0.8477B + 2.5649(log(K))2 + 0.0109B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0021B3 + 0.4499log(K)B − 0.0830Gini(a), R2 = 0.99983,
log(s) = 16.1515− 14.4841log(K)− 1.2486B + 3.3065(log(K))2 + 0.0117B2 (Gh)
+ 0.0036B3 + 0.6183log(K)B − 0.0747Gini(a), R2 = 0.99957.
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S in bad times (state zb), with low, medium, and high government purchases levels
are, respectively:
log(s) = 7.7967− 7.9011log(K)− 0.5212B + 1.9637(log(K))2 + 0.0076B2 (Gl)
+ 0.0018B3 + 0.3255log(K)B − 0.1058Gini(a), R2 = 0.99991,
log(s) = 11.0908− 10.4747log(K)− 0.8318B + 2.4831(log(K))2 + 0.0087B2 (Gm)
+ 0.0032B3 + 0.4553log(K)B − 0.0978Gini(a), R2 = 0.99970,
log(s) = 15.8242− 14.2123log(K)− 1.2243B + 3.2384(log(K))2 + 0.0074B2 (Gh)
+ 0.0052B3 + 0.6220log(K)B − 0.0935Gini(a), R2 = 0.99924.
2.B.2.2 Multi-step ahead forecast errors
To compute the multi-step ahead forecast errors, we compare the aggregate paths
from the equilibrium simulation with those generated by the approximate equilib-
rium rules. To be specific, starting from the first period, we pick a set of aggregate
states 80 periods apart along the final simulation of the stochastic steady state cal-
culation, {K(i−1)×80+1, B(i−1)×80+1, Gini(i−1)×80+1(a)}i∈{1,2,... }. We then simulate each
set of aggregate states for 40 periods with the equilibrium laws of motions HΓ and
HB (with the same aggregate shock sequences as those in the equilibrium simula-
tion), and record the aggregate capital level in the last period of each simulation
{KH(i−1)×80+1+40}i∈{1,2,... }. We then calculate the ith 10-year (40-period) ahead fore-
cast error for aggregate capital as u40i = K(i−1)×80+1+40 −KH(i−1)×80+1+40, where Kt is
the aggregate capital level at period t from the equilibrium simulation. Note that the
forecast errors generated this way are independent of each other because 40 periods
are discarded between each simulation. With the large number of simulations in the
stochastic steady state calculation (12 parallel simulations each for 18,000 periods),
we generate about 2,700 such forecast errors. The mean of these 10-year-ahead fore-
cast errors is 0.0002%, and the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the 10-year-ahead
forecast is about 0.08% of the long-run average capital level, suggesting little bias and
high overall forecast accuracy in our laws of motions.
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2.B.2.3 Estimated laws of motions for the one-shock equilibrium
HΓ for aggregate capital in good times (state zg) and bad times (state zb) are,
respectively:
log(K ′) = 0.1329 + 0.9189log(K)− 0.0016B + 0.0112(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (zg)
− 0.0000B3 + 0.0006log(K)B + 0.0007Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
log(K ′) = 0.1045 + 0.9346log(K)− 0.0014B + 0.0086(log(K))2 + 0.0000B2 (zb)
+ 0.0000B3 + 0.0005log(K)B + 0.0009Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999.
HΓ for Gini coefficient of wealth distribution in good times (state zg) and bad times
(state zb) are, respectively:
Gini(a′) = −0.0509 + 0.0258log(K) + 0.0026B − 0.0018(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (zg)
+ 0.0000B3 − 0.0009log(K)B + 0.9976Gini(a), R2 = 0.999999,
Gini(a′) = −0.0997 + 0.0678log(K) + 0.0030B − 0.0108(log(K))2 − 0.0000B2 (zb)
− 0.0000B3 − 0.0011log(K)B + 0.9992Gini(a), R2 = 0.999997.
S in good times (state zg) and bad times (state zb) are, respectively:
log(s) = 10.0396− 9.6184log(K)− 0.7878B + 2.3216(log(K))2 + 0.0117B2 (zg)
+ 0.0017B3 + 0.4253log(K)B − 0.0841Gini(a), R2 = 0.99991,
log(s) = 9.3062− 9.0204log(K)− 0.7350B + 2.1870(log(K))2 + 0.0096B2 (zb)
+ 0.0025B3 + 0.4157log(K)B − 0.1008Gini(a), R2 = 0.99987.
2.B.3 Computational algorithm for the transition-path equilibrium
Step 0: Set up:
We choose the starting G level (three possibilities) and guess a length for the
transition period Ttrans.
We next assume specific functional forms for {H transΓ,t , Stranst }Ttranst=1 .
We then select the interpolation grid for (a,K,Gini(a), B) used in the spline ap-
proximation of the household’s continuation value function.
This calculation also requires the following inputs:
1. H1sΓ and S
1s: laws of motions from the one-shock equilibrium.
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2. V1s(a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z;H
1s
Γ , S
1s): the value function for households from
the one-shock equilibrium.
3. Ntrans independent joint distributions over (a, ε, β˜) (each with NH households)
drawn from the two-shock equilibrium simulation to start the transition-
path equilibrium simulations. To get a balanced sample for each combi-
nation of z and t, exactly half of these distributions are collected during
good times (z = zg).
4. Ntrans different aggregate productivity shock paths {{zit}Ttranst=1 }Ntransi=1 , where zi1
matches with the productivity level in the ith collected joint distribution
and the zit>1 are randomly drawn following its Markov process.
Step 1: We start from an initial coefficient guess {{a00,t, . . . , a07,t},{a˜00,t, . . . , a˜07,t}, {b0,t0 ,
. . . , b07,t}}Ttranst=1 to get our initial conjectures {H trans,0Γ,t , Strans,0t }Ttranst=1 . Set up a conver-
gence criterion ε.
Step 2: In the nth iteration, we compute the household’s value function at each
period by backward induction, with imposed laws of motions {H trans,nΓ,t , Strans,nt }Ttranst=1 .
To be specific, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , Ttrans}, given the continuation value V trans,nt+1 (a, ε, β˜,K,
Gini(a), B, z;H trans,nΓ,t+1 , S
trans,n
t+1 ), we calculate V
trans,n
t (a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z;H
trans,n
Γ,t ,
Strans,nt ). Note that V
trans,n
Ttrans+1
(·) = V1s(·). We store the value functions at each point
in time of the transition path.
Step 3: In this step, we simulate the Ntrans economies with the corresponding pro-
ductivity shock paths. For the simulation of the ith economy, in each period t,
we first calculate the equilibrium seq,n,it using equation (2.2.11) and H
trans,n
Γ,t . Then
we solve the household’s optimization problem for (Kn,it , Gini
n,i
t (a), B
n,i
t , z
n,i
t , s
eq,n,i
t )
using V trans,nt+1 (a, ε, β˜,K,Gini(a), B, z;H
trans,n
Γ,t+1 , S
trans,n
t+1 ) and {H trans,nΓ,t , Strans,nt , HB}.
The aggregate states in the next period follow from aggregating the optimal house-
hold decisions. We finally collect the following panel data {Kn,it , Ginin,it (a), Bn,it , zn,it ,
seq,n,it }Tt=1}Ntransi=1 .
Step 4: ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , Ttrans}, we run OLS for each point in time along the transition
path to get estimates of {aˆn0,t, . . . , aˆn7,t}, {ˆ˜an0,t, . . . , ˆ˜an7,t}, {bˆn0,t, . . . , bˆn7,t}, which, with a
slight abuse of notation, we summarize as {Hˆ trans,nΓ,t , Sˆtrans,nt }Ttranst=1 .
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Step 5: If maxt |H trans,nΓ,t − Hˆ trans,nΓ,t | < ε and maxt |Strans,nt − Sˆtrans,nt | < ε, we stop.
Otherwise, ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, we set:
H trans,n+1Γ,t = αH × Hˆ trans,nΓ,t + (1− αH)×H trans,nΓ,t
Strans,n+1t = αS × Sˆtrans,nt + (1− αS)× Strans,nt
with αH , αS ∈ (0, 1], and go to Step 2.
Step 6: We check the convergence of the last period’s laws of motion to those from
the one-shock equilibrium. To be specific, starting from the aggregate states observed
in the last period’s simulations, {ziT , KiT , BiT , GiniiT (a)}Ntransi=1 , we calculate the differ-
ences in the predicted values of aggregate capital, the wealth Gini coefficient and s,
between when we use the converged last period’s laws of motions of the transition-
path equilibrium, {H transΓ,Ttrans , StransTtrans}, and when we use the laws of motions from the
one-shock economy, {HΓ,1s, S1s}. If the differences are comparable in size to those of
the one-step prediction errors of the laws of motions from the one-shock stochastic
steady state equilibrium, we go to Step 7. Otherwise, we go back to Step 0 and
increase Ttrans.
Step 7: We check whether the R2s (the multiple-step-ahead forecast errors) of the
final OLS regressions are sufficiently high (small) for the equilibrium rules to be well
approximated. If they are not, we change the functional forms in Step 0 and repeat
the algorithm.35
The numerical methods for interpolation and optimization used to solve the house-
hold’s maximization problem in Step 2 and Step 3 are the same as those in the com-
putation of the stochastic steady state. The only difference is that the procedure does
not involve a value function iteration since we use backward induction to solve for the
value function for each period, starting from the value function from the stochastic
steady state without fiscal uncertainty.
35We choose ε = 10−4, NH = 90, 000, and Ttrans = 400. Ntrans is set to be 8,000 when we start
from Gm and 4,000 for the other two cases, to keep the ratios between the numbers of observations
across different cases the same as those implied by the ergodic distribution of the G-process. On a
32-core 2.4 GHz Intel Xeon E5-4640 Linux workstation, the typical run time for the value function
calculation takes about an hour, and for one simulation loop, it takes about six hours. Starting from
a guess based on the weighted average between the two-shock and the one-shock laws of motion, it
takes about 40 to 50 iterations to converge.
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2.B.4 Estimated laws of motions for transition-path equilibrium
Here we present the estimated laws of motions for selected periods and every
combination of zt and G1.
Table 2.B.1: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gl, zt = zg
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1390 0.9150 -0.0017 0.0118 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2205 0.999999
2 0.1423 0.9122 -0.0018 0.0124 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.2210 0.999999
3 0.1446 0.9104 -0.0018 0.0128 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.2214 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 0.1278 0.9231 -0.0015 0.0103 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0006 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1303 0.9210 -0.0016 0.0108 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0006 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1321 0.9196 -0.0016 0.0110 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0006 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0394 0.0162 0.0027 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0009 0.9975 0.2205 0.999999
2 -0.0340 0.0117 0.0026 0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0009 0.9975 0.2210 0.999999
3 -0.0451 0.0208 0.0028 -0.0008 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0009 0.9975 0.2214 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 -0.0524 0.0271 0.0025 -0.0021 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
399 -0.0475 0.0231 0.0025 -0.0013 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
400 -0.0548 0.0291 0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0009 0.9976 0.2319 0.999999
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 10.1857 -9.8044 -0.6990 2.3558 0.0105 0.0012 0.3858 -0.0880 0.2205 0.99985
2 10.7885 -10.3002 -0.7003 2.4586 0.0099 0.0014 0.3867 -0.0892 0.2210 0.99985
3 10.8166 -10.3177 -0.7052 2.4617 0.0100 0.0014 0.3888 -0.0890 0.2214 0.99986
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 9.2488 -8.9958 -0.7253 2.1997 0.0126 0.0013 0.3996 -0.0880 0.2319 0.99993
399 9.4318 -9.1361 -0.7483 2.2264 0.0134 0.0011 0.4088 -0.0873 0.2319 0.99993
400 9.4819 -9.1765 -0.7500 2.2345 0.0134 0.0011 0.4095 -0.0871 0.2319 0.99993
Table 2.B.2: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gl, zt = zb
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1138 0.9280 -0.0018 0.0098 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0010 0.2205 0.999999
2 0.1213 0.9219 -0.0020 0.0110 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0010 0.2210 0.999999
3 0.1098 0.9312 -0.0016 0.0092 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0010 0.2214 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 0.1000 0.9382 -0.0013 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0009 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.0977 0.9402 -0.0013 0.0074 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.0987 0.9393 -0.0013 0.0076 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.1048 0.0716 0.0035 -0.0115 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013 0.9991 0.2205 0.999997
2 -0.1013 0.0685 0.0037 -0.0108 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014 0.9991 0.2210 0.999998
3 -0.0858 0.0556 0.0037 -0.0081 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0014 0.9991 0.2214 0.999997
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 -0.1108 0.0768 0.0032 -0.0126 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012 0.9992 0.2319 0.999998
399 -0.1003 0.0681 0.0034 -0.0108 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0012 0.9991 0.2319 0.999997
400 -0.0972 0.0655 0.0034 -0.0103 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0013 0.9991 0.2319 0.999997
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1.0000 9.6792 -9.4256 -0.6023 2.2721 0.0084 0.0018 0.3583 -0.1046 0.2205 0.99988
2.0000 8.7794 -8.6901 -0.5785 2.1223 0.0087 0.0017 0.3485 -0.1027 0.2210 0.99989
3.0000 10.3272 -9.9497 -0.6354 2.3792 0.0092 0.0018 0.3717 -0.1024 0.2214 0.99986
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 8.5682 -8.4447 -0.6632 2.0752 0.0123 0.0016 0.3855 -0.1017 0.2319 0.99993
399 8.7976 -8.6271 -0.6809 2.1114 0.0120 0.0017 0.3930 -0.1025 0.2319 0.99993
400 8.7089 -8.5561 -0.6756 2.0973 0.0120 0.0016 0.3908 -0.1025 0.2319 0.99993
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Table 2.B.3: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gm, zt = zg
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1345 0.9176 -0.0016 0.0115 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
2 0.1348 0.9173 -0.0016 0.0115 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
3 0.1351 0.9170 -0.0016 0.0116 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 0.1311 0.9203 -0.0015 0.0109 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1326 0.9190 -0.0015 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0008 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1327 0.9189 -0.0015 0.0112 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0008 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0470 0.0224 0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0009 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
2 -0.0506 0.0253 0.0029 -0.0017 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
3 -0.0523 0.0267 0.0029 -0.0020 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 -0.0520 0.0265 0.0029 -0.0019 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
399 -0.0497 0.0247 0.0027 -0.0016 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0009 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
400 -0.0537 0.0279 0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 11.6816 -10.9556 -0.8705 2.5939 0.0122 0.0018 0.4589 -0.0846 0.2319 0.99984
2 11.6892 -10.9601 -0.8751 2.5946 0.0120 0.0019 0.4607 -0.0855 0.2319 0.99983
3 11.8277 -11.0691 -0.8836 2.6160 0.0123 0.0019 0.4641 -0.0857 0.2319 0.99983
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 10.4730 -9.9769 -0.7954 2.3957 0.0125 0.0015 0.4283 -0.0848 0.2319 0.99992
399 10.3018 -9.8403 -0.7797 2.3687 0.0122 0.0015 0.4220 -0.0855 0.2319 0.99993
400 9.9651 -9.5653 -0.7746 2.3124 0.0121 0.0015 0.4199 -0.0853 0.2319 0.99993
Table 2.B.4: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gm, zt = zb
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1072 0.9322 -0.0015 0.0091 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
2 0.1071 0.9324 -0.0015 0.0091 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
3 0.1077 0.9319 -0.0015 0.0092 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 0.1003 0.9379 -0.0013 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1018 0.9367 -0.0014 0.0082 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1001 0.9381 -0.0014 0.0079 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0976 0.0660 0.0030 -0.0104 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0011 0.9991 0.2319 0.999998
2 -0.0829 0.0538 0.0028 -0.0079 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9991 0.2319 0.999998
3 -0.0868 0.0570 0.0029 -0.0085 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0011 0.9991 0.2319 0.999998
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 -0.0944 0.0633 0.0031 -0.0098 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0011 0.9992 0.2319 0.999998
399 -0.0977 0.0662 0.0028 -0.0105 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9991 0.2319 0.999998
400 -0.0957 0.0645 0.0028 -0.0101 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0010 0.9992 0.2319 0.999998
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 11.1724 -10.5413 -0.8306 2.4971 0.0106 0.0026 0.4544 -0.1022 0.2319 0.99983
2 10.4475 -9.9508 -0.8006 2.3768 0.0101 0.0026 0.4424 -0.1020 0.2319 0.99986
3 10.9516 -10.3594 -0.8225 2.4595 0.0103 0.0026 0.4514 -0.1017 0.2319 0.99985
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 9.2879 -9.0151 -0.7167 2.1881 0.0112 0.0021 0.4077 -0.1022 0.2319 0.99993
399 9.7104 -9.3685 -0.7219 2.2617 0.0113 0.0020 0.4100 -0.1005 0.2319 0.99992
400 9.6848 -9.3502 -0.7156 2.2586 0.0113 0.0020 0.4074 -0.1008 0.2319 0.99992
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Table 2.B.5: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gh, zt = zg
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1279 0.9219 -0.0015 0.0107 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2433 0.999999
2 0.1296 0.9206 -0.0016 0.0110 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2429 0.999999
3 0.1272 0.9226 -0.0015 0.0106 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0007 0.2424 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 0.1408 0.9124 -0.0019 0.0125 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0007 0.0008 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1454 0.9086 -0.0019 0.0133 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 0.0008 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1372 0.9153 -0.0017 0.0119 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0008 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0416 0.0179 0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0009 0.9975 0.2433 0.999999
2 -0.0341 0.0119 0.0024 0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0008 0.9975 0.2429 0.999999
3 -0.0472 0.0227 0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0008 0.9975 0.2424 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 -0.0451 0.0209 0.0026 -0.0008 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0009 0.9975 0.2319 0.999999
399 -0.0376 0.0148 0.0024 0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0008 0.9974 0.2319 0.999999
400 -0.0393 0.0161 0.0025 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0008 0.9974 0.2319 0.999999
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 17.8423 -15.8786 -1.2955 3.5942 0.0142 0.0032 0.6363 -0.0752 0.2433 0.99960
2 17.5167 -15.6076 -1.2901 3.5373 0.0147 0.0030 0.6337 -0.0768 0.2429 0.99962
3 16.0065 -14.3765 -1.2447 3.2855 0.0146 0.0029 0.6151 -0.0760 0.2424 0.99966
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 10.0928 -9.6530 -0.8079 2.3267 0.0132 0.0014 0.4329 -0.0827 0.2319 0.99993
399 10.5458 -10.0150 -0.8425 2.3989 0.0144 0.0012 0.4466 -0.0823 0.2319 0.99993
400 10.7527 -10.1863 -0.8392 2.4344 0.0134 0.0014 0.4457 -0.0824 0.2319 0.99993
Table 2.B.6: Transition-path equilibrium: starting from G1 = Gh, zt = zb
t a0,t a1,t a2,t a3,t a4,t a5,t a6,t a7,t G values R2
1 0.1020 0.9355 -0.0014 0.0085 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2433 0.999999
2 0.1025 0.9351 -0.0014 0.0086 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2429 0.999999
3 0.1020 0.9355 -0.0014 0.0085 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0005 0.0009 0.2424 0.999999
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 0.1131 0.9274 -0.0016 0.0101 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0010 0.2319 0.999999
399 0.1134 0.9271 -0.0017 0.0101 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0006 0.0011 0.2319 0.999999
400 0.1193 0.9223 -0.0019 0.0111 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0007 0.0011 0.2319 0.999999
a˜0,t a˜1,t a˜2,t a˜3,t a˜4,t a˜5,t a˜6,t a˜7,t G values R2
1 -0.0671 0.0408 0.0024 -0.0052 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0009 0.9991 0.2433 0.999998
2 -0.0875 0.0576 0.0029 -0.0087 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9991 0.2429 0.999998
3 -0.0912 0.0605 0.0032 -0.0092 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0012 0.9992 0.2424 0.999998
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 -0.0876 0.0576 0.0028 -0.0086 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0010 0.9992 0.2319 0.999998
399 -0.0987 0.0669 0.0027 -0.0106 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0009 0.9991 0.2319 0.999998
400 -0.0983 0.0666 0.0025 -0.0105 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0009 0.9991 0.2319 0.999998
b0,t b1,t b2,t b3,t b4,t b5,t b6,t b7,t G values R2
1 14.7092 -13.2959 -1.2257 3.0504 0.0144 0.0037 0.6194 -0.0944 0.2433 0.99961
2 16.4578 -14.7219 -1.2851 3.3401 0.0133 0.0040 0.6442 -0.0937 0.2429 0.99952
3 19.4670 -17.1930 -1.3600 3.8468 0.0131 0.0041 0.6750 -0.0948 0.2424 0.99945
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
388 10.2379 -9.7773 -0.7763 2.3407 0.0123 0.0019 0.4317 -0.1007 0.2319 0.99992
399 9.7252 -9.3655 -0.7442 2.2579 0.0108 0.0023 0.4191 -0.0994 0.2319 0.99992
400 9.7874 -9.4211 -0.7399 2.2703 0.0116 0.0020 0.4171 -0.0994 0.2319 0.99993
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2.B.5 Calculating the welfare gain
This appendix shows how to use the value functions from the in the transition-path
equilibrium and the two-shock equilibrium to conduct the welfare cost calculation
implicitly defined in equation (2.5.1), which we restate here for convenience:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1 + λ)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, G˜t)]. (2.5.1)
We denote the value functions from the transition-path equilibrium and the two-
shock equilibrium by V˜ and V , respectively, where
V˜ = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(c˜t, G˜t)] and V = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(ct, Gt)].
Note that the right side of (2.5.1) is exactly V˜ . Under the assumption of a log
separable utility function, the left side of (2.5.1) can be expressed as:
E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu((1 + λ)ct, Gt)] = E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtu(ct, Gt)] + E1[
∞∑
t=1
βtθ log(1 + λ)]
= θ log(1 + λ)E1[
∞∑
t=1
βt] + V.
This allows us to rewrite (2.5.1) as:
θ log(1 + λ)E1[
∞∑
t=1
βt] + V = V˜ .
Thus, λ can be calculated as follows:
λ = exp
(
V˜ − V
θE1[
∑∞
t=1 βt]
)
− 1.
Note that, since β1 is known at time 1, the value of the denominator in the
parentheses is a function of β1. The calculation of λ is straightforward using the
transition matrix governing the Markov process for β˜.
Under a non-separable utility function, we solve for λ numerically. That is, we
calculate the left side of (2.5.1) as a discounted sum of flow utilities under various
values of λ and the equilibrium policy function and then find a value of λ that satisfies
the equation, using a bisection search.
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2.C Appendix: Alternative specifications and additional ex-
periments
Quisque ullamcorper placerat ipsum. Cras nibh. Morbi vel justo vitae lacus tin-
cidunt ultrices. Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit. In hac
habitasse platea dictumst. Integer tempus convallis augue. Etiam facilisis. Nunc
elementum fermentum wisi. Aenean placerat. Ut imperdiet, enim sed gravida sollic-
itudin, felis odio placerat quam, ac pulvinar elit purus eget enim. Nunc vitae tortor.
Proin tempus nibh sit amet nisl. Vivamus quis tortor vitae risus porta vehicula.
2.C.1 λ under different model specifications
Table 2.C.1 reports the λ-measure of welfare gains under different model specifi-
cations.
Table 2.C.1: Expected welfare gains, λ (%), under different model specifications
Wealth Group
All <1% 1-5% 5-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-95% 95-99% >99%
Baseline 0.0298 0.0303 0.0307 0.0307 0.0304 0.0301 0.0290 0.0240 0.0242
Non-separable Utility Function
Substitute (ρ = 0.5) 0.0062 0.0046 0.0071 0.0082 0.0052 0.0090 0.0034 -0.0015 0.0053
Complement (ρ = 1.5) 0.1233 0.1101 0.1142 0.1196 0.1136 0.1309 0.1324 0.1233 0.1218
Different Tax Function Adjustment
Adjusting τ0 0.0295 0.0291 0.0296 0.0298 0.0295 0.0293 0.0288 0.0303 0.0347
Adjusting τ1 0.0293 0.0289 0.0295 0.0296 0.0293 0.0290 0.0287 0.0313 0.0371
Counterfactual Fiscal Regimes
Balanced Budget 0.0288 0.0306 0.0303 0.0299 0.0294 0.0291 0.0280 0.0210 0.0198
Linear Tax 0.0284 0.0277 0.0279 0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 0.0283 0.0315 0.0375
Lump-sum Tax 0.0280 0.0276 0.0276 0.0277 0.0276 0.0275 0.0279 0.0336 0.0412
Additional Experiments
Constant TFP 0.0295 0.0299 0.0303 0.0303 0.0301 0.0298 0.0288 0.0246 0.0252
Double Volatility of G -0.0282 -0.0290 -0.0293 -0.0293 -0.0288 -0.0284 -0.0272 -0.0223 -0.0225
Sudden change in G 0.0343 0.0371 0.0370 0.0363 0.0355 0.0347 0.0324 0.0237 0.0227
2.C.2 Doubling fiscal uncertainty
To implement the experiment of doubling fiscal uncertainty, we start by solving
a new two-shock equilibrium with a government purchases variance twice that in the
baseline model, while keeping the other parameter values the same as in the baseline
calibration. We use the Rouwenhorst method to discretize the counterfactual AR(1)
process and to obtain a new grid for G (Gnewl , G
new
m , G
new
h ) =((1 − mnew)Gm, Gm,
(1 +mnew)Gm), with the same transition probability matrix as in the baseline model.
We then start from the ergodic distribution of the original two-shock equilibrium
and let the economy gradually transit to the new two-shock equilibrium as follows:
at t = 1, after a particular G-state is realized from the old grid, (Gl, Gm, Gh), the
households in the economy learn that, from the next period on (t ≥ 2), the G-states
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will evolve according to a different process, with the same transition probabilities, but
with new period-t grid values that are conditional on the period-1 state, G1, as (G
new
l ,
Gnewm , G
new
h ) +G
adj
t,G1
. Gadjt,G1 is an adjustment term that makes the period-t conditional
mean as of t = 1 equal to those of the original process.36 Mechanically, Gadjt,G1 is zero
for all t when G1 = Gm, and positive (negative) and decreasing (increasing) to zero
when G1 = Gl (G1 = Gh). We plot G
adj
t,G1
in Figure 2.C.1.
Figure 2.C.1: Government purchases adjustment (Gadjt,G1)
We follow similar steps as in the baseline case to solve the model. Note that, unlike
in the baseline case, we now have an uncertain government purchases level along the
transition path in addition to the aggregate productivity shocks. However, we do not
condition on G in the transition-equilibrium laws of motions. Instead, we incorporate
G as a continuous variable in HΓt+1 and St+1, and pool the regressions for the laws
of motion for t = 1, 2, . . . , 30. Note that we do condition the laws of motion on the
period-1 value of government purchases (G1). We find that the following (relatively
36Note that this adjustment term isolates the effect of a change in fiscal uncertainty without a
sudden level adjustment.
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parsimonious) functional forms perform well:
log(K ′t+1) =a0,t(zt, G1) + a1,t(zt, G1)log(Kt) + a2,t(zt, G1)Bt + a3,t(zt, G1)Gini(at)
+ a4,t(zt, G1)B
5
t + a5,t(zt, G1)G
2
t + a6,t(zt, G1)B
5
tG
2
t ,
Gini(a′t+1) =a˜0,t(zt, G1) + a˜1,t(zt, G1)log(Kt) + a˜2,t(zt, G1)Bt + a˜3,t(zt, G1)Gini(at)
+ a˜4,t(zt, G1)B
5
t + a˜5,t(zt, G1)G
2
t + a˜6,t(zt, G1)B
5
tG
2
t ,
log(st) =b0,t(zt, G1) + b1,t(zt, G1)log(Kt) + b2,t(zt, G1)Bt + b3,t(zt, G1)Gini(at)
+ b4,t(zt, G1)B
2
t + b5,t(zt, G1)G
2
t + b6,t(zt, G1)B
5
tG
2
t .
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CHAPTER 3
Optimal Trade Costs after Sovereign Defaults
Coauthored with Chenyue Hu
This paper offers new theoretical and empirical insights into the effect of
sovereign defaults on trade. We contend that sovereign debt renegotia-
tion is associated not with trade sanction but with trade benefit between
debtor countries and creditor countries. We find empirical support for
the argument from the changes in trade share after debt renegotiations
as well as the Aid-for-trade statistics. We build a two-country DSGE
model with incomplete financial market to explain why trade sanction is
not observed. We reason that creditors lower trade costs with debtors
in hopes of collecting the remaining debt during debt renegotiations.
The adjustment in turn affects debtors’ default decisions. The model
departs from the existing literature on sovereign defaults by building on
the strategic interaction between debtors and creditors. We solve the
model numerically to determine the optimal trade costs given different
combinations of debt and income levels.
3.1 Introduction
The danger of default exists with every financial loan, and sovereign debt is no ex-
ception. Holders of sovereign debt face additional uncertainty stemming from the lack
of supernational legal entities. The recent debt crises in Europe and Latin America
have demonstrated the need to study both creditors’ and debtors’ incentives and deci-
sions in the initiation, negotiation and settlement process of sovereign debt contracts.
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion by focusing on a novel mechanism
that has been overlooked in previous work.
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Globalization since the second half the twentieth century has featured both trade
liberalization and financial mobility across borders. The two channels should not be
studied in isolation, as both are important sources of individual countries’ economic
development as well as world risk sharing. As Tomz and Wright (2013) point out,
theoretical models are missing while empirical evidence is ambiguous over how trade
and sovereign default interact. Our paper addresses this gap in the literature by
providing new empirical and theoretical results that bring together the trade and
borrowing channels to explain sovereign default settlement.
Trade, in previous literature on sovereign default, has played a trivial if any role.
For instance, Bulow and Rogoff (1989) argue default may lead to a decline in inter-
national trade, which is interpreted as a constant output loss in their model. Their
approach is followed in the majority of sovereign default papers including Aguiar and
Gopinath (2006), Yue (2010) , Bai and Zhang (2010), to name just a few. Tomz and
Wright (2013) summarize three reasons why trade could suffer after default happens:
(1) creditors’ trade restrictions as a means of punishment (a.k.a. trade sanction), (2)
the collapse of trade credit, and (3) creditors’ asset seizures. None of these reasons
can be captured by direct output loss, let alone the strategic behaviors that arise from
these features. Instead, our paper will focus on how trade costs may change before
and after sovereign default.
Rose (2005) explains empirically the cost of trade after sovereign default. Using
government-to-government debt default information from the Paris Club, he finds
that debt renegotiation has significantly negative effects on contemporaneous and
lagged trade volume in a gravity regression. We find his results inspiring and intrigu-
ing but not fully explored. Trade volume will naturally fall with the deterioration of
economic terms, which may not be fully picked up by their gravity variables. It is the
relative share instead of the absolute value of trade that measures the existence and
severity of punishment in the bilateral borrowing relationship. We replicate Rose’s
analysis on an expanded dataset that includes fifteen additional years. Similar to
Rose (2005) we find trade volume falls, but we also find that trade share increases
significantly (by around 5%) after debt renegotiation happens. This is a surprising
result that runs contrary to the traditional trade sanction arguments.
The finding is robust to the inclusion of exchange rates in the regressions, which
implies that the positive trade effect is not driven by currency depreciation that often
accompanies sovereign defaults. At the same time, the conclusion still holds when
we control for bilateral trade elasticity, eliminating the compositional effect of con-
sumption goods as the reason for the change in trade share. Novy (2013) argues that
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trade share can be used to infer time-varying bilateral trade costs directly from the
model’s gravity equation without imposing arbitrary trade cost functions. Based on
all the argument above, we hypothesize trade costs change as a creditor’s reaction to
debt renegotiation. As there lacks comprehensive and consistent data on direct mea-
surement of trade costs, we resort to OECD’s data on aid for trade and find there is
noticeable increase in trade-related assistance from creditors when debt renegotiation
happens. This is complementary evidence for lower trade costs after defaults.
Our findings lead us to rethink the creditors’ incentives: why would creditors be
willing to lower their trade costs with defaulters? In practice, before a default reaches
its final resolution, there is a renegotiation stage where the creditor and the debtor
could agree on debt settlement based on the current income of the debtor and the size
of the debt. Our hypothesis is that in the renegotiation stage, it is sometimes optimal
for the creditor to lower trade costs so that the debtor is more likely to service the
debt.
We build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to develop our hypothe-
sis. Our model differs from a standard sovereign default model in the following ways.
First, it is a two-country model instead of a small open economy. Additionally, be-
cause we are interested in whether the model’s prediction of trade share can match
our empirical finding, we will study a creditor-debtor two-country model integrated
with a world market. Second, our model includes a trade component. The consump-
tion bundle in a country consists of domestic goods, financial partner’s (whether it
be creditor or debtor) goods, and goods from the world market, with an elasticity
of substitution among them. Third, creditors are risk averse. Creditors in most
sovereign default models are risk-neutral and perfectly competitive for tractability
reasons. Bond prices are directly linked to the world interest rate once the probabil-
ity of default is computed. The assumption will be relaxed in our model as we assume
a concave utility function. We are able to get a market-clearing bond price under the
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) assumption.
In our story, the amount creditors hope to collect from debtors induces the adjust-
ment of bilateral trade costs. At the same time, the change in trade benefit affects
debtors’ probability to service the debt. At the end of the day, default probability,
bond prices and optimal trade costs can all be endogenously derived as the solution
to the general equilibrium model. Trade and debt channels are more correlated and
interactive in our model than in any previous work, and can explain our novel empir-
ical finding.
Our contribution is three-fold. First, we identify an interesting but overlooked
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phenomenon through our empirical analysis, which calls the widely-accepted trade
sanction argument into question. Second, we propose a new mechanism which links
bilateral trade and bilateral borrowing. Third, we develop computation techniques
that allow us to numerically solve a sovereign default model with more realistic fea-
tures, such as risk-averse creditors.
In our new approach, we have maintained several important features from pre-
vious work. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) proposed financial autarky as a means to
support debtors’ incentive to repay the debt. In our model, defaulters are also denied
access to new loans. Our paper is also related to the recent work of Gu (2015) but
with a different focus. She introduces vertical integration into the bilateral trade
relationship between a creditor and a debtor while examining the dynamics of terms
of trade and trade volumes, while our work aims to provide an answer to the optimal
trade cost a creditor imposes on a debtor after debt renegotiation takes place. In
terms of empirical analysis, our paper is in line with Martinez and Sandleris (2011)
who find debtors’ bilateral trade with creditor countries does not fall more than trade
with other countries. On the computation side, we follow Hatchondo et al. (2010)’s
recommendation and use cubic spline interpolation rather than discrete state space
technique to approximate the value functions to reduce computational burden.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical
findings. Section 3 describes the model as well as the properties of the recursive
equilibrium. Section 4 elaborates on the algorithm, parameterizations and numerical
results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present our findings about the effect of sovereign defaults on
trade. We are interested in the dynamics of trade share after a debt renegotiation be-
cause it is a more accurate measure of trade sanction/benefit between a creditor and
a debtor than trade volume: if there were trade sanction, creditors would dispropor-
tionably depress their trade with debtors, which would lead to lower creditor-debtor
trade share after debt renegotiation.
Following Rose (2005), we track sovereign default episodes since 1956 from the
Paris Club. It is an informal group of financial officials from 19 of some of the world’s
biggest economies, which provides financial services such as war funding, debt restruc-
turing, debt relief and debt cancellation to indebted countries and their creditors. We
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Figure 3.2.1: Debtors’ Trade Share in Creditors’ and Non-creditors’ Imports
recognize that there are diverse forms of international lending besides the debt ex-
changes between governments1 , yet the Paris Club has remained a central player in
the resolution of developing and emerging countries’ debt problems. We can track
the date, the list of creditors, the amount of debt and the terms of treatment of
sovereign debt renegotiations from the association. Another reason that we only con-
sider government-to-government bilateral agreements is that private lending does not
have so direct impact as public lending on the flow of international trade. After all,
governments are the major players to design trade policies and sign trade treaties.
Before we move to regression analysis, it is intuitive to first show the trends of
trade share graphically around sovereign default periods. In Figure 3.2.1, we plot
debtors’ share in creditors’ and non-creditors’ imports averaged over all the default
episodes. Trade share reaches its trough in the default year (denoted as zero on the
x-axis) when debtors’ economies experience hardest hit. However, it is noticeable
that debtors’ trade with creditors is able to recover sooner and better than that with
non-creditors: while the trade share in non-creditors’ imports is lower than the level
before defaults, the trade share in creditor’s imports bounces back and even higher
than the level before defaults.
I herein use a panel regression to quantify the effect of sovereign defaults on trade.
The first step we take is to replicate Rose (2005)’s results with extended data till 2012.
1Besides government to government bilateral debt under the Paris Club umbrella, debtor countries
also issue commercial bank debt under the London Club, or issue bond debt. For detailed elaboration
and comparison of different forms of sovereign debts, see Das et al. (2012).
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The original gravity model of Rose is
ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1ln(YiYj)t + β2ln(YiYj/PopiPopj)t + β3lnDij + β4Langij
+β5Contij + β6FTAijt + β7Landlij + β8Islandij + β9ln(AreaiAreaj)
+β10ComColij + β11CurColijt + β12Colonyij + β13ComNatij + β14CUijt
+β15,0IMFijt +
∑
k
β15,kIMFijt−k + φRENEGijt +
∑
m
φmRENEGijt−m + ijt
Xijt is the trade flow between country i and j at time t. Y denotes real GDP
and Pop denotes population, so that Y/Pop is income per capita. Dij represents
the distance between i and j and Area represents a country’s land mass. Binary
variables include Lang (common language), Cont (common border), FTA (regional
trade agreement), ComCol (common colonizer after 1945), CurCol (colonies at time
t), ComNat (part of the same nation at time t) and CU (same currency). Landl and
Island are the numbers of landlocked and island countries in the country pair, which
take the value of 0,1, or 2. RENEGijt is a binary variable which is unity if i and
j renegotiated international debt at time t and zero otherwise, meanwhile IMFijt is
one/two if one/both of i or/and j began an IMF program at t and zero otherwise.
Lagged RENEG and lagged IMF are also listed as explanatory variables, consider-
ing the change of trade flow is a gradual and persistent process.
Our first goal is to extend Rose’s data by 15 years to reflect the recent trend of
sovereign defaults. In collecting the data, we do our best to choose similar, if not the
same data sources as Rose, in order to make the results consistent and comparable.
We get the trade data from the ‘Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS)’ dataset by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The values are in current US dollars, so
we deflate them by the US CPI (82-84=100) from BLS. GDP and population data
are taken from World Bank’s ‘World Development Indicator’. In the case of missing
values, we turn to Penn World Table. Values of other common variables for a gravity
model including distance, contiguity, language and colonization are available in the
CEPII dataset2. The information about regional trade agreements is updated with
the records from the World Trade Organization. Lastly, we get the list for the IMF
programs from Axel Dreher. See Table 5 in Appendix for detailed categories.
The results on trade volumes we get are similar to Rose’s, in both sign and mag-
2It is a square gravity dataset for all pairs of countries, downloadable at http://econ.sciences-
po.fr/thierry-mayer
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nitude of the estimated coefficients. Table 1 lists the estimates in fixed-effect and
random-effect model with contemporaneous and fifteen lags of the dummy variable
for debt renegotiation. In all the cases (i.e. bilateral trade, trade from debtor to
creditor (denoted as country1to2), and trade from creditor to debtor (country2to1)),
the linearly-combined coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged debt renegotiation
—
∑15
t=1 RENEG — are all negative, whether we employ a fixed-effect or random-
effect model. This result indicates that bilateral trade volumes between a creditor
and a debtor decrease after a sovereign default.
Table 3.2.1: Linearly Combined Contemporaneous and Lagged Effects of Debt Rene-
gotiation on Trade Volumes
Coefficient Std. Err. t [95 percent Conf. Interval]
bilateral FE -1.098 0.118 -9.300 -1.329 -0.867
bilateral RE -1.608 0.119 -13.490 -1.842 -1.375
trade 1to2 FE -1.416 0.150 -9.460 -1.710 -1.123
trade 1to2 RE -2.177 0.151 -14.410 -2.473 -1.881
trade 2to1 FE -1.426 0.144 -9.930 -1.708 -1.145
trade 2to1 RE -1.891 0.144 -13.090 -2.174 -1.608
After replicating Rose’s original results, we go a step further to analyze trade
share. We believe it is the relative but not the absolute change in trade that reflects
the existence and severity of trade sanction after defaults take place. To this end,
we create two variables Impw1to2 and Impw2to1 to measure 1) of all a debtor’s im-
ports, how much comes from its creditor, and 2) of all a creditor’s imports, how much
comes from its debtor. Then we replace trade volumes with these two measures as
the dependent variable in the regression.
We deal with two caveats when we analyze trade share. First, we add exchange
rates as an independent variable as currency depreciation may bias the results. For
instance, the collapse of South America during the 1970’s debt crisis affected the
currency values of nearly all the countries in the whole region. The covariance be-
tween exchange rates across Latino countries was different from that between Latino
countries and developed countries, which mattered for the change of trade share. To
correct this bias, we collect data of exchange rates starting from 1948 from the Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS). The original data are in the units of currency per
US dollars, which can be converted to obtain the relative exchange rates between two
arbitrary currencies under the no-arbitrage condition in the foreign exchange market.
Second, we need to control for bilateral trade elasticity for fear that the change in
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trade share is simply driven by the composition effect given different trade baskets
among countries. Elasticity is estimated with the equation
log tradeij,t = α0 + α1log GDPi,t + α2log GDPj,t +
m∑
t=0
log tradeij,t−m
Table 3.2.2: Linearly Combined Effects of Debt Renegotiation on Trade Share
Coefficient Std. Err. t p > |t| [95 percent Conf. Interval]
share 2in1 0.0590 0.0048 12.2000 0.0000 0.0495 0.0684
share 1in2 0.0628 0.0047 13.4600 0.0000 0.0537 0.0720
Table 2 lists the regression results in the fixed-effect model. We present the coeffi-
cient and the standard error of
∑15
t=1RENEG , the linear combination of coefficients
on paris,paris1-15. It is a good measure of the effects of sovereign defaults on trade.
From the table, debt renegotiation has significantly positive effect on trade share.
The coefficients on default variables are not only significant but also remarkable in
magnitude. For instance, a sovereign default is associated with a 5% increase of
debtors’ share in creditors’ trade. The increase is impressive, given the number of
trade partners available nowadays in the integrated world market. We believe the
increase in trade share indicates that sovereign defaults do not lead to trade sanction,
but are instead associated with trade benefit.
Trade share has been used by the economists at the World Bank to uncover trade
costs. The approach was developed by Head and Ries (2001) and extended by Novy
(2013), who derived a micro-founded measure of bilateral trade costs that indirectly
infers trade frictions from observable trade data. The measure turns out to be con-
sistent with a broad range of leading trade theories including Ricardian and het-
erogeneous firms models. The bilateral comprehensive trade costs are calculated as
follows
τij = (
XiiXjj
XijXji
)
1
2(σ−1) − 1
where τij represents the geometric average of trade costs between countries i and j
relative to domestic trade costs within each country. Its value means that trading
goods between i and j involves, on average for all tradable goods, additional costs
amounting to approximately τij of the value of goods — as compared to when the
two countries trade these goods within their borders. It covers tariffs, transportation
costs, and other unobservable trade barriers. Xij, Xji denote trade between i and j,
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Xii, Xjj denote domestic expenditure.
With a little math, it is easy to see an increase in trade share is equivalent to a
decrease in trade cost. Thus, we hypothesize that trade costs between a creditor and
a debtor are lower after default happens.
While our argument will be much stronger if we can support our hypothesis with
a consistent and continuous data set of visible and invisible trade costs, such data
set is rare.3 Alternatively, we turn to case studies with OECD’s aid for trade dataset
to see whether the efforts to boost bilateral trade are strengthened when debt rene-
gotiation happens. For the purpose of the paper, we restrict our attention to the
categories of aid which are directly related to trade policy adjustment (See Table 7
for details). Figure 3.A.1 plots the change in aid (only for trade policy purposes)
around the default period for the following three cases: Honduras in 2004, Congo
in 2008 and Burundi in 2009. In the years of sovereign defaults, creditors double or
triple their expense in trade-related aid to help defaulters out. They are generous with
trade benefit instead of strict with harsh trade punishment. The case studies serve as
indirect evidence for our hypothesis that creditors lower their trade costs with debtors.
In a nutshell, sovereign renegotiation is associated with increased bilateral trade
share between debtors and creditors. This empirical result, in line with Martinez and
Sandleris (2011), contradicts the prediction of the trade sanction theory of sovereign
debt. Based on Novy (2013)’s trade costs theory and aid-for-trade data, we believe
bilateral trade costs decrease after debt renegotiation.
3.3 Model
In the previous section, we challenge the conventional trade sanction theory of
sovereign default. Our explanation for this interesting observation is that a creditor
is willing to compromise in the trade channel in order to minimize its loss from the
financial side. In another word, when the creditor finds the debtor on the brink of
defaulting, it is willing to lower trade costs to boost the debtor’s exports such that
the debtor is more probable to service the debt. The reduced trade costs will in turn
determine a debtor’s willingness to repay. The strategic interaction between the two
parties are solved in the Markov perfect equilibrium of our model.
3Bilateral tariff and non-tariff data from the World Bank’s WITS is discontinuous and available
only for the past decade. Trade costs in our paper are broader in definition, so it is hard to find
direct comprehensive evidence.
131
3.3.1 Model Environment
There are three countries: a creditor, a debtor and the rest of the world (ROW).
Although commonly used for sovereign default problems, a model with a small open
economy is not able to capture the strategic interaction between a creditor and a
debtor. Meanwhile, a standard two-country model is not helpful in studying the
trend of trade share after sovereign defaults. To this end, we will build a creditor-
debtor two-country model integrated with a world market (or ROW).
There are two countries in the model, i = c, d (c denotes the creditor and d denotes
the debtor). Each country is an endowment economy with a country-specific good.
For simplicity, we assume the income of the creditor A¯ in each period is constant and
large enough for the country to always be the lender. On the other hand, the income
of the debtor follows an AR(1) process
yt = ρyyt−1 + (1− ρy)y¯ + t
where t ∼ N(0, σ2i ) and y¯ is the long run mean of yt.
Other than the two countries, there is a world goods market that both countries
can interact with. Specifically, our world market consists of two parts — world
financial market and world final goods market. In the world financial market, there
is a risk free asset called world bond with rate r. The world goods market supplies
one kind of consumption good cw. To simplify the price and quantity of the world
goods, we assume ciw = cwi which indicates the world goods can always be traded
one-for-one for domestic goods.
Country i’s objective is to maximize the expected lifetime utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
C1−γi,t
1− γ
where utility takes the form of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) from consump-
tion
Ci,t = [θiic
ρ
ii,t + θijc
ρ
ij,t + (1− θii − θij)cρiw,t]
1
ρ
The consumption composite of country i consists of domestic goods (cii), foreign
goods (cij) and world goods (ciw) with elasticity of substitution
1
1−ρ . For simplicity,
we assume preference is symmetric across countries θii = θii = θh and θij = θji = θf .
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The market clearing condition of goods i states that
cii + cji + cwi = yi
Let pii represent the price of goods i in its source country. There is a trade cost
τij > 1 imposed by country i on goods coming from country j, reflecting trade restric-
tions like tariff. Thus, the effective price of imports from country j to country i is
pij = τijpjj. As we are mainly interested in the impact of the creditor’s trade policies
on the debtor’s default decisions, we assume τdc ≡ 1. An implication of this assump-
tion is that there is no trade retaliation or reciprocity from the debtor’s side. On
the other hand, the creditor has some flexibility in adjusting trade costs τcd,∈ [τ , τ ].
Tariff also becomes part of the creditor’s income for the model to yield a non-corner
solution to τcd. As we will show later, τcd is a crucial policy instrument that affects
not only bilateral trade but also bilateral debt. The trade costs between a country
and the rest of the world are set equal to zero for simplicity: τiw = τwi = 1, i = {c, d}.
The debtor issues one-period risky bonds to the creditor. The bond market fea-
tures limited enforcement in that the debtor can default on its debt. Two default
states (S0, S1) coexist in the debt problem:
State 0 (S0): The debtor repays the bilateral debt previously and retains financial
ties with the creditor.
State 1 (S1): The debtor defaults previously and is stuck in financial autarky.
In S0, the debtor chooses from two default options (D ∈ {D0, D1}). It either
services the debt (D0) and stays in S0, or defaults (D1) and downgrades to financial
autarky in the next period. In S1, it no longer issues debt and consumes its endow-
ment.
The timeline of the model is summarized in Figure 2. At the beginning of period
t, the debtor can issue risky bond b to the creditor if it is in S0. The creditor lends
money, chooses risk-free asset bc from the world financial market and sets trade cost
τ . When the one-period bond matures at t + 1, the debtor observes the realization
of its current endowment and chooses either to repay the debt so as to stay in S0, or
to default and move to S1. Meanwhile the creditor sets τ
′ based on state variables
b, bc and y. If the debtor defaults previously, it is in financial autarky (S1). Following
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), there is an exogenous probability λ for the debtor in S1
to regain access to borrowing.
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Figure 3.3.1: Timeline
3.3.2 Recursive Equilibrium
State space in the model consists of default state s ∈ S = {S0, S1} and a set of
fundamental macroeconomic variables including the debtor’s income, bilateral bond
and the creditor’s wealth w. Denote the set as x = (y, b, w) ∈ X. Agents’ value
functions and decision rules will depend on S ×X. In this section, we solve for the
creditor’s and the debtor’s problem and define the equilibrium of the model.
3.3.2.1 Debtor’s Problem
In S0, the debtor enters a period with b and observes the endowment realization y.
If it chooses not to default, it issues a new bond b′ at the price q(y, b′, w) (denominated
in the debtor’s goods price). If it chooses to default, its debt b is written off but it
moves to financial autarky at the beginning of next period. Denote the value function
of a debtor who has not previously defaulted by Vd(S0, y, b, w).
Vd(S0, y, b, w) = max{W0(y, b, w),W1(y, b, w)}
where W0(y, b, w) is the welfare by choosing D0 and W1(y, b, w) is the welfare by
choosing D1. A debtor makes its default decision upon the comparison of the two
welfare levels
Ds = argmax
s
Ws(y, b, w), s = {0, 1}
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More specifically, W0(y, b, w) can be expressed as
W0(y, b, w) = max
Cd,≥0,b′
U(Cd) + βE[Vd(S0, y
′, b′, w′)|y]
subject to
Cd + q(y, b
′, w)b′ ≤ y + b
Notice that everything is denominated in debtor country’s domestic good. Thus, the
debtor’s total expenditure on consumption is
Cd =
cddpdd + cdcpcc + cdwpdw
pdd
From now on, we normalize pdd to be one and define
pcc
pdd
≡ p. Thus, Cd = cdd + cdcp+
cdw. We also discipline the level of bonds with the financial constraint following
Aiyagari (1994)
b′ ≥ − y¯
r
where r is calibrated to the world interest rate. As long as the debtor does not borrow
b′ > 0, it saves the money in the world financial market at rate qf = 11+r .
Similarly, W1(y, b, bc) the welfare of choosing D1 follows
W1(y, b, w) = max
Cd≥0
U(Cd) + βE[Vd(S1, y
′, 0, w′)|y]
subject to
Cd ≤ y
A country in S1 is in financial autarky, but it has exogenous probability λ of
returning to S0 in the next period. Hence, its value function becomes
Vd(S1, y, 0, w) = max
Cd≥0
U(Cd) + β(λE[Vd(S0, y
′, 0, w′)|y] + (1− λ)E[Vd(S1, y′, 0, w)|y]
subject to
Cd ≤ y
3.3.2.2 Creditor’s Problem
In this paper, we assume the creditor does not face any income uncertainty for
simplicity. Its endowment level (yc = A¯) is so high that it will always be the lender
in the bilateral debt relationship.
When the creditor deals with the debtor who hasn’t defaulted in the last period,
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its value function is
Vc(S0, y, b, w) = max
Cc,b′c≥0,τ0
U(Cc) + βE[pi00(y, b
′, w)Vc(S0, y′, b′, w′)|y
+pi01(y, b
′, w)Vc(S1, y′, b′, w′)|y]
subject to
Cc − q(a, b
′, w)b′
p
+ qfb
′
c ≤ yc −
b
p
+ bc
where
Cc =
cccp+ τcdccd + ccwp
p
pimn(y, b
′, w′) represents the debtor’s probability of going to state Sn from state Sm
conditional on y. There is a cutoff income value y∗ of the debtor that it is going to
default if and only if the realization of y is below the value. Thus, we have
pi00(y, b
′, w) = Pr(y′ > y∗|y) =
∫ y¯
y∗
f(y′|y)dy′ = 1− pi01(y, b′, w)
If the debtor is in the default state, the creditor’s value function Vc(S1, y, b, w) is
Vc(S1, y, b, w) = max
Cc,b′c≥0,τ1
U(Cc) + βE[λVc(S0, y
′, 0, w′)|y + (1− λ)Vc(S1, y′, 0, w′)|y]
subject to the budget constraint
Cc + qfb
′
c ≤ yc + bc
Financial wealth is the aggregate holding of the two bonds. Since there is possibility of
default, we need to multiply risky asset by the debtor’s repayment decision D ∈ {1, 0}
where D = 1 represents the repayment case and D = 0 represents the default case.
w = D(−b) + bc
3.3.2.3 Bond Price
The creditor can choose between two assets: a risky asset and a risk free asset.
The former is the bilateral bond at price q. The latter is the bond purchased from the
world financial market at qf =
1
1+r
. If the debtor is in the default state, the creditor’s
saving which is the difference between its income and consumption is used solely to
purchase risk-free asset bc. If the debtor has good credit history, the creditor’s saving
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is divided between b and bc. In this case, the bilateral bond price can be determined
by the creditor’s Euler equation
q
∂Vc
∂Cc
= βE
∂V ′c
∂C ′c
The right hand side is the expected marginal utility from tomorrow’s consumption,
which incorporates the default probability of the debtor. As is pointed out by Lizarazo
(2013), bond price is higher in the case where creditors are risk-averse due to the fact
that there is covariance between creditor’ consumption level and debtors’ default de-
cision.
3.3.2.4 Goods Price
p denotes the creditor’s goods price pcc relative to the debtor’s goods price pdd.
Based on the creditor’s budget constraint,
cccp+ τcdccd + ccwp
p
− q(a, b
′, w)b′
p
+ qfb
′
c = yc −
b
p
+ bc
we find p is determined jointly by debt b, wealth w and trade cost τ . In the model, the
creditor chooses optimal wealth and trade cost to maximize its utility. In this process,
it is considering the gain from both the lending channel and the trade channel. This
explains why τ may deviate from its optimal value when the two countries do not
borrow and lend to each other. The debtor anticipates the lower trade cost and
strategically makes its borrowing the default decision. This mechanism can be used
to explain why both debt level and default probability are higher than expected.
3.3.2.5 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We now proceed to define the equilibrium of the model.
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium consists of the debtor’s value function Vd(S,X),
the creditor’s value function Vc(S,X), bond holdings b
′, b′c, consumption choices Cc,
Cd, default decisions D, trade costs τ , bond pricing schedule q(y, b
′, w), and relative
goods price p, such that
1. Given the bond price q, goods price p, trade costs τcd, the creditor’s wealth
w and consumption Cc, the debtor chooses optimal Cd, D and b
′ to maximize its
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expected lifetime utility.
2. Given the debtor’s default decisions D, bond holding b′ and consumption Cd,
the creditor chooses optimal τcd, bc and Cc to maximize its expected lifetime utility.
3. Bond market clears at q and goods market clears at p.
3.4 Computation
In this two-country model, the creditor and the debtor decide interactively their
policy rules. The numerical solution to the model is found over the space of three
state variables, b the bilateral bond,w the creditor’s wealth and y the debtor’s income.
The solution to the problem is found through a combination of policy function
iteration and value function iteration. We first divide all the three state variables into
grids and compute the initial value function at each grid based on different default
states. Second, we derive interactively the optimal choice of bond holding of both
countries and the creditor’s optimal trade cost τ . In this process, we approximate the
value function by cubic spline interpolation, which is significantly more efficient and
accurate than the discrete state space technique which is commonly used for the com-
putation of sovereign default problems, as is pointed out by Hatchondo et al. (2010).
After we find optimal policy functions, we solve for the debtor’s default decision and
update its value function. We continue the iterating process until the difference be-
tween value functions in consecutive iterations is smaller than my precision criterion.
The algorithm is described in detail below.
3.4.1 Algorithm
Step 1. Discretize b, w, y and compute the corresponding consumption of the
debtor at all the grid nodes. In different default states S0, S1, calculate the utility from
consumption V 00 , V
0
1 . The initial value guess is the higher of the two V
0 = max{V 00 ,
V 01 }.
Step 2. In default state S1, solve for the creditor’s optimal choice of tariff τ1 and
bond holding bc. With τ1, calculate the price level that clears the goods market and
the resulting debtor’s value function V 11 .
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Step 3. In repayment state S0, guess an initial value of tariff τ
0
0 and calculate the
corresponding price level.
Step 4. Given the creditor’s choice, solve the debtor’s problem to get the opti-
mal borrowing in the next period b′, with which to update the best responding bond
holding b′c and τ
1
0 by maximizing the value function of the creditor.
Step 5. Continue the iterating process until τ0 converges, at which time compute
the debtor’s interpolated value function V 10 .
Step 6. Compare the debtor’s value function V 10 , V
1
1 , and find the maximum
V 1 = max{V 10 , V 11 }.
Step 7. Repeat Step 2 - Step 6, until value function converges, |V i+1 − V i| ≤ v.
3.4.2 Calibration
Parameters in the model are chosen in our best effort to match either stylized facts
or classical literature on the topic. The coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is set to 2.
Discount factor β is set to be relatively low as in Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) to speed
up convergence of solution and to get a reasonable prediction of default occurrence.
We set the elasticity of substitution between goods ρ to be 2 and the weight of
domestic/partner’s goods in consumption is θh = θf = .3 in the benchmark case.
These two parameters are important in reflecting the relative significance of bilateral
trade. We will do a numerical exercise by looking at value functions and default
decisions when varying the values of ρ. Also following Aguiar and Gopinath (2006),
we assume income in the debtor country follows an AR(1) process with coefficient of
autocorrelation ρy = .9 and standard deviation 3.4%. The advantage of choosing the
parameter values in a classic paper is that we can directly compare our results, and
highlight the contribution our model — which is the trade channel — to the existing
literature. To this end, we also temporarily set bc = 0 and focus on bilateral lending.
To start with, we assume the endowment of the creditor is twice that of the debtor
A¯ = log2. The relative economy size also comes into play in affecting the creditor’s
willingness to adjust trade costs and forgive debt.
All the parameter values are summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3.4.1: Parametrization
Parameter Description Value
β quarterly discount factor 0.80
σ coefficient of relative risk aversion 2
r international risk-free rate 0.01
λ probability autarky ends 0.1
Income process
ρy coefficient of autocorrelation in endowment of debtor 0.9
σy standard deviation of endowment shocks of debtor 0.034
y¯ average endowment level of debtor .00058
A¯ constant endowment level of creditor log2
In the benchmark case
θ weight of home/partner’s goods in consumption 0.3
ρ elasticity of substitution between goods 0.75
Table 3.4.2: Comparison across Models
Variable Description AG’s result Our result
std(c) consumption volatility 4.37 4.03
std(tb/y) trade-balance volatility .17 2.81
corr(y, c) correlation between income and consumption .99 .79
corr(y, tb) correlation between income and trade-balance -.33 -.10
avg(b/y) average debt ratio .27 .34
d% default probability .02% .48%
3.4.3 Results
3.4.3.1 Comparison with Previous Work
We first compare the performance of our model with that of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2006) (AG for short hereafter) in capturing the features of sovereign defaults. We use
150 simulation samples with 500 periods and report statistics in the Table 4. Among
all the statistics, consumption volatility and average debt ratio are similar across
models. Trade-balance volatility is much greater in my model, as the price adjusts
based on the two countries’ endowment as well as creditor’s trade costs. Correlation
between income and consumption turns out to be smaller in our model, partly due to
the additional uncertainty from price changes. We also manage to simulate counter-
cyclical trade balance, but the value is greater than that in AG since creditors adjust
trade costs to boost debtors’ exports. Lastly, both debt level and default probability
are much higher in our model. The additional trade benefits encourage debtors to
take on more debt than what they can afford.
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3.4.3.2 Trade Costs
In this part, we evaluate the adjustment of trade costs in our model. The following
two graphs represent the trend in τ in the two default states S0 and S1 given different
combinations of endowment y and debt b.
It is easy to spot the monotonic relationship between τ1 and y. When there is
no outstanding debt in S1, a debtor’s price of exports negatively comoves with its
endowment. As the elasticity of substitution between goods is below unity in the
baseline case, price adjusts in the same direction as tariff revenue. Thus it is in the
creditor’s interest to set a high trade cost when the debtor’s endowment is low. And
the optimal tariff in the default state is independent of initial debt b as the tariff does
not affect repayment probability.
In S0 with outstanding debt (which corresponds to the debt renegotiation stage
in data), the optimal tariff not only covaries with the debtor’s endowment but also
the debtor’s amount of outstanding debt. For a relatively low level of debt, when
we control for b, we find τ0 decreases in the debtor’s endowment y. This fact can be
explained by the same reasoning as in the S1 state: trade policies do not matter for
the debtor’s default decision because it is always in the debtor’s interest to service
the debt. Hence, the creditor chooses trade costs simply to maximize its revenue. We
also find in this region that controlling for the level of y, τ0 first decreases and then
increases in initial debt. This is largely due to the curvature of the interior solution
to the goods market clearing condition. We find interesting jumps in optimal tariffs
above a certain debt level. It is within this region that the debtor is on the brink
of defaulting and has non-smooth choices of b′. The shape of the surface can be ex-
plained by the following reasons. When debt is high, the debtor has higher probability
to default. To avoid the financial loss of sovereign defaults, the creditor is willing to
sacrifice in the trade channel by choosing a lower value of τ . Hence, the solution to
the optimal τ0 plummets in the region. It is worth-noting that the creditor and the
debtor are best responding to each others choices. In expectation of lower τ in S0,
the debtor is also willing to take more debt than in an ordinary setting.
Next, let us compare side by side τ0 and τ1 by fixing the initial debt level to a
high level and a low level.
In the case where initial debt is equal to zero, τ0 and τ1 are very close in value. τ0
is slightly greater since the debtor is going to borrow from the creditor in the current
period, the loss in wealth caused by lending is partially compensated by the increased
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Figure 3.4.1: Optimal Trade Costs in S0 and S1
tariff revenue. Once the level of debt goes up, τ0 is going to be significantly lower
than τ1. This is consistent with the main empirically finding of the paper: when the
debtor is on the brink of defaulting, the creditor has the incentive to lower trade costs
in order to increase repayment probability.
Figure 3.4.2: τ under different endowment
3.5 Conclusion
This paper identifies the increase in bilateral trade share between a creditor and
a debtor when sovereign default happens. The finding runs contrary to the tradi-
tional trade sanction theory. We build a model which incorporates the trade channel
in a sovereign debt problem to account for the phenomenon. The model builds on
the strategic interaction between the creditor and the debtor. By solving the model
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numerically, we are able to capture counter-cyclical trade balance and high default
probability that are closer to data than other models.
We consider extending our model in the following ways so that it reflects real-
ity better. First, we can build a production-economy model instead of endowment-
economy model. Many debtors are in need of developed countries’ support for capital
goods and investment. By introducing two sectors (consumption goods and capi-
tal goods) into the model, the two countries will be more dependent on each other.
Second, we consider introducing a partial default state into the model to reflect the
renegotiation stage in sovereign defaults better. The equilibrium will feature financial
haircut, grace period and dynamics in trade simultaneously. But the extension does
come at the cost of a higher level of computation complexity. Lastly, we can relax the
assumption of constant creditors’ income, and study the creditors’ incentives in dif-
ferent economic conditions. To sum up, there is much interesting interaction between
the trade channel and the borrowing channel. We hope future research will explore
the mechanism in depth so that we can have a better understanding of sovereign
defaults.
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3.A Appendix: Additional tables and charts
Table 3.A.1: IMF Programs
IMF SBA IMF Standby Arrangement agreed
IMF EFF IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement agreed
IMF SAF IMF Structural Adjustment Facility Arrangement agreed
IMF PRGF IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement agreed
IMF SBA 5 IMF Standby Arrangement in effect for at least 5 months
in a particular year
IMF EFF 5 IMF Extended Fund Facility Arrangement in effect
for at least 5 months in a particular year
IMF SAF 5 IMF Structural Adjustment Facility Arrangement in effect
for at least 5 months in a particular year
IMF PRGF 5 IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement in effect
for at least 5 months in a particular year
Figure 3.A.1: Aid for Trade during Sovereign Defaults
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Table 3.A.2: Effect of Debt Renegotiations on Trade Volumes
bilateral bilateral trade 1to2 trade 1to2 trade 2to1 trade 2to1
FE RE FE RE FE RE
paris -0.0115 -0.0114 0.0259 0.0124 -0.0496 -0.0459
(-0.30) (-0.32) -(0.54) (-0.25) (-1.08) (-0.99)
parisl1 -0.0438 -0.0515 -0.0432 -0.0639 -0.102* -0.106*
(-1.14) (-1.32) (-0.89) (-1.30) (-2.19) (-2.25)
parisl2 -0.0358 -0.044 -0.0194 -0.0392 -0.0832 -0.0882
(-0.92) (-1.11) (-0.39) (-0.79) (-1.76) (-1.85)
parisl3 -0.057 -0.0746 -0.0732 -0.103* -0.0705 -0.0861
(-1.45) (-1.87) (-1.48) (-2.05) (-1.48) (-1.79)
parisl4 -0.0376 -0.059 -0.0183 -0.0516 -0.0724 -0.0937
(-0.95) (-1.47) (-0.37) (-1.02) (-1.51) (-1.93)
parisl5 -0.0568 -0.0662 -0.0507 -0.0695 -0.115* -0.125*
(-1.43) (-1.64) (-1.01) (-1.36) (-2.38) (-2.56)
parisl6 0.0226 -0.00173 0.0153 -0.0228 -0.0317 -0.0539
(-0.56) (-0.04) (-0.3) (-0.44) (-0.65) (-1.10)
parisl7 -0.0389 -0.07 -0.0862 -0.134** -0.053 -0.0812
(-0.96) (-1.71) (-1.69) (-2.58) (-1.08) (-1.64)
parisl8 -0.0588 -0.0972* -0.0904 -0.148** -0.0588 -0.094
(-1.44) (-2.35) (-1.76) (-2.85) (-1.19) (-1.88)
parisl9 -0.0794 -0.112** -0.116* -0.167** -0.043 -0.0737
(-1.89) (-2.63) (-2.19) (-3.11) (-0.84) (-1.43)
parisl10 -0.109* -0.144*** -0.156** -0.209*** -0.0897 -0.122*
(-2.55) (-3.32) (-2.89) (-3.82) (-1.73) (-2.33)
parisl11 -0.136** -0.178*** -0.132* -0.192*** -0.168** -0.206***
(-3.10) (-4.00) (-2.39) (-3.43) (-3.17) (-3.84)
parisl12 -0.0615 -0.108* -0.0911 -0.158** -0.0728 -0.115*
(-1.33) (-2.31) (-1.56) (-2.67) (-1.30) (-2.04)
parisl13 -0.0779 -0.130** -0.0963 -0.166** -0.120* -0.169**
(-1.63) (-2.68) (-1.60) (-2.70) (-2.07) (-2.87)
parisl14 -0.125* -0.195*** -0.212*** -0.303*** -0.118* -0.184**
(-2.53) (-3.88) (-3.40) (-4.80) (-1.97) (-3.03)
parisl15 -0.196*** -0.277*** -0.277*** -0.378*** -0.175** -0.251***
(-3.83) (-5.34) (-4.31) (-5.80) (-2.83) (-4.01)
imf -0.128*** -0.155*** -0.201*** -0.233*** -0.144*** -0.170***
(-28.48) (-34.03) (-33.79) (-38.87) (-25.29) (-29.80)
imfl1 -0.0248*** -0.0401*** -0.0366*** -0.0552*** -0.0290*** -0.0432***
(-5.08) (-8.11) (-5.71) (-8.50) (-4.73) (-6.98)
imfl2 -0.00372 -0.0132* -0.000829 -0.0122 0.00468 -0.00298
(-0.72) (-2.53) (-0.12) (-1.79) -0.73 (-0.46)
imfl3 -0.000458 -0.0109* 0.0129 0.000624 0.00785 -0.000803
(-0.09) (-2.00) -1.85 -0.09 -1.18 (-0.12)
imfl4 0.0281*** 0.0134* 0.0425*** 0.0247*** 0.0239*** 0.0116
(-5.1) (-2.39) (-5.95) (-3.41) (-3.48) (-1.68)
imfl5 0.104*** 0.0720*** 0.147*** 0.109*** 0.125*** 0.0981***
(-19.68) (-13.48) (-21.66) (-15.77) (-19.09) (-14.9)
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custrict 0.421*** 0.398*** 0.389*** 0.387*** 0.296*** 0.325***
(-10.54) (-10.33) (-7.43) (-7.68) (-5.88) (-6.7)
ldist 0.255*** -1.334*** 0.0988 -1.556*** 0.515*** -1.438***
(-4.04) (-80.74) (-1.21) (-70.94) (-6.58) (-66.55)
lrgdp 0.332*** 0.543*** 0.216*** 0.528*** 0.487*** 0.676***
(-54.99) (-119.28) (-25.7) (-84.79) (-61.38) (-113.06)
lrgdppc 0.155*** 0.00498 0.357*** 0.102*** 0.0924*** -0.0336***
(-18.36) (-0.79) (-30.63) (-11.97) (-8.41) (-4.10)
comlang -0.0284 0.243*** 0.0850** 0.419*** -0.271*** 0.107***
(-1.27) (-12.56) (-2.81) (-16.05) (-9.51) (-4.33)
border 0.0191 0.976*** 0.0234 0.983*** -0.158 1.177***
(-0.1) (-11.27) (-0.09) (-8.63) (-0.62) (-10.44)
regional 0.295*** 0.275*** 0.291*** 0.264*** 0.321*** 0.312***
(-10.39) (-9.58) (-8.1) (-7.28) (-9.27) (-8.92)
landl 1.158*** -0.559*** 1.202*** -0.623*** 0.689*** -0.658***
(-26.48) (-27.48) (-20.6) (-22.97) (-12.35) (-24.75)
island 0.422*** 0.197*** 0.436*** 0.219*** 0.456*** 0.254***
(-20.25) (-11.84) (-15.76) (-9.9) (-16.89) (-11.74)
lareap 0.496*** 0.172*** 1.419*** 0.259*** 0.531*** 0.149***
(-5.67) (-36.3) (-12.35) (-40.79) (-4.74) (-23.9)
comcol 0.574*** 0.197*** 0.551*** 0.222*** -0.216* 0.195***
(-6.99) (-5.03) (-4.88) (-4.22) (-2.08) (-3.8)
curcol 0.348*** 0.539*** 0.374*** 0.617*** 0.644*** 0.797***
(-4.05) (-6.39) (-3.43) (-5.76) (-6.13) (-7.75)
colony 0.314** 1.408*** 0.327** 1.534*** 0.261* 1.368***
(-3.23) (-18.2) (-2.66) (-15.43) (-2.21) (-14.21)
comctry -0.701*** -1.077*** -0.670*** -1.132*** -0.776*** -1.146***
(-12.23) (-19.33) (-9.24) (-16.06) (-11.11) (-16.93)
cons -18.87*** -6.088*** -37.82*** -7.988*** -28.41*** -11.06***
(-8.99) (-33.77) (-13.72) (-33.16) (-10.59) (-47.02)
t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%, * significant at 1%, * significant at 1%
Country 1 denotes a debtor; country 2 denotes a creditor.
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Table 3.A.3: Trade Policy, Regulations and Trade-Related Adjustment
CRS Code Description Clarifications / Additional notes on coverage
33110 Trade policy and administrative
management
Trade policy and planning; support to ministries and departments responsible
for trade policy; trade-related legislation and regulatory reforms; policy analysis
and implementation of multilateral trade agreements e.g. technical barriers to
trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (TBT/SPS) except at regional
level (see 33130); mainstreaming trade in national development strategies (e.g.
poverty reduction strategy papers); wholesale/retail trade; unspecified trade
and trade promotion activities.
33120 Trade facilitation Simplification and harmonisation of international import and export procedures
(e.g. customs valuation, licensing procedures, transport formalities, payments,
insurance); support to customs departments; tariff reforms.
33130 Regional trade agreements
(RTAs)
Support to regional trade arrangements [e.g. Southern African Development
Community (SADC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), African Caribbean Pacific/European
Union (ACP/EU)], including work on technical barriers to trade and sanitary
and phytosanitary measures (TBT/SPS) at regional level; elaboration of rules
of origin and introduction of special and differential treatment in RTAs.
33140 Multilateral trade negotiations Support developing countries effective participation in multilateral trade nego-
tiations, including training of negotiators, assessing impacts of negotiations; ac-
cession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other multilateral trade-
related organisations.
33150 Trade-related adjustment Contributions to the government budget to assist the implementation of re-
cipients own trade reforms and adjustments to trade policy measures by other
countries; assistance to manage shortfalls in the balance of payments due to
changes in the world trading environment.
Source: OECD Aid for Trade
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